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PREFACE 
In the fall of 1967, I attended Schiller College in Kleininger-
sheim, Germany. The school was located high above the Neckar in a 
castle which had once been owned by the Radowitz family. Several years 
later, while studying the early life of Otto von Bismarck, I once again 
encountered the name Randowitz in the person of his contemporary, Joseph 
Maria von Radowitz. I became interested in his identity and role in 
German history and soon discovered that very little work had been done 
on him by American scholars. This led to further research and eventually 
to a Master's thesis. After receiving a Fulbright-Hays Grant to study at 
Johann von Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany, I continued my re-
search on Radowitz in the Goethe University Library, the German Federal 
Archive in Frankfurt and the private holdings of the Radowitz family. 
The result of this work is this dissertation. 
Despite his relative obscurity, the importance of Radowitz in German 
history is great. His career stretched from the Napoleonic era to the 
Revolution of 1848. Through a study of his political career, one covers 
such significant issues as the organization of the German Confederation, 
the Frankfurt National Assembly and, most important, the Prussia Plan of 
Union and the conference at Olmlitz. 
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the help and 
patience of Dr. Douglas D. Hale, who was always willing to give of his 
time in order to help me complete my graduate work and this thesis. I 
would also like to thank Dr. George F. Jewsbury for his encouragement 
iii 
and understanding. Further credit is due to Dr. W. A. Owings, Dr. James 
G. Caster, Dr. Lloyd K. Mussleman, Dr. Virgil D. Medlin, and Professor 
Willis O. Sadler for urging me to enter graduate studies. I would also 
like to thank Dr. Homer L. Knight, Dr. Odie B. Faulk, Dr. John A. Syl-
vester, Dr. Norbert R. Mahnken, Dr. Alexander M. Ospovat, and Dr. LeRoy 
H. Fischer for their advice during my period of study at Oklahoma State 
University. I am also grateful to Dr. F. H. Schubert, Dr. Wilfred 
Forstmann, and the German Federal Archive in Frankfurt for their assist-
ance with my research in Germany. I owe appreciation to the Fulbright-
Hays Commission for making my work in Germany possible. Finally, I 
would like to acknowledge the help of the members of my committee, Dr. 
Bernard W. Eissenstat, Dr. Bogumil W. frenk, Dr. H. James Henderson, and 
Dr. Edward Walters. 
I also wish to express my gratitude to my mother and stepfather, 
Mr. and Mrs. Nelson N. Newman, Jr., for their constant help and support 
and to my father and stepmother for helping me begin my education. I 
would also like to thank my grandmother, Mrs. Ernest M. Black, for her 
great assistance and encourag.ement. I would like to express the debt 
owed to the Baroness Freia von Radowitz for her interest and support for 
my study. Finally, I wish to express the great amount of gratitude owed 
to my wife, Cheryl Haun Morris, for her dedicated proofreading, trans-
lation of French language documents, typing and patience. 
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In November, 1850, as Prussian troops stood face to face with a 
south German army in the small central.German state of Hesse-Kassel, it 
appeared to many that the two leading German powers were on the verge of 
war. At stake was the leadership of Germany, Prussia or Austria, and 
the fate of the Prussian Plan of Union. But before the end of the month, 
both sides had backed down, a compromise was reached and the final con-
frontation over which power would dominate Germany was postponed until 
the defeat of the Habsburg Empire by Hohenzollern troops at Ktlniggr~tz 
on July 3, 1866. Although the Hesse-Kassel crisis of 1850 did not lead 
to open war, it was still a major turning point in German history, for 
it marked the final defeat of the Revolution of 1848 and the efforts of 
Prussia to unite Germany under its leadership. The chief architect of 
these efforts was a tall, dark, mustachioed army officer named Joseph 
Maria von Radowitz. In 1850, Radowitz was at the highpoint of a career 
which had spanned one of the most important eras of German history, the 
VormYrz and the Revolution of 1848. During this period, he stood at the 
very center of German politics and was deeply influenced by the most im-
portant issues of German history during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Some consideration must be given, therefore, to the condition 
of Germany in the VormYrz, that period between the establishment of the 
German Confederation in 1815 and the Revolution of 1848, and to the 
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central problems with which Radowitz would come to be concerned. 
The single most important underlying factor in German history during 
the first half of the nineteenth century was the rising impulse toward 
the national unification of the German people. Since the Middle Ages, 
during a period when other kingdoms were.developing into modern nation-
states, the old Holy Roman Empire had been in the process of disintegra-
tion. After the conclusion of the wars of religion in the seventeenth 
century, the territory of the Empire was divided into more than 300 semi-
independent states. This process of decentralization of authority was 
accompanied by the rise of a new power, Prussia, to challenge the tra-
ditional hegemony held by the Habsburg dynasty. Under the leadership of 
such men as Frederick William the Great Elector, Frederick William I, the 
Soldier King, and Frederick the Great, Prussia rose from an insignificant 
electorate to become one of the most important kingdoms in Europe and a 
potent rival to the Habsburg ruler in Vienna. 
The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 was a major turning 
point in German history. In 1792, war broke out between the revolution-
~ry government in Paris and the German states, led by Austria. By 1799, 
Napoleon Bonaparte came to power as the leader of the French cause and 
was able to inflict a series of major defeats on his German enemies. 
After he had conquered the German states, he reorganized them into the 
Confederation of the Rhine, thereby dealing a death blow to the Holy Ro-
man Empire. In the French-dominated'Confederation, many of the smaller 
principalities and ecclesiastical states were eliminated, thus reducing 
substantially the number of independent states. Simultaneously Bavaria, 
WUrttemberg and Saxony were elevated to the level of kingdoms. In 1806, 
Napoleon completed his subjection of Germany through his defeat of 
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Prussia at the Battle of Jena. 
The defeat of Germany by the French contributed to the awakening of 
German nationalism. Such men as Heinrich von Kleist, in his plays and 
his "Catechism of the Germans," and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in his Four-
ll!m Addresses to the German Nation, helped spread the new gospel of Ger-
man patriotism to all elements of society. The reforms in Prussia under-
taken by Karl Heinrich vom und zum Stein furthered this movement. Fi-
nally, the process of driving the French out of Germany and Napoleon's 
defeat at Leipzig in 1813 added to the development of a national senti-
ment among the German people. 
At the end of the War of Liberation, the powers.of Europe assembled 
at Vienna and dealt the advocates of German unification a major disap-
pointment when they gave them not the nation-state for which they had 
fought but a loose confederation of semi-independent sovereign states. 
The German Confederation was formalized in the Federal Act signed on 
June 8, 1815. It consisted of one empire., Austria, and five kingdoms: 
Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, WUrttemberg and Hanover. One electorate, 
Hesse-Kassel, was created, as well as seven grand duchies: Baden, Hesse-
Darmstadt, Luxembourg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Saxe-
Weimar-Eisenach and Oldenburg. Ten duchies--Holstein, Brunswick, Nassau, 
Save-Gotha, Saxe-Coburg, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Hildburghausen, Anhalt-
Dessau, Anhalt-Ktlthen and Anhalt-Bernberg--,.and t.en principalities--
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Hohenzollern-Heching-
gen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Liechtenstein, Waldeck, Reuss (Older 
Line), Reuss (Younger Line), Lippe-Detmold and Schaumberg-Lippe--were 
included. Four imperial free cities--Frankfurt am Main, LUbeck, Breman 
and Hamburg--completed the list. By 1848 one county, Hesse-Homburg, had 
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joined the Confederation, and four of the Saxon duchies had been ab-
sorbed into the new states of Saxe.-Coburg-Gotha and Saxe-Altenburg. 
Anhalt-K~then and Anhalt-Dessau had also been joined to form a single 
. 1 
state. Thus, by 1848 there were thirty-six member states. 
The major policy-making body of the German Confederation was the 
Diet, which met in Frankfurt am Main. In this body· the Empire and the 
Kingdoms each had four votes. Hesse-Kassel., Hesse-Darmstadt, Hol.stein 
and Luxembourg had three. Brunswick, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Nassau 
each cast two votes, while the other German states had but one vote each. 
The King of England was a member of the Diet for Hanover, the King of 
the Netherlands for Luxembourg and the King of Denmark for Holstein. 
Austria presided over meetings of this body, which had the right to pass 
laws concerning the Confederation but only with a two-thirds majority. 
Any change in the Federal Act required unanimous consent of the member 
states. However, the Confederation had little real power, since the 
sovereign rights of the German states were so strong as to prevent any 
effective central goverrunent. The member .states had almost complete con-
trol of their own affairs and could form any alliances they wished which 
did not endanger the security of the other member states. 2 
Moreover, the Federal Diet failed to meet on a regular basis. In-
stead, the Select Council, under the presidency of the delegate from 
Austria, carried on the day-to-day business of the Confederation. All 
action required the consent of a simple majority of the membership. 
1 "Deutsche Bundesakte," in Ernst Rudolf Huber, ed., Dokumente zur 
Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (S.tutt.gart, 1961), I, pp. 75-81; Ma;--
Wilberg, Regenten-Tabellen (Graz, 1963), pp. 174-177, 200-202. 
2 
Huber, Dokumente, I, pp. 75-81. 
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Each of the larger states had one vot.e., .. .hut the smaller states were di-
vided up into curias, each of which posses.sed one vote. In 1821, the 
powers of the Council were completed .. by the. formation of a Federal Mili-
3 
tary Commission. 
This loose Confederation was a far cry from the united nation hoped 
for by so many during .the War of Liberation. Actually, it was but a 
league of states. Although the numbe.r_ .. of. Gennan states had been de-
creased from more than 300 to but thirty-nine, real German unity had not 
been achieved, and this posed a major problem, throughout the era of Rad-
owitz's activity. The unfilled desires of many Gennans was a major 
source of the agitation which dominated this period of German history. 
Through the 1830s and 1840s, the rivalry among these thirty-nine 
states prevented any meaningful cooperation. Even when the French na-
tionalists threatened an invasion in 1840 the jealous states could agree 
on a connnon defense policy only with gr.eat. difficulty. In 1848, the 
winds of revolution swept across this Confederation and led many Germans 
to demand the erection of a united nation~state to replace it. The Rev-
olution forced the German governments to allow the meeting of a German 
National Assembly in Frankfurt. This body attempted to create a united 
German Empire based firmly on a constitution. However, Frederick William 
IV, King of Prussia, did not want to become German Emperor under its 
terms and undertook to unite Germany on the basis of a revision of the 
Frankfurt Constitution. Austria refused to permit this, and finally, 
with Russian support, forced the Hohenzollern Monarch to abandon his 
version of unification. 
3Ibid.; Hajo Holborn, ~ H.istory of Modern Germany, ~-1840 (New 
York, 1968), p. 446. 
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Throughout these important years, Joseph Maria von Radowitz stood 
at the very center of German affairs. As the Prussian delegate to the 
Military Connnission of the German Confederation, he observed firsthand 
the ineffectiveness, impotence and disunity of the organization. During 
the war· scare of 1840, he realized the need for a connnon defense policy 
and fought hard to overcome . the petty particularism of the German states. 
Even before 1848, he made a concerted attempt to per.su,ade Frederick 
William IV artd Prince Clemens von Metternich of Austria to agree on 
measures to reform the structure of the Confederation. When this first 
effort toward German unification was overtaken by the outbreak of the 
Revolution, he continued his work through.the Frankfurt National Assem-
bly. After this too ended in failure, Radowitz refused to give up his 
fight and sought to unify Germany on the basis of a league of states 
headed by Prussia. 
Despite the important role played by Radowitz in German history, he 
has never been the subject of a biography in the English language. Even 
the two-volume study of Radowitz by Paul Hassel and Friedrich Meinecke 
4 
neglected many valuable sources and is now quite out of date. Thus 
there remains a need for a reexamination of all the material available 
on the activities of Radowitz and a biography in English. 
Unfortunately, historians have neglected the whole era of Rado-
witz 1 s life. From the average survey of nineteenth-century German his-
tory, the student is led to believe that from 1819 to 1848 very little 
happened. Such is not the case. One is also led to the conclusion that 
4Paul Hassel, Joseph Maria .Y£!! Radowitz, 1797-1848 (Berlin, 1905); 
Friedrich Meinecke, Radowitz und die deuts.che ~l~n (Berlin, 1913). 
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after the refusal of the Imperial Cro~n by Frederick William IV in 1849, 
the forces of darkest reaction took ove.rthe direction of German affairs, 
and the Revolution sputtered to a halt. This is manifestly untrue. In-
fluenced by Radowitz, the Prussian King continued to fight for German 
unification under a revised form of the. Frankfurt Constitution. Had this 
effort been successful, the major goals of the Frankfurt National Assem-
bly would have become realities and .unification might well have arrived 
a generation earlier and under quite different conditions than those in 
1871. But a combination of reactionary pressure and Austrian and Prus-
sian protests in the fall of 1850 forced him to abandon this effort. On 
November 29, 1850, the two German powers signed the Treaty of OlmUtz, 
which marked the end of the Prussian efforts to unite Germany. Histor-
. . 5 
ians have labeled this agreement a "Punctuation," or a "Humiliation." 
Here again a study of the facts does not support this interpretation. 
Historians have often unjustly pictured Radowitz as a reactionary 
6 
or an unrealistic romantic. Radowitz was indeed conservative in his 
politics but at the same time realistic enough to perceive the faults of 
the old order and to work to correct them. He knew that the demands of 
the German people for unification and constitutional government had to 
be met,. or the radicals would gain thei.r .support. He attempted to find 
a middle-of-the-road solution to the German problem that would satisfy 
the more moderate liberals while preserving the position of the monarchs 
5Typical statements of the "humiliation" thesis can be found in 
William Carr, !_ History of Germany 1815-1945 (New York, 1969), p. 73, 
and Gordon A. Craig., lli . .Po.liti.cs of the .Prus.sian Army (New York, 1968), 
p. 132. 
6see, for example, Veit Valent.in, Geschichte der deutschen Revolu-
tion~ 1848-1849 (Aalen, 1968), I, PP• 320-321. 
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and the old.German states. 
This involved Radowitz in the.constitutional question, second only 
to that of unification as a major issue during the Pre-March period. Al-
though Article Thirteen of the Federal Act had implied that every German 
state would receive a constitution, only a minority of the rulers had 
honored this commitment. The first state to do so was the Duchy of Nas-
sau in 1814, followed by Saxe-Weimar-Kisena.c;.h in 1816. These first two 
documents formed governments based on the medieval system of hierarchical 
states and did: not really meet the hopes o.f the German liberals. How-
ever, s.everal south German states adopted. constitutions which allowed the 
people greater participation in their goverrunent. 7 
The first southern state .to adopt a constitution was Bavaria. In 
1818, Crown Prince Louis and a group of noblemen combined to force the 
end of the ministry of Count Maximilian Montgelas and provide the king-
dom with a constitution. That same year, Karl Nebenius persuaded Grand 
Duke Louis II of Baden to grant. his people a constitution as well. 
WUrttemberg followed in 1819. Subsequently, new constitutions were pro-
mulgated for Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. The south Ger-
man constitutions were based on the French Charter of 1814. In all of 
them except that of WUrttenberg.,_the ruler .gavet.he constitution to the 
people without consulting their representatives. Sovereignty still re-
mained in the hands of the ruler, and any rig4ts granted to the legisla-
ture were but gifts from the monarch. The state diets typically con-
sisted of two houses: an upper house appointed by the ruler and a lower 
7 
Huber, Dokumente, I, p. 78; Carr, Germany, P• 15; Koppel S. Pin-
son, Modern Germany, Its History and Civilization (2nd Ed., New York, 
1968), p. 446. 
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house elected by corp.orate .. bodies_. The on.ly exception to this was the 
Grand Duchy of Baden,.in which the lower h9u.se.was selected by electoral 
districts, thus making.:.it .. the.firs.t mode.t:n .x,:epresentative body in Ger-
8 
many. 
The continued debate on constitutionalism.and unification caused the 
development of political factions which would later evolve into politi-
cal parties. During __ the.1840s, five such groups evolved: the Conserva-
tives, the Roman Catholics, the Liberals, the Radicals and the Social-
ists. Conservati vism w:as most highly developed in Prussia, where the 
movement can be further subdivided into four ~oups: Ultraconservatives, 
Social Conservatives, National Conservatives and State Conserv.atives. 
The major tenet of the Ultraconservatives was the principle of legiti-
macy. They believed in p.reser..ving ... the f.orms. of the past and in certain 
unbreakable laws. Led by Friedrich Julius Stahl, the Ultraconservatives 
believed that the foundation of the .state must be an "alliance between 
throne and altar." They tended towards a rather "High Church" form of 
Lutheranism and had great regard for the Roman Catholic Church. They 
also believed that the government. of the .state must include the historic 
medieval estates rather than elected rep.resentatives as the legislative 
body. The power of the king should not rest on a freely chosen parlia-
ment, but rather on the grace of God. To the Ultraconservatives, the 
power of the ruler must not be compromised in any form. Influenced by 
Karl Ludwig Haller, they believed that the state was much like a family, 
with the monarch as the father. In Haller' s system, the king had no 
8Pinson, Germany, p. 63; Holborn, Germany, 1648-1840, p~ 469. 
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superior but God. They also believed .that the. rights of citizens did not 
rest on natural law but came from.ancient t.raditions and an unbreakable 
law sanctioned by history. The Ultraconser.vat.i ves did not support German 
unification. They champ.ioned.instead the rights of the old German 
states, supported. the German Co.nfederation,. upheld the dualism between 
Austria and Prussia, and accorded the Habsburg,. Empire the first position. 
In international affairs, they followed the. p.rinciple of the balance of 
9 
power and the concert of Europe. 
Other schools of Conservativism develop.ed simultaneously. The So-
cial Conservatives believed that the property owner had certain social 
responsibilities. They viewed propert.y as a trust and held the owner 
accountable for its usage. The most important plank in their platform 
was the obligation of the factory owner to guard the welfare of his 
workers. Radowitz himself belonged. to another group, the National Con-
servatives. The.y advocated .a moder.at.e. .. co.urse .of evolution toward a con-
··1 
stitutional federal state. Bef.ore 1848, th~y supported the reform of 
the German Confederation and after the outbreak of the Revolution, par-
ticipated in the Frankfurt National Assembly. Following the failure of 
the Assembly, the National Conservatives attempted to unite Germany on 
the basis of a revision of the Frankfurt Constitution. Another faction, 
the State Conservatives, had less concern for doctrine. Pragmatic and 
opportunistic, they sought political power through a monarchial-
autocratic state led by the military and bureaucracy. During Radowitz's 
time, the various groups never formed a united political party, but 
9 
Ernst Rudolf Hubar, D..eutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 
(Stuttgart, 1957), II, pp. 331-.339; Pinson, Germany, P• 58. 
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organized several graups.which often fought among themselves, 
11 
The second impor.tant po.lit.ical faction. .to. emerge during the Vorm'Elrz 
was primarily compo.sed of the fo.llowe.rs .. o£ .. t:he Roman Catholic religion. 
This movement developed originally in op.p.os.ition to the policy of secu-
larization begun by the French.Re.volut.ion o.f 1789. The theories of Ro-
manticism and French Raman Catholicism g.r.ea_;ly influenced the growth of 
this group, which fought for the. fre.edom . .of. t.h~ Roman Catholic Church to 
practice its religion and educ.ate its youth. They stood for independence 
of the Church from state control. A ver.y imp,o.rtant part of their program 
concerned marriage. Following the .. teachings, ... of their religion, they op-
posed any action by the state to compromise the control of the Church 
over matrimony, especially the legalization of divorce. 11 
Although the members. of the Catholic faction based their ideas on 
the same foundation, they differed on certain specific issues. One group 
favored a conservative approach to .politics and advocated a government 
based on the collaboration of the monarch and the medieval estates. 
Other Catholic conservatives advocated Ge.nuan unification through a res-
toration of the o.ld Holy Roman Emp,ir.e.,. On.e. .of the most persistent prob-
lems faced by those who fores.aw .and favored a united Germany was the 
question concerning the future boundaries. On this issue, most of the 
Catholic group championed the inclusion of Austria in the future German 
nation, although Radowitz himself belonged to that group which would ex-
12 




12Ib"d . ]. ' ' 
Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 337-363. 
PP• 347-357. 
pp. 357 -363. 
12 
As a conservative Catholic p.o.s.ition ~ged in the Vorm'arz, a par-
allel development in the direction of libe.t:q.lism occurred. Centered in 
the Rhineland, this movement championed .. the. .. ,<;.reation of a constitutional 
state with repres.entative.institutions and g.w.i,.rantees of civil liberties. 
They favored the unification of Germany and the retention of the mon-
archy. Farther to the left, a social Catholic movement also began to 
develop in the middle 1830s. They favored the creation of a socialist 
state with democratic institutions and demanded social and political 
equality for all men. 13 
The most active political elem..ent .. in Germany during the Vorm'arz 
was that of the liberals. German liberalism was rooted in the rational-
ism of the eighteenth century and the concepts embodied in the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789. Although German liberals con-
demned the excesses of the French Revolution, they looked to it for in-
spiration. To the liberals, the foundation of the state was the cortsent 
of the governed. They saw the state as a connnunity rather than a crea-
tion of the monarch. The.y: .. believed that the state was an organism unto 
itself with certain rights and obligations. Liberals stated that it was 
not the prince but the state itself, as a creation of the governed, 
which carried the rights of sovereignty. The state had the obligation 
to protect the liberties of the individual, who had both rights and ob-
ligations. According to liberal theory, a person had three basic ob-
ligations: to receive an education, to pay taxes and to serve in the 
military. A person had the right .t.o p.articipate in government at all 
13. 




The liberals, as strong supp~rters of Gennan unification, believed 
that the citizen owed loyalty to the German nation rather than to the 
various dynasties. The liberals favored the .creation of a Gennan federal 
state that would achieve unity without completely dissolving the old 
states. They prescribed .a constitutional monarchy with a democratic 
legislature. In the beginning,. mo.s.t 1.ib.e.r.als. favored a "greater Ger-
many," which would include the Austrian lands, but as time passed, more 
and more came to advocate the exclusion of the Habsburg Empire, They 
also believed that Germany had not developed liberal institutions be-
cause its weakness and division had allowed foreign powers to influence 
. . 15 
German politics. 
Like the other political groups in Germany, the German liberals did 
not agree on the application of their theories. The more conservative 
liberals formed the Constitutional Liberal or Right Center faction. 
They favored an evolutionary solution to the German problems rather than 
a revolutionary one. They supported a constitutional monarchy with the 
power to govern placed in the hands of a mint-stry appointed by the ruler 
and answerable to, but not dep.endent upon,. a. parliament. They were very 
heavily influenced by Montesquieu's concept of a separation of govern-
mental powers into independent legi.s.lative, executive and judicial 
16 
branches. 
The Constitutional Liberals consisted of four factions. The "Pro-
fessor's group," which centered in academi.ccircles, was one of the most 
14Ibid., PP• 371-380. 
15 . 
371-390. Ibid., PP• 
16Ibid., PP• 390-392. 
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important of these, 1n the Prussian Rhineland, a group of industrialists 
and merchants joined the Constitutional Liber,als. They began their ac-
tivity in the pr.evincial diet, rose to national prominance in the Prus-
sian United Diet of 1847 and ,participated ,in the Frankfurt National As-
sembly in 1848., Anot,her body of Constitutional Liberals centered in 
Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden and WUrttemberg., ,' the so-called "Southwestern 
Group," The final faction of the-Right, C.ent.e.r was the North German Lib-
erals or Liber:al Heg.elians. They.. w.e.z:e_.chief,.).y philosophers and theolo-
gians who applied the philo,sophy of,, Geo.rg...E:c,i.edrich Hegel to liberalism. 
They published a journal, the Hallis.chen.,JahrbUcher, to express their 
ideas. After the Revolution of 18.48, they split into left and right 
wings. h b f h f . ·1· 17 Ot er mem ers o t · is action went over to soc1a ism. 
Another element of liberalism centered in Baden, the Palatinate, 
the Rhine-Main Reg.ion, in Nassau and in H~se-Kassel. These were the 
members of the Parliamentary Liberal Party, or Left Center. They fa-
vored a parliament, but believed. that a king .. should .r:ul.e. .but. never. ... 
govern. The theories of Montesquieu and the. .. French Liberals very heavily . 
influenced the thinking .. of this g.r.o.up_ ... At the Frankfurt National Assem-
bly, they supported a united.Gennany .with .an e,lective Emperor. However, 
some Parliamentary Liberals sup.p.or:ted .the.King of Prussia as hereditary 
German Emperor, while others sided with the Radicals. Their chief doc-
18 
trine was the superiority of the legislative branch of the government. 
The fourth political group .in Germany was the Democratic Liberals 
or Radicals. The basis for German Radicalism was the doctrine of 
17Ibid., PP• 392-397. 
1~Ibid., pp. 398-401. 
• 
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absolute sovereignty of the peopLe •. To. the Radic.als, all executive, 
legislative and judicial authority emanated solely from the consent of 
the population. They opposed any comp.romise with monarchy, advocating 
instead the creation of a republic. They were dedicated believers in 
German unification, opposing any efforts to comptomise through the cre-
ation of a federal state. They favored the creation of a unicameral 
parliament which represented the people alone. Radicals opposed the con-
cept of an upper house as incompatible with the principle of popular 
sovereignty. They also believed that all citizens should have equal po-
litical and social standing. Like the other political groups, the Radi-
cals divided into several factions. The first was the Radical Poets, who 
came to prominance in the 1840s. The other group of Radicals formed the 
Radical Democratic Party which split into two factions, the Moderate 
Left and the Radical Left. 19 
Although German Socialism became an important movement after mid-
century, this group played but an insignificant role in Germany during 
Radowitz 1 s lifetime. Socialism, with its concern for the welfare of the 
workingman, developed a so-called u:topian orientation during the 1830s 
and 1840s. By 1848, a so-called "Scientific Socialist" school had de-
veloped under the influence of Karl Marx, but this movement was not to 
play an important role in politics during the Revolution of 1848. 20 
The political factions of the Vorm~rz would form organizations at 
the Frankfurt National Assembly and greatly affect Radowitz's work. 
They developed in the frustration felt by many Germans over the failure 
19Ibid., pp. 402-413. 
20Ibid., pp. 414-434. 
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of the Confederation to provide real unity and the des ire of many to 
achieve constitutional forms of government. As one political faction 
would expound its theories, others would challenge them and spawn new 
factions. This conflict forms one of the major themes of German history 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, with an 
understanding of the political background of this period of German de-
velopment, it is possible to turn to the subject of this work, the career 
of J o,seph Maria von Radowitz. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1797-1836 
Although Joseph Maria von Radowitz stood at the very center of Ger-
man politics for much of his life, comparatively little is known about 
the man and his origins. Much that was written about him during his 
lifetime is pure fiction •. For example, i:n 1850, readers of the Illus-
trated London ~ were told that this champ.ion of Gennan unification had 
attended a Jesuit seminary for several years and that he might have taken 
1 
minor orders in the Roman Catholic Church. Even today historians some-
times report erroneous infonnation about him. A recent work falsely in-
I • 
fonns its readers that he was a Silesi.an no.bleman, while another current 
study confuses him with Field Marshal Josep.h.Radetzky, the victor of the 
2 
Battle Custozza. The distinguished historian Veit Valentin, wrote that 
3 
no one knew for sure who he really was or from where he had come. Yet 
his origins are not difficult to discover, and a knowledge of his back-
ground and early life is essential to an understanding of his role in 
Gennan history. 
To be sure, little is known about Radowitz I s forebears. The family 
111Lieutenant-Gene:r::al Joseph vo.n Radowitz," The Illustrated London 
News, November 16, 1850, p. 377. 
2Edna Sagarra, T_radition and Revolution: Gennan Literature and So-
ciety 1830-ll2.Q. (New York, 1971), p. 189; Peter N. Stearns, 1848: Th;-
Revolutionary ~ in Europe (New York, 1974), p. 162. 
3Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, I, p. 320. 
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was of Hung.arian ancestry; a Libaf de. Radovvicz participated in the Con-
gress of Br\lnn in 1460. The earlies.t known direct ancestor of our sub-
ject was Demetrius von Radowitz, his grandfather. Even the Radowitz 
family, which has for several generations provided Germany with politi-
cal, diplomatic and military leaders even to the present day, cannot 
trace its origins beyond this man. ln the castle at Kleiningersheim, 
near Stuttgart, once the possession of Radowitz I s great·-great grandson, 
the traditional family tree is displayed..-.as. is the custom in most noble 
German families. But this elaborate piece of work stops .at. dead end with 
Demetrius von Radowitz. 
The homeland of Demetrius was not the Germany which his grandson 
fought so har.d to unify but the plains of Hungary. This patriarch was 
of minor nobility, and as an officer of the. Habsburg army fought against 
Prussia during the Seven Years I War. After. his capture at the Battle of 
Lowosits in 1757, the elder Radowitz decided to remain in Germany and 
settle in Saxony, where he became a wine merchant. The father of the 
subject of this study, Joseph Maria von Radowitz, was born in Hungary and 
came with his father to Germany. (lt is the custom even today for the 
Radowitz family to name the first-born male Joseph Maria.) After com-
pleting his law studies at the University of G\Sttingen, Radowitz was 
granted a license to practice law in Blankenburg by the Duke of Bruns-
wick. He married Frederike Theresia. von Kl:foitz, the daughter of the 
Baron von K\Snitz, and on February 6, 1797, Joseph Maria Ernst Christian 
Wilhelm von Radowitz, their only son, was born in that town. 4 
4Rachus von Liliencron, ~ al., eds.,. Allgemeine deutsche ;Bio.graphie 
(Leipzig, 1875-1912), XX.VII, p. 141; Friedrich von Holstein, The Holstein 
Papers, ed. by Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher (Cambridge, 1955):--I', P• 98; 
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As a boy, Joseph .attended school at Albenburg. During the early 
years of his life, one of the..mo.st imp.o.rt.ant: influences on Radowitz was 
his loneliness. He was without brothers.or .sisters and had no relatives 
near his home. As an escape from his boredom, he began to read at an 
early age. Reading,, contemplation and learning became the major pastime 
for the boy, and he subordinated all the usual childish activities to 
this quest for knowledge. However, some of his teachers misinterpreted 
this intense interest in study and disinter.es.tin the usual play activi-
ties and considered him stupid and maladjusted. Thus from his youth, 
Radowitz began t.o display the traits that would mark him throughout his 
· adulthood. He w:as nev.e.r able t.o mas.t.er the social graces so important 
for a young nobleman. lnstead he was content to read and study and de-
1 h . . d 5 ve op is min. 
The first years of Radowitz 1 s life coincided with the rise and fall 
of Napoleon Bonaparte;• The French had been fighting in the Germanies off 
and on since 1792. Austria, as the leader of the German states, had 
served as the primary barrier to French exp.ansion, but was defeated by 
the French leader and forced to sign the Treaty of Luneville on February 
9, 1801. This document g~ve Napo.leon .a free. hand to deal with the small 
German states as he wished, and he undertook.a major reorganization of 
the Holy Roman Empire. In 1803, through. the Reichsdeputations-haupts-
chluss, most of the smaller German states were' merged with larger terri-
tories. In 1805, Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Sweden formed the 
Third Coalition to drive the French from Ger.many and end the power of 
Joseph Maria von Radow:itz, ~ G.es.chichte meines Leb.ens, in Paul Hassel, 
Radowitz, pp. 4-6. 
5Radowitz, Ges.chichte Meines Lebens, p. 4. 
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Napoleon over Europe. After defeating .... this alliance at the Battle of 
J 
Austerlitz on De.cemher 2., .. 180.5,. Nap.ol.eon,.w.a,s free to complete the dis-
solution of the Holy Roman Emp.ire.. .T.he.-ne.x;t, .year he organized the Col)-
'\ 
federation of the Rhine, w.hich pl.aced a lctrg~ part of Germany under 
French hegemony. Radow.itz's home in Brunsw.ick was united with Hanover, 
while Hesse-Kassel and the Prussian lands wes.t of the Elbe. were absorbed 
by the French_ Emperor to. form the Kingdom o.f Westphalia,· which he gave 
to his brother J.erome. The subjugatio.n of Ge.rm.any was completed with the 
defeat of Prussia at the Battle of Jena in 1806 and the humiliating Peace 
of Tilsit the next year. 
Since Radowitz was growing up during a time of great military ac-
tivity, his father desired a military career for his son. Through the 
influence of a relative of his mother, the Hessian Adjutant General von 
Bastineller, the fourteen· year-old Joseph entered the service of the 
newly formed Kingdom of W.estphalia in 1808, and began his training at the 
military schooL.at:·Mainz. From Mainz, he.went to a center for the newly 
developed art of artillery, the Polytechnic at .Paris. Although too young 
·to be admitted as a full student, he was allowed to attend classes. .His 
papers: and. textbooks from this period s.how the intensity of his study, 
He filled many pag.es ... w.ith complex. mathematic;.al formulas, often writing 
. 'h . 6 1.n t e margins. At thi.s point he develop.ed . the mathematical approach 
· to problems which would be so important in his l~ter activities. He also 
cultivated an expertise in the use of artillery, thereby laying the 
foundation for his milit~ry career. 
6Ibid., pp. 4-5; The Radowitz Family Collection owned by Baroness 
Freia von Radowitz contains several of his. notebooks from his days in 
France •. 
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On January 1, 1812, the young ... cadet .. hec~e a second lieutenant and 
continued his military training .. at the Arti.l.Lery and Engineering,.,.School 
at Kassel, the capital of the Napoleonic Kingd.om of Westphalia. On De-
cember 23 of that year, the army commissioned him lieutenant in the 
Second Infantry Regiment of Hes.se-Kassel. The young officer was as-
signed to the Headquarters of the Second Army Corps under Marshal Mac-
7 
Donald. It is remarkable that as a mere .youth o.f fi.fteen .. Radowitz 
should have been promoted so fast. It is also somewhat ironic that 
Radowitz began his career in the service of an army fighting for the 
French against Prussia, the state which he would serve with such dedica-
. . 
tion later in his life. 
The War of Liberation began in 1813 after the disastrous attempt by 
Napoleon to defeat the Russians tp.e p,re.v.io.us .year. As the French troops 
retreated from Moscow aft.er the unsuccessful invasion of the Slavic em-
pire, many Germans rose up to overthrow their French overlords. Led by 
Prussia, the German states deserted Napoleon one by one .. and aid.ed in the 
fight. After re.organizing his forces, the French ruler reinvaded Ger-
many and took his stand at Le.ipz . i.g.. Here., between October 16 and 19, 
1813, the French and __ their remaining. al.l.i.e.s. were defeated and once again 
Germany was free of foreign domination. 
As an officer in the army of one of the states supporting Napoleon, 
Radowitz fought against Pl!'ussia and its alli_es. Barely old enough to 
shave, the new officer first saw combat at the Battle of Gross-Gtlrschen 
and received a minor wound in the chest. However, when the young Rado-
witz returned to his duties, he was named acting commander of a unit of 
7Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 5. 
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the Westphalian infantry and led.his men, .into battle· at Ltswenberg on 
August 21 and Katzbach on August 26, 1813. Finally, at an age when most 
youths today are still in school, the,adoles~ent commander and his men 
fought at the Battle of Leipzig, which saw the defeat of Napoleon and 
the beginning of his ultimate downfall. After three days of hard fight-
ing, Radowitz was wounded in his thigh hy a fragment from a grenade. He 
was taken to Leipzig ,and became a prisoner. of the anti-Napoleonic coali-
, 
tion. His worried father rushed to the side of his fallen son. When 
young Radowitz was well enough to travel, .he returned to Kassel, where 
the pro-French party had been disposed and Elector William I had returned 
8 
to the throne. 
After Leipzig, like so many of his contemporaries, Radowitz turned 
against Napoleon. He joined the newly organized Hessian Army as a first 
lieutenant under Colonel Koehler, commander. -Of the artillery. In Febru-
ary, 1814, he joined the. Hess.ian conting.ent..-il;l. the invasion of France and 
participated in the blockade of Met.z, Thionville, and Luxembourg. In 
July, he returned to his homeland. The rest between campaigns was short, 
however, for Napoleon attempted to come to power again in 1815, and Rad-
owitz joined his fellow Hessian soldiers. in the final campaign which led 
to Waterloo. Assigned to guard the fortresses on the Dutch border, he 
saw little action and was not present at the climatic battle. After 
9 
Napoleon's final defeat, Radowitz and his comrades returned to Germany. 
With peace restored, Radowitz.found a position in the service of 
the Elector of Hesse-Kassel, who had decided to establish a military 
8Ibid., P• 6. 
\bid., p. 7. 
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academy. According.t.o the.. pl.an, .. a. boy would enter at thirteen and be-
come an officer at sevente.en o.r .eighteen •.... .After William I named Colonel 
von Cochenhausen commander of the .. school and Chief of the General Staff 
in 1814, the Colonel asked Radowitz to assume a post as chief instructor 
of mathematics and military science. At the.. age of seventeen, Radowitz 
began to teach in the same building .... i.n which he had been a student only 
h 1 . 10 tree years ear ier. It must have seemed strange to the students to 
have an instructor who was. so young. Radowitz I s rapid advance in the 
ranks of the military is an early indication of his ability and a fore-
shadowing of the important role he would play in German history. 
From 1815 to 1821, Radowitz taught .at the Hessian Military Academy 
and was very pleased with his work and the.success he had with his stu-
dents. After his stormy youth during. the Napoleonic wars, he welcomed 
these quiet years as a chance to take time .and develop his ideas. Since 
his schooling had been mainly in military and mathematical fields, Rad-
owitz felt that he had neg.lect.ed the fine .arts; he now spent much of his 
time studying this side of life.. He read the works of Shakespeare, 
Dante, Schiller and other majo.r authors and began to appreciate the music 
of Bach and Mozart. Living in the ag.e .. of the Romantic movement, he, like 
so many men of his time, saw great beauty in the gothic architecture of 
his native land as well as the German painters of the sixteenth century. 
Most important, the young instructor began to ponder religious matters 
11 
and turned to the Roman Catholic faith of his father. 
His new-found religious belief soon. became the most important thing 
lOibid. 
11Ibid., PP• 8-10. 
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in his life. Developing an interest in religious mysticism, Radowitz 
believed that the only valid source of truth was through reaching an 
understanding of the divinity. He also wrote a series of more than one 
hundred articles on religion and philosophy. Significantly enough, most 
of these were presented in the romantic form of "fragments •11 In these, 
Radowitz answered many of the Protestant criticisms and frequently cited 
the Bible and historical evidence to justify his defense of the historic 
Catholic position. For example, he argued that Protestants erred when 
they based their faith completely on the Scriptures, for it was the 
Church that had determined which books should be included in the canon. 
He defended the Papacy as a symbol of the unity of the Church and an 
institution sanctioned by Christ and history. In the 1830s he chal-
lenged rationalism and the attempts of such "higher critics" as David 
Friedrich Strauss to rid~Christianity of mythology. His religious writ-
ings reveal that Radowitz based much of his belief on historical 
12 
study. 
His most important religious work was his The Iconography of the 
Saints,. fir'st published in 1834. Here he applied a vast amount of his-
torical research in an effort to describe hundreds of saints. He 
listed each saint, explained their symbols and indicated the activities 
they patronized. In one section of the book, Radowitz listed various 
professions, sicknesses, cities and countries and the patron saint of 
each. He also included a detailed essay on church symbolism. The many 
12see for example, Radowitz I s monographs on "Wahrheit, 11 "Petrus," 
"Der Glaubensgrund des Protestantismus," and "Formen des Unglaubens," 
in Gesannnelte Schriften (Berlin, 1853), V, pp. 68-70, 130 ... 139, 88-89. 
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facts in his work show the thoroughne.s.s of Radowitz I s scholarship. 13 
As the power of the Church came .under attack during the 1830s and 
1840s, and especially following the Colagne .. episcopal dispute, Radowitz I s 
religion began to transcend purely spi:citUf,1,_l concerns to influence his 
political attitudes as well. In his w.ritit1gi;i., Radowitz consistently ar-
gued that the Church should concern itself solely with religious matters 
and leave political affairs to the .jurisdiction of the state. In "The 
Chu:cch and Political Freedom," he stated that the Roman Catholic Church 
in Germany had made a major mistake by linking its interests with the 
destinies of Bavaria and Austria. The young officer declared it a car-
dinal error to tie the welfare of the Church to a particular political 
system. 14 This positi~n was impo:ctant,.since one of the things that 
helped divide Germany into factions was the matter of religion. Rado-
witz I s mystical Catholicism would later strengthen his ties. with Fred er-
ick William IV of Prussia, who, although ... a Protestant, was also some-
thing of a religious mystic. Radowitz would also become the leader of 
the Catholic faction at the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848. 
Radowitz shared his quest for the meaning of life with a circle of 
friends, some of whom would later join in his activities during the 
Revolution of 1848. ~e found a second home in the house of the von 
Schwertzell family at Willingshausen. He also became friends with the 
13Radowitz, Ikonographie der Heiligeii, Ein Betrag ~ Kunstges-
chichte, in Gesammelte Schriften, I. 
14Radowitz, "Die Provisoren und die Allianzen,"' 11Kirchliche und 
politischen Freiheit," and "Der Katholik zwischen seiner Kirche und den 
Staate, 11 Gesammelte Schriften, IV, p. 43, V, pp. 192-195, 248-253. See 
below. for a discussion of the Cologne episcopal dispute. 
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painter, Gerhard von Reutern, and Alexis Boyneburg. A friend who would 
be deeply involved in his later life .. was the.,adjutant to Prince William 
of Prussia, Baron Ernst Wilhelm von Canitz arid Dallwitz. Canitz was a 
I 
frequent guest at Willingshausen, and would l:ater serve as the Foreign 
Minister of Prussia. Radowitz sp.ent much of 1the time discussing religion 
with his friends, and the young soldier, thou~h remaining loyal to his 
Church, developed an ecumenical tolerance. for: Protestants which would 
later serve to bind him to the King of Prussi~. At the same time, he 
also had the opportunity to grow closer to hib immediate family, which 
had moved to Kassel. This renewed relationsh~p between the young teacher 
and his father was cut short, however, by the, death of the elder Radowitz 
late in 1819. 15 
Radowitz might have spent a long and happy career in relative ob-
scurity as chief instructor of mathematics and military science in the 
i 
I 
Electoral Military Academy had not fate inter~ened to change the whole 
course of his life. In 1821, Elector William: I of Hesse .. Kassel died, and 
his unstable son, William II, ascended the throne. This proved to be the 
turning point in Radowitz I s career. The new .ruler of the small central 
i 
I 
German state appointed von Cochenhausen, Radowitz I s former commander, 
head of the war department, and he in turn n~ed Radowitz a member of the 
General Staff with the rank of capt_ain first-t:lass and a salary of 1,000 
thalers per year. His duties in the Artiller7 Department included as-
i 
I 
sisting the military studies commission in thf development of examina-
tions for the selection of officers. 16 
15 
Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, pp~ 10-12. 
16Ibid., PP• 13-14. 
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This position gave.Radowitz the op.p.o.r.tunity to learn the art of 
diplomacy, which would be of .such g.:ceat..-~ortance to him later. In 
October 1821, the young.offi.cer undertook. his first official mission to 
other German states. First, he traveled.to Dresden, capital of the King-
dom of Saxony, to observe the Saxon method of building pontoon bridges, 
and then to Prussia, where he studied survaying methods. On this jour-
ney, Radowitz made his first acquaintance with his future home and met 
the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Baron Friedrich Ferdinand von 
MUssHng, and the Minister of War of the north German kingdom, Karl Georg 
17 
von Hake. 
Radowitz would have continued to advance in the service of Electoral 
Hesse and probably would have spent the res.t of his life there had the 
consequences of a court scandal not forced him to leave his comfortable 
position in Kassel and seek a living elsewhere. None of the German 
states had a more despised prince than Hesse-Kassel' s William II. In 
his private life, the new Elector continued the habits of _the princes of 
the Old Regime and allowed his mistress to occupy a very important place 
in his court. This notorious lady was Emilie Ort18pp, from Berlin, who 
had been granted the title of Countess Reichenbach and who was able to 
exert almost complete control over the Elector. When William argued with 
her, Reichenbach threw expensive vases and cups at him, until the ruler, 
realizing the cost of her temper tantrums, gave in and granted her what 
she wanted. So strong was his mistress' hold over the ruler that she 
persuaded him to ennoble her brother and this disreputable figure pro-
ceeded to strengthen his position at court. Once, when he was challenged 
17 
Ibid., P• 14. 
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to a duel by an officer because of a questionable love affair, the Elec-
tor protected the brother of his favorite by declaring dueling a capital 
offense and ordering that anyone challenging another to such an act 
would be liable to punishment. 18 
Since William's consort, the Electress Augusta, was the sister of 
King, Frederick William III of Prussia, her objections to the presence of 
Reichenbach and her brother in the .court led.to tensions between the two 
German states. The Prussian King p.rotested the mistreatment of his sis-
ter, and several scandalous incidents followed. At one point, the Elec-. 
tor abducted his sister, the Duchess of Bernburg, \from Bonn to Hessian 
Hanau, claiming that she was insane. Since Bonn was part of the Prussian 
Rhine Province, the Hohenzollern ruler protested this invasion of his 
sovereign territory by recalling the Prussian envoy to Kassel, and a 
major break appeared irmninent. Crisis was averted after the Elector was 
19 
forced to apologize, but it was all most embarrassing. 
Radowitz, as a leading member of the military, was in a precarious 
position. He was not the kind of man to conceal his opinions concerning 
what he considered to be the irmnorality of the Elector and his mistreat-
ment of the Electress and her son, the heir to the throne. The prince 
and his mother corresponded with Radowitz, and he informed them of his 
support. William II was furious over his son's opposition and ordered 
General Adam Ludwig von Ochs, a noted military historian, to discover his 
supporters. The General found several letters between Radowitz and the 
18Heinrich von Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth 
Century, trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul (London, 1919), IV, pp. 346-348. 
19Ibid. 
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Electress and her son which contained statements by the captain which 
were critical of his ruler. This earned.him the displeasure of the 
20 
Elector and his mistress·and led to Radowitz 1 s exile from Hesse-Kassel, 
William II, alarmed by the criticism of his affairs by his officers, 
decided to take action to eliminate. those .. d.~ed dis loyal. On June 13, 
1823, he suddenly -left hi.s. p.alace at Wilhelmsh8he outside Kassel and 
moved to the city. The angry Elector or.dered., .. the alarm bell sounded and 
the garrison assembled in the Friedrichsp.l.atz'. He then announced the 
demotion of Radowitz and three other officer.sand their transfer to small 
garrison towns. Radowitz was informed that he had been reassigned to 
the university city of Marburg. and ordered not to leave his post. 21 
But the disgraced officer refused to accept this humiliating penalty 
and chose flight instead. He hastily fetched his sickly mother and with-
in an hour was on his way out of the city. The party fled to Willing-
hausen, where Radowitz had friends, and waited for further developments. 
They did not have long to wait. Within the month, William II issued a 
royal decree dismissing him from the service and granting him a pension 
only on the condition that ha leave the Electorate. Radowitz realized 
' 
that his position was beyond saving and secretly returned to Kassel in 
disguise to sell his house and retrieve his belongings. While in the 
capital, Radowitz met a friend from his youth, Alexis Boyneburg, who in-
vited him to stay on his estate, St~dtfeld, near Eisenach. Three days 
later, the exile and his mother began their journey to a new life. As 
their carriage crossed the border between Hesse and Thuringia, the 
20Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, pp. 16-17. 
21Ibid .. , P• 17. 
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fleeing Radowitz realized that a major po:ction of his life lay behind 
. 22 
him and that he was on the way to many new experiences. 
At Stttdtfeld, Radowitz I s friends at.tempted to make him and his 
mother feel at home, and he remained five months in the small town while 
considering his future. In his search for a new p.osition, Radowitz 
turned towards Prussia. The earlier impres:s.fons from his journey there 
lay heavy on his mind as he pondered his next step. He decided that of 
all the thirty-nine states of Germany, Prussia had tha~most promise. for 
the future. But there was also the possibility of entering the service 
of the greatest German state of the age, Austria. Since he was a Roman 
Catholic and his family had orig.inally come from the Habsburg lands, the 
23 
exiled captain gave serious thought to moving to the south. 
However, through what Radowitz considered to be an act of God, fate 
intervened and decreed that he should live in Prussia. The Electress of 
Hesse recommended him to her brother, Frederick William III, in an ef-
fort to obtain for him a position in the Prussian military. Encouraged 
by this support, Radowitz promptly applied for a post. In the meantime, 
William II revoked Radowitz 's pension because he had received two 
threatening letters and suspected his former servant of involvement in 
a plot to kill him and his mist.ress. With his only means of livelihood 
lost, Radowitz had to find a way to earn a living. This problem was re-
solved when on October 4, 1823, he received. a royal cabinet order from 
Frederick William III naming him a captain and placing him at the service 
of Friedrich Ferdinand von MUssling, the Chief of the Prussian General 
221 bid. , p. 18. 




In December, 1823, Radowitz took his mo.t~f to Berlin. At first the 
large and bustling city seemed....s.trang.e-and .. h(i).s,t.ile to the still young of-
ficer, but his old friend, E.rnst Wilhelm. von: C,anitz, and his wife helped 
the refugee find a new .home in the .. Prus.sian capital. Von MUss ling re-
ceived his new worker w:ith g.reat enthus.iasm and assigned him to the 
western section of the General Staff. A few days after his arrival, 
Radowitz learned that one of his new duties was to act as tutor to 
Prince Albrecht, the young.es.t .son .. o.f the King. As he taught his young 
charge, Radowitz spent part o.f 1824 at the. summer palace of the Rohen-
zollerns, Sanssouci, in Po.tsdam. It was here that he met the man who 
would most influence his career, Crown P.rince Frederick William. Rado-
witz grew to be a devoted servant and friend of the future king and in 
25 
doing so, laid the foundation for his work in the 1840s. 
In addition to gaining friends in the royal family, Radowitz met 
several important people with whom his future political activities would 
be deeply involved. At the home of Canitz, he associated with Leopold 
von Gerlach, a major in the General Staff of the Third Army and his 
brother, Ludwig, a justice of the provincial court at Naumburg. He also 
became acquainted with Count Aug.ust Ernst von Voss, his future father-
in-law. With his new friends and the Crown Prince, Radowitz spent many 
evenings discussing politics and sharing with them his religious views. 
A common mystical belief in the importance of Christ in the world 
24Ibid., p. 20. 
25Ibid., p .• 21; Caroline von Rochow, V.om. Leben am Preussische Hofe, 
1815-1852, ed. by Luise v. d. Matil.itz (Berlin, 1908)-,-P• 196. 
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Radowitz continued advancing. .i.n the service of the north German 
kingdom. Aftet'. advising .. GeneraL .R\.\hl v.o.n Lilienstern, who was involved 
in reforming the Prussian officers' training program, Radowitz so 
pleased his superiors with his work that in 1826 they made him a member 
of the Board of Prussian Military Schools. Two years later, he became 
a member of the HighG.ammission on Military Studies. In this new capac-
ity, Radowitz was chiefly responsible for the. direction of the School of 
War. From 1826 to 1836, every. aspect. o.Lthis institution, came under his 
influence, though his chief concern was training in artillery and engi-
neering. He also served on the Artillery Examinations Commission. 
During these years, Radowitz was very pleased with his work and accom-. 
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plishments because he saw many of his proposals become reality. 
But the tangled affairs of Hesse-Kassel again entered into his 
happy life to cause him many problems.., .as they would during his entire 
career. After an argument with his father, .the Hessian Crown Prince had 
fled to Berlin, where he took a room in a hotel. In September, 1826, 
he summoned Radowitz into his pres.ence. to inform him of the continued 
conflicts within the royal family and of his flight to Berlin and that 
of his mother to the court of her sister, Queen Frederica Wilhelmina of 
the Netherlands. The dispute this time had arisen over the desire of 
the prince and his mother to move from Kassel and set up an independent 
court either at Hanau or Fulda. When the Elector refused to allow this, 
26Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 24; Rochow, Preussische 
~' P• 188. 
27R d ' h h b 26 a owitz; Gesc ic te Meines Le ens, p. • 
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the mother and her son had fled. 
Radowitz help.ed_ the-C.rown Er.in.c.e and .. his mother for the next two 
33 
years and saw the princ.e every. day to discuss possible solutions to their 
problems. They became good friends; . the.. p.tj.nce promised his confidant 
that when he came to.power, he.would nam.a-Rqdc::>witz his chief minister. 
When he heard af the activities of his son, Elector William II became 
furious and sent a rep.resentati.ve.-to Be:c1i.n to bring back the wayward 
heir, only to be told by King .. Fr.ede.rickWil.liam III that the prince was 
under his personal pretection. To emp.ha,size _his solicitude for his 
nephew, the Prussian King moved the p.rince .into his palace. Because the 
Prussian Crown Prince took g:ceat.-1.ntex:.es.ts in the affair, Radowitz I s 
efforts on behalf of his cousin and aunt''. led to stronger ties between 
h ff d h . f . 29 t e o icer an is uture sovereign. 
Radowitz's association with the Crown Prince of Hesse-Kassel also 
led ta his first trip to England. I,n the summer of 1827, Radowitz ac-
companied the prince on a journey to visit his mother, who was living 
with the Dutch royal family at Lacken, near Brussels. After several 
weeks in Lacken, the group, at Radowitz's urging, decided to go to Lon-
don, where they arrived on August 1. After a short stay in the British 
capital, -the_~P~.r~_}returned to Berlin. The journey to and from England 
introduced Radowitz to several German courts and increased his knowledge 
of other parts of the Confederation. 30 
After his return to Berlin, Radowitz learned that the Hessian prince 
28Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
29Ibid., PP• 28-30. 
30Ibid. 
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did not g.et. .. alo.ng....w.e.11 ... w.ith ... hi.s Hohenz.o.lle.r:9 ... relatives , Though on good 
terms with the. Crown. Prince., ... he cons.t.antly .ai::gued with the other members 
of the Prussian court. Radowitz soon r.e.ali.z.ed that he could not remain 
loyal to both his .sup.er.Lo.rs. in Be:rlin and the.. . .H.essian Crown Prince. When 
the Prince insisted .upo.n.w.e.ar.ing.....a.Pr.us.sia.n.un;i.form without accepting the 
obligations that accomp.ani.ed .. it., the. .. hre.ak .. he,t;.ween the two became only a 
matter of time. ... Against .. Rado.:w:it.z...1.s. ad.vi.ca.,, the Prince left Berlin to 
join his mother in Bonn, where she. had mo.y..ed.. In January, 1829, General 
MUssling informed Radowitz that from then .on iie should confine himself to 
transmitti.ng._the opinions o.f .the.. E.rus.s.ian .King to the Prince and should 
refrain from any other involvement in the afJa.ir. Naturally, upon being 
handed this ultimatum to choose between ohey.i,ng the order or continuing 
his intimacy with the. son of hi.s former sovereign, Radowitz decided to 
remain a servant of the north German kingdom. Moreover, the Prince 
showed himse.1£ to be following.. in. the footstep..~ of his father by becoming 
involved in an illicit affair with the wife of a Prussian lieutenant, and 
the break between the two became final. In Seµtember, 1829, Radowitz in-
formed his friend that if he persist.ed. in s.uch itmnorality he could expect 
no further help from him or from Prus.sia. This earned Radowitz the un-
dying hatred of the Prince and his advisor, Hans Daniel Hassenpflug, a 
hatred that would be a major factor in the final defeat of Radowitz 1 s 
plans for German unification in 1850. 31 
As an officer in the Prussian military, Radowitz was expected to 
fulfill certain social ob.ligations. This aspect of his duties was not 
accomplished quiet as successfully as his purely military duties. He was 
31 
Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
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an imp.ress.ive man.- .. t.all and well built, with fiery deep-set eyes, a high 
brow and a mustache that gav.e him.a. .. d.ec.idedlJ,: non-Prussian look. But he 
was also something o.f an int rove.rt •. At social functions, he had the ha-
bit of sitting_ alone reading .a bo.ok, occasioniilly glancing up and inter-
jecting .. an opinion. int.o .the. discus.sion.carried~on about him. He was very 
abstemious in his eating_ hab.its., consumed.no al coho lie beverages, and 
drank only water. In other. words, .Radowit,z I s personal habits did not 
32 
conform to the social traditions of the.Junker ruling class. 
Despite his somewhat aloof personality, Radowitz was sufficiently 
sociable to meet and marry the girl who would be his lifelong companion 
through his greatest and worst days. This was Ceuntes.s Maria von Voss, 
a member of one of the oldest and most respected atistocratic families 
of northern Germany. He met the young lady in May, 1826, during a visit 
to the home of Gustav von Rochow, a member of the Directory of State 
Schools, and she made an innnediate impress.i.o.n on him. He saw her several 
times during the coming years, and each occasion strengthened his feel~ 
ings for her. Soon, Radowitz realized that the emotion drawing him to 
the Countess was true love. When Maria's father, Count August E~nst von 
Voss, was appointed Prussian Minister to Nap.les, Radowitz was separated 
from the object of his love, and this merely strengthened his affection. 
When the Voss family visited Berlin early in 1828, Radowitz grasped the 
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opportunity to propose. 
The circumstances of this prop.osal were characteristic of the man. 
Radowitz arranged to encounter Maria at a. ball in the palace of Duke 
32Treitschke, History of Germany, VI, p. 314. 
33Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, pp. 34-35. 
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Carl of Mecklenburg-Strelitz at Montbijou. Shaking with the fear of an 
anticipated refusal, Radowitz shyly approached the girl. In a short 
conversation during a lull in the dancing, Radowitz asked the object of 
his love if he might write her mother to ask for her hand, since her 
father was in Naples. After a short pause, Maria accepted his proposal 
and the dancing began again. Returning home in great excitement that 
night, Radowitz penned a letter to Countess Luise Kroline von Voss in-
forming her of his love for her daughter and pleading for her permission 
to marry. The next day, the Countess sent a message that he should come 
to the Voss home to receive her answer. Breathless with anticipation, 
Radowitz hurried to the lodging of the Countess. In an emotional scene, 
.Maria's mother agreed to the proposal and called her daughter to come to 
the room. When she arrived, the Countess put her in Radowitz's arms and 
in this symbolic act gave her blessing to the union.· Radowitz would 
find in his mother-in-law a very important ally during the trials 
34 
ahead. 
However, Radowitz's joy over his engagement was dispelled by the 
death of his mother, which occurred shortly thereafter. Frederika von 
Radowitz, who had been very close to her son, became ill with pneumonia 
in October, 1827 •. Her condition had worsened, and the efforts of her 
physicians failed to bring relief. Early on February 28, 1828, the dy-
ing mother called for her son, but Radowitz rushed to the sick bed only 
to find his mother already dead. The sorrow of the passing of his be-
loved mother filled Radowitz's heart with anguish. She was sixty-two 
years old and during her son's exile had served him as a strong 
34Ibid. 
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supporter. Thus, with both his mother and father gone, Radowitz was 
left at thirty-one without any family except for that of future bride. 35 
In a small wedding in St. Hedwig's Roman Catholic Church in Berlin, 
Radowitz married Maria van Voss on May 23, 1828. In accordance with the 
wishes of the groom, it was a simple ceremony conducted by a military 
chaplain. Through his marriage to a member of such a respected family, 
Radowitz enhanced his position and gained the ancient pedigree that he 
lacked. The aristocratic Junkers of Prussia were very suspicious of the 
intentions of any outsider, and Radowitz was now able to travel in the 
highest circles of the kingdom on a more equal footing than before. The 
marriage also gave Radowitz financial security to such an extent that 
when informed by the Brunswick Court of Justice that the estate of his 
grandfather consisted of 13,000 thalers, he made no effort to gain his 
inheritance. 36 
As Radowitz's social position improved, so did his place in the 
military. Shortly before his marriage, the King had promoted him to the 
rank of major. His work in education went so well and his favor with 
the Crown Prince grew so strong that he was promoted to Chief of the 
General Staff of the Artillery two years later. Naturally, his rapid 
advance and his attainment of such a high office at only thirty-three 
caused much criticism. The older Prussians resented the rise of the 
foreigner and his many suggestions to modernize the Prussian artillery. 
They considered Radowitz perhaps well versed in theory but inexperienced 
in its application. Some were envious that Radowitz should have such a 
35rbid., p. 36. 
36Ibid., p. 37; Holstein, The Holstein Papers, I, p. 98. 
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great influence on the future king and were quick to find objections to 
his every proposai.37 
Radowitz's promotion to the General Staff also gave him increased 
opportunities for travel. In the summer of 1830, he accompanied the 
Chief of the Artillery, Prince Augustus Frederick William, on what was 
to have been a trip to Paris. At Antwerp, however, the party learned 
of the outbreak of the July Revolution in their intended destination, 
and the Prince decided to travel to London instead. Fortunately, Rado-
witz had chosen a military rather than a naval career, since no matter 
how smooth the sea, the Channel crossing always made him ill. He went 
below deck immediately upon boarding and stayed there during the passage, 
sniffing smelling salts to avoid sea-sickness. Arriving in London, the 
Prince's party stayed at the Hotel Clarendon on New Bond Street. 38 
Since this was his second trip to the British capital, Radowitz was 
able to study the English with more attention than most tourists, and he 
found London astir with the bitter conflict concerning the reform of 
Parliament and the broadening of the franchise to include the middle 
classes. During his stay, the Prussian officer visited Windsor Castle 
and spent his evenings in a men's club discussing military affairs and 
political ideas with English gentlemen. Radowitz began to understand 
the British constitutional system and learned much from observing the de-
bate on the reform of Parliament. He came to realize that constitutional 
reforms did not inevitably lead to the excesses of the French 
37Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, pp. 38-39. 
38Hassel, Radowitz, p. 211. 
Revolution; this realization would greatly influence his actions in 
1848. 39 
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The Prince's party also visited Portsmouth, the home port of the 
British fleet. Upon their arrival, they were greeted by the ringing of 
bells and shots fired in salute, They sought out the Victory, Nelson's 
flagship at Trafalgar, and dined with Admiral Folen. As they enjoyed 
the Admiral's hospitality, they received word that King Charles X of 
France had landed in exile at Spithead. Radowitz recalled the irony of 
the fact that the Admiral had. helped place the Bourbon on the throne 
which he had now lost through revolution.40 
Prince Augustus and his party left London late in August and ar-
rived in Brussels just in time to witness the outbreak of the revolt that 
led to the loss of Belgium by the Dutch, Unable to move on because of 
the revolution, they spent three days in the capital city and watched 
the Dutch troops in their unsuccessful efforts to defeat the Belgian 
rebels. 41 His observations of an actual insurrection in progress made 
a great impression upon Radowitz. He could not help but compare the 
order he had seen in London with the revolution which swept over Brus-
sels. 
The revolutions which drove the Bourbons from France and won the 
independence of Belgium had considerable impact upon Germany as well. 
Revolts broke out in Brunswick, Hesse-Kassel, Saxony and Hanover. In 
Brunswick, Duke Karl II was driven from the throne and replaced by his 
39Ibid. 
40ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 41. 
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son, William I. In Hesse-Kassel, Elector William II was forced to call 
a meeting of the Estates and grant them considerable power, which they 
used to write a liberal constitution. At first William yielded to popu-
lar opinion and abandoned the notorious Countess Reichenbach, but as 
soon as he felt safe again he brought .her back. This was a serious er-
ror in judgment, for on September 4, 1831, the Estates electeq his re-
bellious son, Crown Prince Frederick William, as Co-Regent. Once in 
power, however, the Prince began in his turn an organized campaign to 
evade the provisions of the constitution and sowed the seeds of future 
problems which would involve Radowitz once again in Hessian politics. 42 
Radowitz's encounter with revolution in 1830 proved to be a turning 
point in his political development. In his ''European Politics and the 
July Revolution," a long essay which he wrote shortly after his return 
to Berlin, he advanced the theory that once a revolution had begun it 
could not be stopped in mid-development, but would continue until it had 
run its course. In his assessment of the regime of Louis Philippe, the 
successor to Charles X of France, written in 1837, Radowitz saw a danger-
ous emphasis on materialistic concerns, which he believed should be but 
secondary to spiritual matters. However, Radowitz was no advocate of 
absolutism; this he felt to be as reprehensible as the new materialism 
of the French state. From impressions gained during his journey to 
England, he considered the settlement reached by the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688 to be the best alternative to the extremes of absolutism and the 
• 
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excesses committed by the French after 1789. 43 Radowitz, in short, re-
vealed himself to be amoderate who refused to support either form of 
extremism and placed himself closer in the political spectrum to the 
German liberal reformers than to the Prussian Junker reactionaries. 
Another cardinal tenet which became ever more prominent in his 
writing. was his general emphasis on German nationalism. He wrote that 
the highest form of statehood rested in a nationalism based on "family ••• 
origin and folk traditions." The most important element in the history 
of Europe since the Middle Ages was the destruction of the multinational 
state and the creation of new nations based on common origins and cul-
ture. He cited the examples of France and Spain as models for Germans 
to emulate. In his writings, Radowitz traced the awakening of German 
nationalism back to such men as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, who in his 
Letters Concerning~ Newest Literature called for an end to blind imi-
tation of French literary trends and for the creation of a German liter-
ature based on the English model of Shakespeare. According to Radowitz, 
the German poets and thinkers had spread this nationalism from the Eider 
to the Alps and from the·Mosel to the Pregel.44 
Radowitz shared his interest in political ideas with his friends 
who were alarmed by the storms of 1830. He often joined Carl von Voss, 
the cousin of his wife and advisor to the Crown Prince, the Gerlach 
43Among his more important political tracts were, "Die europMische 
Politik und die Jtlli-Revolution;" 11Idealism9s-Materialismus in der 
Politik," and ·~Die Profisoren und die Allianzen," in a,sammelte Schri£-
~' IY, pp. 43, 81-84, 192 •.. 
44Radowitz, "Frankfurt am Main, Erste Abschnitt von 1848," in 
Gesammelte Schriften, II, pp. 8-19. See below for a discussion of the 
crisis of 1840. 
42 
brothers and Canitz, who had served as the Prussian observer at Russian 
headquarters during the Polish revolt of 1830, in discussions at Canitz's 
offices on the Wilhelmstrasse. The chief of the artillery and his 
friends saw the revolts of 1830 as a continuation of the French Revolu-
tion of 1789 and the Napoleonic system. They believed that the princi-
ples of the revolution were dangerous and a serious threat to the es-
tablished order.45 
In the middle of 1831, Radowitz decided that one way to avert revo-
lution was to establish a newspaper to serve as a platform for conserva-
tive ideas. He thereupon broached the idea to Karl Ernst Jarcke, an 
instructor of jurisprudence at the University of Halle and leading con-
servative Catholic. Jarke approved, and Radowitz enlisted the help of 
the Gerlach brothers and Carl von Voss. They agreed to begin publication 
of the Berliner politische Wochenblatt on October 1, 1831, under the 
editorship of Jarcke. When the latter accepted a position in the Aus-
trian State Chancellery soon after, Major Friedrich Streit became the 
new editor of the newspaper. 46 
The Wochenblatt became the leading conservative publication in the 
Germanies, and Radowitz contributed many articles on various subjects. 
The newspaper bitterly denounced the youthful excesses of the German 
liberals; it referred to the Hambach Festival, a mass meeting of liber-
als and patriots held in May 1832, as a "political Walpurgis Night. 1147 
This paper provided Radowitz with a very important platform to express 
45Hassel, Radowitz, pp. 213-214. 
46Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, pp. 43-44. 
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his ideas, and also made the Prussian officer .well known throughout 
Germany as an opponent of revolution. It also brought him to the atten-
tion of the beleaguered officials of his former home, Hesse-Kassel. 
In Kassel, the Regent and the Diet had come to open conflict by 
1832. In May of that year, Frederick William named Hans Daniel Hassen-
pflug Minister of Justice and the Interior, and this official began a 
dedicated campaign to eradicate the last vestiges of constitutionalism 
in the Electorate. The main target of the attack against liberalism was 
the militia, which had fallen under the control of the supporters of 
the constitution. When the Minister attempted to restrict the power of 
the militia, the liberals in the Diet, led by Sylvester Jordan, pro-
tested. The Regent ordered the body dissolved, and the conflict inten-
sified. The outcome of this struggle in the central German state was 
closely watched in Berlin. Treusch von Buttlar, a friend from his days 
in Kassel, wrote Radowitz detailed reports which the Prussian officer 
transmitted to the Crown Prince, who was especially interested in the 
dispute.48 
The Hessian Minister of Justice needed the support of Berlin in his 
battle with the liberals in the Diet and sought to use his old friend-
ship with Radowitz to secure this. He requested him to use his influence 
to secure the appointment of a Prussian minister to Kassel friendly to 
his aims. Radowitz, however, surprised his friend with a contemptuous 
condemnation of the "chicken fight" between the minister and the Diet. 
The Prussian officer advised Hassenpflug that every state must rest on 
the authority of law; since the Diet was established by law, the 
48Ibid., p. 228; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, II, p. 70. 
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opponents of liberalism should not abandon the constitution. Instead of 
violating the constitution by the unlawful repression of the liberals, 
Radowitz advised the Hessian minister to secure through a new election a 
Diet friendly to his cause. He believed that by adopting .this tactic a 
real and lasting victory could be won against the liberals. Radowitz 
strongly advised against the adoption of violence, for this would only 
help the opposition. While urging moderation on Hassenpflug, Radowitz 
nevertheless used his influence to obtain the appointment of his fellow 
conservative Canitz as the new Prussian Minister to Kassei.49 
Radowitz's advice to Hassenpflug shows a great deal about his po-
litical philosophy. While he opposed the liberals in their attempts to 
force the Regent to depose Hassenpflug, he was also a strong believer in 
the importance of the law. Radowitz realized that by fighting the liber-
als with legal methods, the chances for gaining a real victory were much 
better than by resorting to a show of force. Unlike many conservatives, 
the Prussian officer was not opposed to constitutionalism; he realized 
that a constitution did not necessarily mean the adoption of a liberal 
program. He had seen the British sys.tem in action and knew that it was 
possible to maintain old institutions without violating the law and 
adopting violence to suppress liberalism. Radowitz was a moderate con-
servative rather than a reactionary. He would use the same tactics of 
moderation in his own efforts in 1848. 
While Radowitz was active in political affairs during this period, 
he also found time for other activities •. In July, 1831, Radowitz ac-
companied Prince Augustus on an inspection trip to Silesia where the 
49Hassel, Radowitz, pp. 228-229. 
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group visited the fortresses at Glogau, Breslau and Schweidnitz. The 
following month, at a celebration of the King's birthday at Cels, the 
Crown Prince proposed that Radowitz join him on a pleasure trip through 
the mountains. The officer accompanied the royal party, which consisted 
of Crown Prince Maximilian of Bavaria, whom Radowitz had met when he 
studied in Berlin, and Prince Karl of Prussia. Throughout the month of 
August, they wandered around Silesia and Bohemia; the friendship between 
Radowitz and the future king grew stronger, and he made many important 
contacts which would later be of use in his work. Radowitz had become 
the constant companion of the Crown Prince and one of his most important 
d . 50 a v1.sers. 
Late in 1832, Radowitz left on another journey. Prince Augustus 
decided to take a trip to Italy and took Radowitz along as his courier. 
On the way south, the party stopped at several German courts in accord-
ance with the wishes of.King Frederick.William III, who wanted to learn 
of the military practices and attitudes of the southern states. 51 While 
studying military matters, Radowitz also learned something about the art 
of diplomacy. 
The first stop on the Junket was Darmstadt, one of the most liberal 
of the German states. Radowitz met Grand Duke Louis II and his wily 
first minister, Baron Karl van Bos du Thil, one of the most prominent 
proponents of monarchal supremacy in south Germany. Du Thil was at the 
moment locked in a controversy with the liberal opposition majority in 
the Hessian Diet, which demanded a greater share of legislative power. 
50Ibid., pp. 216-217. 
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Within a year he would successfully parry the blows of the liberals and 
maintain monarchal prerogatives intact for another decade and a half. 
He was a practical politician and no visionary, but his methods disen-
chanted Radowitz, who considered him more versed in theories than po-
litical realities. The next stop was the Grand Duchy of Baden, a state 
which would support Radowitz through his fight for German unification. 
He met Grand Duke Leopold I and his brother, Count William. The loyal 
servant of Prussia wrote his wife of the great similarity of the small 
state to the great power and the pro-Prussian attitude he found. How-
ever, Radowitz did not have a pleasant experience in the Kingdom of 
WUrttemberg. On November 6, Radowitz dined with King William I, and an 
argument ensued, with the King criticizing the conservatism of the 
Wochenblatt. 52 
From WUrttemberg, the travelers turned south into Switzerland. At 
the border they were met by the Prussian Minister to Bern who guided 
them to the Swiss capital. From there they went to Milan, and Radowitz 
received his first impressions of Italy, which he found very beautiful 
and picturesque. The Italian journey took the party to Genoa, where 
Radowitz met King Charles Albert of Sardinia, to Florence, where the 
Prussian viewed the wonders of the Renaissance at the Uffizi, and on to 
53 
Rome. 
The party remained in the Eternal City during the Christmas season, 
and the spirit of Rome overcame Radowitz. He spent countless hours con-
templating the remains of the Roman Empire and the glories of the Roman 
52Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
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Catholic Church. He wondered at the paintings of Paphael and the statues 
of Michelangelo in the Vatican. From Rome the party journeyed to the 
capital .of the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Naples. They visited 
the ruins of Pompei and viewed the art treasures of southern Italy. Fi-
54 
nally, in early February, 1833, they returned to Rome. 
In Rome for the second time, Radowitz sp.ent his days learning about 
the operation of the Vatican. He received an audience with Pope Gregory 
XVI and attended services in the papal chap.el, but was impressed neither 
with the papal c.ourt nor its worship.. and left disappointed. While in 
Rome, he met Otto, the Bavarian Prince who was on his way to become King 
of Greece, and Prince Henry, brother o.f the King of Prussia. Leaving 
Rome late in February, their return to Berlin took the party through 
Bologna and Modena, where Radowitz had a long talk about politics and 
religion with Duke Francis IV. From Modena, the Prince and his entourage 
visited Venice and spent several hours view.ing the sights of the city. 
Radowitz was awed by St. Mark's Cathedral and its Byzantine style. From 
55 
the maritime city, they traveled thr'ough Verona to Munich. 
They spent several days in the Bavarian capital. The Prussian of-
ficer got along very well with King Louis I, who admired his writings and 
the conservative position of the Wochenblatt. Radowitz, impressed by the 
efforts of the Wittelsbach to beautify the Bavarian capital, wrote glow-
ing commentaries on the art he found there. The party arrived back in 
Berlin in late March. During this trip, Radowitz enjoyed the opportunity 
to ponder his political theories in the light of his observations of the 
54Ibid., pp. 238-243. 
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south German states and Italy. He also became acquainted with leaders 
· 56 of other parts of the Confederation. 
Upon his return to Berlin, Radowitz. continued his duties and was 
honored several times for his work in .education and his political writ-
ings. He received the Red Order of Nobility, Third Class, in 1832, and 
while in Baden, accepted the Cross of the Crying Lion from the Grand 
Duke. In 1834, Tsar Nicholas I of Russia aw.arded Radowitz the Order of 
St. Ann, Second Class, But the rapid ri.se of Radowitz in power, his in-
fluence on the Crown Prince, and his p.ol.itical activities did not meet 
with the approval of many Prussians. Above all, many objected to the 
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closeness of Radowitz and the future king. 
The leader of this opposition was Job Wilhelm von Witzleben, the 
leader of a liberal group of Protestants who objected to the growing 
power of the conservative Roman Catholic. Since his appointment as 
Minister of War in 1833, Witzleben had sought grounds to demand the dis-
missal of Radowitz. When the officer argued with him over the organiza-
tion of artillery, the Minister was able to use his influence over King 
Frederick William Ill to persuade him that Radowitz should be removed 
from the Prussian capital. When the Prussian representative on the 
Military Commission of the German Confederation retired, the King took 
advantage of this opportunity to send Radowitz away from Berlin and thus 
satisfy Radowitz 's critics without actual_ly demoting the officer. Upon 
arriving home on the evening of March 18, 1&36, Radowitz found a Cabinet 
Order naming him the new Prussian member of the Military Commission. 
56Ibid., pp. 246-249. 
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Thus the first chapter in Radowitz I s life came. to an end, and he received 
a new assignment which would open t.o him ne:w possibilities for service 
58 
to his adopted country. 
While Radowitz's orig.ins are by no means shrouded in mystery, and 
the facts of his early life and r.ise are easy enough to discover, there 
still remains the question as to how and why he was able to advance from 
his beginnings as the s.on of a Brunswick lawyer to an advisor to the 
future King of Prussia and that country's representative on the Military 
Commission of the GermanConfederation. Radow.itz's rather rapid advance-
ment was due to several factors, one of the most important of which was 
luck. He seemed to have the ability to be in the right place at the 
right time, such as meeting the Crowri Princewhile tutoring his younger 
brother. Radowitz also benef.ited by knowing .. the right people. When his 
former commander in Hesse-Kassel became the head of the War Department, 
Radowitz became a member of the General Staff of the small electorate. 
When forced to leave Kassel, the influence of the Electress enabled him 
to find a comfortable posit.ion in the Prussian army. In Berlin, Canitz, 
a friend from his youth, introduced him.into the right circles. Finally, 
an important reason for Radowitz 1 s success was his ability and hard work. 
He did not take his duties lightly but worked long and hard at them, as 
59 
his many memoranda on the minute details of his activities attest. His 
assignment as Prussian Representative on the Military Commission would 
enable him to continue his advance on a level affecting all of Germany. 
58Ibid., PP• 49-50. 
59Many of these commentaries and memoranda are presently in the 
Radowitz Family Collection. 
At Frankfurt, Radowitz would be at the very center of German politics 
and would learn at first hand the many failings of the Confederation. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MILITARY COMMISSION 
Radowitz left his agreeab.le post in Berlin with mixed emotions. 
The German Confederation was at best a loo.se union without much power. 
Its thirty-seven member. states retained all the rights of sovereign 
powers and guarded thei.r traditional "German liberties" with great jeal-
ousy. The Military Commission, consisting ... of the representatives of all 
these states, was charged with creating s<;>me form of common military 
policy, an almost impossible task. On the one hand, Radowitz realized 
the difficulties inherent in this new position. But, he and his family 
believed that it would give him an opportunity to participate in Euro-
1 . . 1 pean p.o 1.t1.cs. Despite many problems, Radow:itz was to learn much dur-
ing his six years at the seat of the Confederation, the free city of 
Frankfurt am Main; it was her.e. that he was to come to the conclusion that 
a more stable union of the German states was.necessary if the German 
people were to attain a position of power in the face of other European 
states. In Frankfurt, Radowitz would find hims.elf involved in many petty 
intrigues and conflicts, which, although insignificant in comparison to 
his later work, reveal a great deal. about the capacity of the German 
states to defend themselves in a dangerous world. 
On May 3, 1836, Radowitz gathered his family and household to set 
1Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lehens, p. 51; Rochow, Preussischen 
Hofe, p. 199. 
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out for Frankfurt. Before his departure, as he took leave of Prince 
Augustus and the Crown Prince., Rado.witz w:as on the verge of tears. Dur-
ing the ten-day journey, they. spent soma t~ visiting in Thuringia and 
2 
Hesse-Kassel before arriving in the "capital" of Germany. 
As the Prussian member of. the.Mil.i.tary Commission, Radowitz 1 s chief 
concern was develoErlng.the def.ensive. .. cap.ability of the Confederation, 
and he wasted no time in getti.ng. down to work. The first matter can-
fronting him was the p:c:o.blem created by the separation af Belgium from 
Holland in 1831. In 1815, the Gem.an. C.onfed.eration had pledged itself 
to the defense of the Maas River .and .. the fort.ress of Maastricht. Since 
Belgium had became a severeign natio.n,. the new government in Brussels 
wanted this obligation terminated., .and the, Dutch monarch concurred. 
Radowitz resisted this, believing that it w:as the Prussian interests for 
the Germans to retain a presence on Flemish territory. However, his su-
periors in Berlin disregarded his advice and the German states lost the 
3 
right to defend the fertress., 
The most important and potentially dangerous issue before the Com-
mission was the question of building and maintaining federal fortresses 
to protect Germany from possible French aggression. The debate over 
this problem, which lasted several years, revealed all the jealousies 
among the German states, the rivalry between Austria and Prussia, and 
the distrust among the smaller states. S.ince 1815, the Canfederation 
had spent fifteen million francs of the French reparation payments to 
fortify the Rhine and had already es.tabli.shed three federal fortresses at 
2Hassel, Radowitz, p. 261. 
3Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 53. 
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Mainz, Luxembourg and Landau. In 1817, Austria had proposed to build a 
fourth fortress at Ulm. Howave.r, the ... o.ther southern states believed that 
this location, deep in German te.rritory, w:ou.ld not se.r-ve .the.i.r. bes.t.. 
interests because it would leave the Ravarian P~latinate, Baden, Hesse-
Darmstadt, WUrttemherg, .. Hahe.nzo.llern-He.ching£m. and Hohenzollern-Sigmar-
ingen exposed to attack. They f.avore.d inste.ad the site of Rastatt, which 
would protect all of south Germany. At first, even they could not agree 
on a proper site. Baden, the state. in which Rastatt lay, protested out 
of fear that the presence of so many fede.raL troops would compromise the 
.military independence of the Grand Duchy. Bavaria, whose armies made up 
the largest contingent of the Ge.rman force.son the Rhine, suggested in 
1835 that Germersheim be made the center of the fortifications on the 
river. When Radowitz arrived at Frankfurt in the sununer of 1836, the de-
bate over the question was at its height. 4 
On June 7, Radowitz, who favored the Rastatt site, reported his sug-
gestions to his superiors in Berlin. He reminded them that it was neces-
sary for Prussia to maintain the best possible relations with the south 
Germans. He also pointed out that regardless of the objections from 
Baden, the frontier between Germersheim ancL.Lake Constance still lay un-
defended and that it was necessary for the southern states to have a 
central location for the mobilizatio.n of men.., and supplies. Through his 
recommendations, Radowitz came into conflict with the Austrians who stil 1 
wanted the fortress at Ulm. The Prussian deputy representatives at the 
Federal Diet, General Otto von Schtller, had informed his Austrian 
counterpart of Radowitz's suggestions, and they were promptly relayed to 
4 Hassel, Radowitz, pp. 266-269. 
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the Habsburg member of the MiLit.ary Cennnission, Franz Ludwig von Welden. 
Welden, believing that the young.Prussi.an had not shown him or his -state 
praper respect, scolded Radowitz for not first asking his advice before 
sending his reconnnendations to Berlin.. After the two had art argument 
during a session of the Comm:Ls.s.ion.,. Me.tte:cnich sent a formal protes.t to 
the Prussian court. Because Berlin was in no mood for problems with 
Austria, Radowitz was instruct'ed to avoid .offending the Empire; the is-
sue of the fortresses needed further d.i.scussion. Thus Radowitz ex-
perienced the first of many frustrations in t.rying to deal with Vienna. 5 
In October, 1836, King Wi.lLiam I .of W.Ur.tt.emberg developed a solution 
to the prablem. He proposed that instead of building one fortress the 
Confederation build two, one at Ulm to p.lease-Austria, and one at Rastatt 
to mollify the southern states. Two months Later, Radowitz wrote Berlin 
in suppart of William's ideas. However, the Prussian deputy to the Diet 
itself disagreed and suggested that Prussia support the building of but 
one fortress at Rastatt. At this point, King Frederick William Ill in-
structed his representatives at Frankfurt. to refrain from any further 
discussions of the matter as it might harm commercial negotiations then 
6 
taking place betwe:en Prussia and Austria. 
After these petty but time .... consuming controversies during his first 
year at the center of the German Confederat.ion, the next few years were 
a time of camparative calm. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-
colonel and busied himself with the day~to~day affairs of the Military 
Commission. He get along well with his new Austrian colleague, Major 
5 
Ibid., PP• 268-269. 
6Ibid., pp. 269-271. 
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General Karl von Roditzki, wha came t.o Frankfurt in June, 1838. He en-
jayed his duties, last all des.ire. to leacLtr.oops in the fi.eld, and hoped 
that when Frederick William IV came...to the. throne he would be called ta 
Berlin ta assume some post in gavernme.nt... Throug):t his experience in 
diplamatic and administrative work in F.rankfurt, Radowitz had found a 
7 
new means of service ta his adopted state. 
While he carried an his duties, Radowitz found some time for a per-
sonal · life. He and his family 1i ved in a house an the Mainkai, where a 
son was born on May 19, 1839. Since their firstborn had died, Radawitz 
and his wife carried an family tradition. by .naming. .. the ... new memhe.r. of .... 
their family Joseph Maria. He spent much .af hi.s free time studying mili-
tary science, mathematics, philasophy and art. His favorite form of art 
was the sketch, and he assembled a callection af drawings by old and 
recent masters. Radowitz found his study of philosophy so depressing 
that he wrote that at times he felt as if he were sinking in water look-
. . 8 
ing for a rope . to pull himself out onto the land. 
Because of Frankfurt I s central lo.cation, Radowitz met many digni-
taries as they passed through the free city. He became acquainted with 
the Crown Princes of Mecklenburg and Denmark, Grand Prince Alexander of 
Russia, the future King William .II af Holland and the Duke of Nassau. 
One of the most important af Radowitz I s new acquaintances was Prince 
Clemens von Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister. Radowitz first 
met the Prince as he was t.raveling__to his estate at Johannisberg on the 
7 Radowitz, Ges.chichte Meines Lebens, p. 66. 
8 . 
Joseph Maria von Rad.owitz (son. o.f subject), Aufzeichnungen ~ 
E:dnnerung.en ~ d.em t.eb.en. ~ .B.o.tschaft.ers..Joseph Maria~ Radawitz, 
ed. by Hajo .. Halborn (Osnahr\lck, .19.67-)., .... .p..:_ .. .l.; .. R.ad.owi.tz., Geschichte Meines 
Lebens1, PP• 69-70. 
Rhine. The Prussian was not impressed by .t.he Austrian statesman, whom 
he considered frivolous and without true w;inciples. Radowitz would 
later enter into se.ri.ous ~ti.ati.o.ns .. wi,th Metternich and witness his 
downfall in 1848. 9 
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While busy with his effo.rts to_ strengthen. German military power and 
mediate between the various German .s.t.at~'.,Radawitz began to realize 
fully the flaws in the s.et.tl.ement 1:e.ached .in Vienna. The Prussian of-
ficer saw that in the e:v.ent of any reaL.mi.Utary threat, Germany could 
not hope to defend itself unle.ss .soma .. maJo.r. reforms were enacted. He 
alsa realized that as lang as Austria dominated German affairs to suit 
its interests, the needs of Prussia and other.German states could not be 
10 
met. His further experiences at Frankfurt would serve to reinforce 
these convictions. 
In 1839, the debate over the federal fo.rtresses again became a major 
issue. Berlin continued to suppo.rt the plan. to canstruct a fortress at 
Rastatt out of a desire to win the £av.or o.f the. sauthern states, protect 
the Hohenzollern territories in the sauth and better serve the military 
interests of the Confederat.ian. Hewev:er, RUxt.temb.er.g. . .t.emp.orarily changed 
its position on the issue, because Tsar Nicholas I af Russia intervened 
in the conflict to persuade King William I ta adopt the Austrian po-
sition. While informing the Prussians af this decision, the King had 
moreover protested against Prussian interference in south German affairs. 
It appeared that Austria had won the point. However, political 
9Radawitz, Geschichte Meines.Lebens, pp. 54-55, 62-65; 11Aufenhalt 
in K~nigswart und auf Johan.nisbex:g.,~.1 .. ,.C.lernens ;,v.on Metternich, Aus Metter-
nichs nachgelassen Papi.er.~ ed. _hy .Richa:cd. von Metternich-Winneburg · 
(Vienna, 1880-1884), VI, p. 502. 
lORadawitz, Ges.chichte Meines Lebens, p. 66. 
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developments in France, where the nationalists, led by France is Guizot , 
and Ad0lphe Thiers, had 0verthrown the moderate ministry of Louis Mole, 
caused a sudden reversal in the polic.ies. of the southern courts. With 
the growing pow.er 0f the French nationalists and the threat of French 
aggression that accompanied it, th.e .south began t0 abandon its loyalty 
t0 Vienna and to think in t.erms o.f self-p.rotection. Since Ulm was deep 
in German territory, the location of a fortress in that city would pro-
tect Austria, but leave undefended Baden., WUrttemberg, the Bavarian 
Palatinate and Hesse-Darmstadt. Grand nuke Leopold of Baden led the 
other rulers wh0 turned t0 Berlin for p.ro.tection. As a result of this 
appeal, Frederick William III decided on May 25, 1839, t0 adopt the very 
pr0posal for the two f0rtresses which had been recommended by Radowitz 
h 1 . 11 tree years ear 1.er. 
In time, the c0nflict reached the-Military Commission in Frankfurt, 
as Metternich tried to halt the exodus of states from the domination of 
Vienna. He instructed R0dit.zki t0 v0te for the..constructi0n of a for-
tress at Ulm, while Berlin instructed Radowitz to work fer the fortresses 
at Ulm and Rastatt. After a bitter debate., the Commission decided to 
12 
recommend the construction of both fortresses. Thus one of the con-
troversial issues of the Pre-March period seemed at least temporarily 
resolved. 
But the conflict began anew .0nce the decision had been made to build 
both fortresses. This time the controversy centered over the exact lo-
cation and the territorial rights of the state. in which each was located. 
11 
Hassel, Radowitz, PP• 286-287. 
12Ibid. 
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The southern German .states met at Karlsruhe,, the capital of Baden, in 
April, 1840, to discuss the .. px.o..b.lem..- .. .S.in.c,e,Ulm lay on the Danube, the 
boundary between Bavaria and. W\lrttemb.e.J::.g.,..,..,:t,he:"'fortress could be built in 
·, 
either kingdom. Both states want.ed ... to. p.res.e:r;,ve their independence from 
Vienna as much as possible., and. feared..that .the presence of Confedera-
tion troops on its soil would comp.romi.s.L..this independence too much. 
The southern states de.cid.ed that .. re.gai:d.1~: of what decision the Con-
federation made concerning. the exact. lacat..:1,..o.n of the fortress, the best 
way to p.reserv.e their independenc.e .. was. to. £orm a unified organization 
for the defense of southern Germany. 0.P.-~l 24, 1840, Bavaria, WUrt-
temberg, Baden and Hesse-Darms.tadt sigt1ed. .. an . .agreement which in time of 
war provided for the creation of a. unified. ~rmy under the command ef 
Prince Charles of Bavaria. 13 
Austria objected violently to this de.c,ision and immediately pro-
tested the south German alliance. Radowitz was also alarmed about the 
possibility of a major conflict among the members of the German Confeder-
ation at a time when France was assuming a rather aggressive posture. 
The sleeplessness that had plagued him in 1836 returned, and he was 
forced to leave his charge for a. cure at Willingshausen. He suffered 
from a severe case of rheumatism, and he_.ho.ped that the healing waters 
would alleviate some of his pain. However, the waters could not cure 
his concern about the outcome of the quarrel over the fortresses. On 
June 6, 1840, the day before the death of his sovereign, he wrote his 
wife that were he not married and a father, he would r-esi,gn his .. d.uties ... 
13Ibid. 
14 
and seek the p.e.ace. and seclusion of a monastery. 
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While. Radowitz was attemp.ti.ng_.to.~.rega.i.t} his health, events, which 
had their roots far .away from .Ge.rmany .. , .. ,i.n .. tJ:i.e, troubled Near East made a 
quick solution to the conflict over. the.. fo.rt.resses of the utmost import-
ance. With French supp.a.rt, Mohammed Ali, the .Pasha of Egypt, had de-
clared war against the Ott.0man Empir.e. ... in. 1832 and the great powers of 
Europe had become involved. France, with the .ultra-nationalist Adolph 
Thiers as Foreign Minister, was wiLli.ng.to go to war to save face and 
Mohammed Ali from defeat. Ali attacked .and .o.ccupied part of Syria. But 
the British, alarmed over the possible g.r.ow:th of French influence in that 
part of the world, aided the Ottoman trooiis~ .. in expelling him. When the 
people of Syria joined the fight. .. agai.ns.t the. invader, Ali was forced to 
retreat, and: France lost considerable prestig,e. Had Thiers been willing 
to accept this outcame, the matter would have been forgotten. But the 
French Foreign Minister decided to repair the damaged prestige 0f France 
by uttering threats against divided Germany. French newspapers carried 
the demand to extend the French frontier to the Rhine, and cries of "To 
the Rhine, to the Rhine,!! were sounded throug];i, the Gallic kingdom. For-
tunately for the preservation of p.eace, the.. aggressive schemes of Thiers 
were not shared by his monarch, Louis Philippe, and the war fever died 
down after he dismissed the Foreign Minister after only a few months in 
ff . 15 o ice. 
But the French rhetoric had by this time prompted a wave. 0f 
patriotic indignation which s1wept over Germany in the early forties, 
14Ibid., PP• 298-299. 
15Alfred Cobban, ! History of Modern France (Baltimore, 1968), II, 
PP• 108-109. 
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leaving in its wake a spate of nationalistic anthems written by a group 
of radical poets. Nicholas Becker wrote his "Rheinlied:" "They shall not 
have it, the free German Rhine!" Max Schneckenburger, fired by patriotic 
zeal, wrote the well known and still popular "Die Wacht !m Rhein." Ul-
timately this patriotic effusion of the 1840s produced the future na-
tional anthem of Germany,. Heinri.ch von Falle.r.sleben' s "Deutschland Uber 
all es." Other popul.ar poets of the .. ag.a,-.G.eo.rg Herwegh and Hermann Ferd-
inand Freilig.rath, also lent their talents to the outpouring of German 
. 1 · 16 nat1.ona 1.sm. 
The war never came, but the resp.onsibility for military preparation 
for a possible French attack lay heavily upon the Military Commission of 
the German Confederation nonetheless, and Radowitz soon found himself in 
the middle of these concerns. On October 23, 1840, the King summoned 
his representative to Berlin. Radowitz sp.ent three weeks at Sanssouci 
discussing every angle of the crisis with his monarch, and was greatly 
alarmed about the possibility of a war for which Germany was not pre-
pared. As was his custom, he mathematically calculated the possible out-
come of such a war and the possible German strategy. He figured that 
since England had split with France over the Egyptian question, the 
British and the Russians would side with the Gennans. In this event, he 
speculated that Prussia, Austria and the other German states could have 
400,000 men on a line from Trier to Rastatt in eight weeks and a force 
of one million under anns in eleven. The British and Russians would de-
stroy the French fleet in the Mediterranean and capture the French colony 
16Treitschke, History of Germany, VI, pp. 389-395; J. G. Robertson, 
!!_ History of German Literature, 5th ed., rev. by Edna Purdie~ al. 
(London, 1966), pp. 455-465. 
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of Algeria. Then Russian troops would land near Antwerp and attack 
France from the north, while the German troops moved toward Paris from 
the Rhine. After the defeat of France, Radowitz believed that the German 
Confederation should be enlarged to include the German speaking peoples 
of Switzerland, the Low Countries and France. In this idea he was re-
fleeting the spirit of German nationalism which called for the creation 
of a German nation-state including_ all German speaking areas. Radowitz 
also proposed to erect federal fortresses at Maastricht, Mainz, Strass-
burg and Basel. In this way, Germany would be safe from any possible 
French. aggression, and the German peop.Le-w:ould be united. Radowitz ar-
gued that Frederick William IV should not wait for Vienna to make a de-
cision, but seize the initiative himself and by so doing emerge as the 
17 
leader of a stronger and more united Germany! 
Although Louis Philippe had removed Thiers from office and expressed 
his desire to preserve the peace, the French had mobilized their troops 
and still had 250,000 men on the German frontiers. While Metternich was 
satisfied with the actions of the French monarch, the Prussian King and 
his advisors believed that the incident had shown the necessity of prep-
aration for war in case the extreme nationalists should once again gain 
the upper hand in Paris. Therefore, the Prussian King and his ministers 
decided to accept Radowitz 1 s recommendations for a program which would 
require every member of the German Confederation to fulfill their obliga-
18 
tion for the mutual defense and submitted this as a formal proposal. 
The original Confederation Army consisted of 300,000 men, of which 
17R d . G h" h M. Lb 72 83 a owitz, esc ic te eines e ens, pp. - • 
18Ibid., PP• 83-85. 
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Austria and Prussia were to provide threa .corps and the other German 
states enough soldiers to make up .four additional corps. The Prussian 
plan of 1840 would enlarge .. the .size of the F.ederal Army to 610,000 men: 
300,000 men from Prussia, 150,000 men from Austria and the remainder 
from the other states. Berlin also proposed to station an army of 
100,000 Prussians on the lower Rhine and a second of the same size on 
the middle Rhine. The third Prussian army would be stationed on the 
Elbe to reinforce the .other. two armies.. Officials in Berlin estimated 
that it would take from seven to eight .weeks .. to organize the forces and 
move them into place. Austria.was to station its army on the upper 
Danube. The other German states were to divide their forces between the 
lower and middle Rhine. Frederick William IV sent Radowitz and Grolmann 
19 
to lay this proposal before Habsburg court in November, 1840. 
On the way to Vienna, Radowitz stopped at Dresden, the capital of 
the Kingdom of Saxony, to win the support of King Frederick Augustus II. 
He spent several days discussing the military reorganization with the 
King and his ministers and was able to persuade them to lend their sup-
port to the Hohenzollern program. Radowitz also spent some time in con-
ference with the commander of the IX Corps and future King of Saxony, 
Prince John. The Prince was greatly impressed by Radowitz and wrote that 
he was the only person he had met who seemed to really understand the 
plans of King Frederick William IV, who had assumed the throne on June 
7, 1840. After a short visit with the romantic author Ludwig Tieck, 
Radowitz traveled by way of Prague to the Habsburg capital to present 
19Ibid., p. 85; Holborn, History of Germany, 1648-1840, p. 446. 8 
20 
the Prussian proposals. 
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Arriving in Vienna on November 20., Radowitz spent several days in 
negotiations with Metterni.ch. He po.int.ed ... o.ut the many weaknesses of the 
Confederation and championed joint Austro-Prussian cooperation to de-
velop the defense capability of Germany. Radowitz learned that Vienna 
was as concerned with the possibility of war against Russia as against 
France, but the Austrian Foreign Minister aSJ=fed to the Prussian plan in 
principle, and Radowitz and Grolmann .wo.rked., o'ut the details with Karl 
Ludwig von Fiquelmont, the chief of the Austrian military. They agreed 
that within four weeks two Austrian units would move to Pilsen and 
Braunau and t.hen within six weeks to WU.rzburg and Ulm. A division was 
to remain at Bregenz to act as reinforcements. Thus Austria had agreed 
to the Prussian suggestions and had abandoned her idea of an attack on 
France through Switzerland. After dining with Emperor Francis, Radowitz 
21 
left Vienna to present the agreement to the south German courts. 
Radowitz arrived in Munich on November 30, where he found King Louis 
I open to the Prussian proposals. The King, who was very worried about 
the possibility of war with France, agreed to all aspects of the plan but 
expressed concern regarding Austria's loyalty to the Confederation. 
After Radowitz overcame Louis' doubts on this point, the monarch agreed 
that Bavaria's army would join that of the Confederation in the defense 
20John of Saxony, Lebenserinnerungs des K~nigs Johann~ Sachsen. 
Eigene Aufzeichnungen ~ KHnigs ll.berA,die Jahre 1801 bis 1854, ed. by 
Helmut Kretzschmar ( GHt.tingen., ... 19 58) , p. 1.63; . Hass el, Radowi tz , ·pp. 317 -
318. 
21Hassel, Radowitz, pp. 319-321;Treitschke, History of Germany, VI, 
pp. 404-405; "Aus dem T.agebuche .der- .F.\lsten ~lanie, 23-24. November 
1841," in Metternich, Nachgelassen Papieren, VI, pp. 396-397. 
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of Germany with the condition that the Wittelsbach troops would retain 
their sep.arate identity, at least in name. From Munich, the diplomatic 
mission proceeded to Stuttgart, the capital of WUrttemberg. 22 
On the trip to Stuttgart, Radowitz paused a few hours in Ulm to 
study the proposed site of the federal fortress, and noted the many 
technical difficulties that had to be over.co~ before construction could 
begin. Upon his arrival in Stuttgart, Radowitz found an atmosphere 
similar to that at Munich. King..Will.i.am.. I was more than willing to lend 
his support to the defense program .of Prussia with the one condition that 
the German commitment to defend Lombardy and Venetia be retained. Rado-
witz spent some time discussing the conflict over the fortresses with 
the Swabian monarch, who argued that the treaty between WUrttemberg and 
the other German states obligated him only to support the building of a 
fortress at Ratatt·but not at Ulm. However, Radowitz left Stuttgart 
with his support and continued his journey to Karlsruhe, the capital of 
23 
Baden. 
In Karlsruhe, Radowitz found a climate of fear. The Grand Duke and 
his ministers were very alarmed about the French threat and the possi-
bility that the other German powers would not come to their aid in the 
event of an attack. After negotiations with Friedrich von Blittersdorf, 
the Foreign Minister, and General von Freydorf, President of the College 
of War, Radowitz had no problem winning the support of the Grand Duchy 
for his program. With the taste of success in his mouth, Radowitz left 
22Hassel, Radowitz, p. 323. 
23Ibid., pp. 324-325. 
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Karlsruhe for the last stop on his diplomatic tour, Darmstadt. 
As was the case throughout his travels of 1840, Radowitz found. 
willing listeners in the Hessian capital. Arriving in the city on De-
65 
cember 14, he spent a short time speaking with Grand Duke Louis II and 
continued his negotiations with Foreign Minister du Thil and the Chief 
of the General Staff, General Ludwig Jakob von Lynucker. He spent most 
of his time with Prince Emil of Hesse, who without hesitation pledged 
himself to the Prussian program. With his wife and daughter Marie, who 
had met him in Darmstadt, Radowitz returned to Frankfurt on December 
18. 25 
His mission had made him a national figure, the newspapers featured 
laudatory articles about him, while Austria, Bavaria, WUrttemberg, Ba,-
den, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hanover and Saxony awarded him their highest or-
ders. The travels also gave Radowitz some time to improve his health. 
He wrote that he had never felt better than during those nights and days 
of traveling during the winter of 1840. However, his satisfaction was 
short lived; for at the beginning of 1841, Radowitz again returned to 
Berlin to find a completely different picture from that which he had 
left a few weeks earlier. With the dissipation of the threat of war, 
the unity he had found before was beginning to fall apart, and most 
states had failed to carry out. their part of the agreement for defense 
. 26 
that he had worked so hard to achieve. 
Realizing that it would be a great mistake to allow the spirit of 
cooperation that had emerged among the German states to break up, he 
24Ibid., PP• 325-326. 
25Ibid., PP• 326-327. 
26 . 
Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 90. 
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proposed to Frederick William IV that a reform of the Articles of War of 
the German Confederation be undertaken to insure the compliance of the 
German states with the program. on military deployment they had already 
accepted, but had failed to put into effect. On January 6, 1841, he sent 
a memorandum to the King outlining.his suggestions. He proposed that 
each member state should be assigned a sp.eci£ic number of troops as its 
contribution and that the Confede:c.at.ion .stri.ctly control the size of each 
contingent. The most impo.rtant part of his program was a requirement 
that each state adopt a clearly defined military budget. Finally, Rado-
witz advised his ruler that the Military Commission should inspect the 
various elements of the Federal Army every two years and report its find-
ings to the Federal Diet. Radowitz:l.cs program would have great.ly 
strengthened the authority of the Confederation. It would control the 
size and quality of the armies of the member states and, most important, 
exercise influence over their military spending, one of the most jealous-
ly guarded aspects of sovereignty. Thus through Radowitz's program, the 
foundations would.be laid for further strengthening of the powers of the 
27 
Confederation; the possibility of a stronger German union was opened. 
The Prussian monarch and his ministers agreed to Radowitz 's proposals 
and realized the urgency of a fundamental reform of the Confederation so 
that should any future threat develop, it could be met at once. Prussia 
proposed to Austria that the two German powers issue a joint declaration 
to the Federal Diet on the importance of a stronger federal army and 
27Hassel, Radowitz, p. 331. 
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communicate in detail portions of Radowitz's reform proposals. 
Vienna replied to the Prussian notes by sending General Heinrich 
67 
Hess, chief of the Austrian General Staff, to Berlin at the end of J anu-
ary, 1841, to negotiate on the matter. Frederick William IV assigned a 
commission consisting of William Johann von Krauseneck, Chief of the 
General Staff of the Army, Ludwig Gustav von Thile, Minister of the 
Treasury, and Radowitz to discuss the proposal with the Austrian repre-
sentative. Radowitz found in Hess a reasonable man with whom he could 
work well. The two conferred througho.ut the following month, and Austria 
accepted all the proposals with the exception of the suggested inspec-
tions •. At the end of February, Hess returned to Vienna to lay the plan 
bf hi . 29 e ore s superiors. 
After reaching agreement with the largest Ge.rman power, Prussia 
still had to win the support of the other thirty-five German states. 
This task fell partially to Radowitz, who undertook another diplomatic 
venture, the first stop of which was Hanover. Radowitz spent almost 
three days trying to win King Ernest Augustus's approval for the pro-
gram. After achieving his goal, Radowitz departed to Kassel, the site 
f h . hf 1 h . 1 . . 3 O o is yout u urn1 1at1on. 
In Kassel, .Radowitz, full of anticipation, encountered his former 
friend, Crown Prince Frederick William. As he explained the proposals 
to the Regent, the Prince treated the Prussian representative as if 
nothing had occurred between them. After Radowitz explained every 
28 . 
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detail of the Prussian plan, he was invited to dine with the Regent and 
his court. Naturally, the discussion turned to domestic politics, and 
Radowitz subsequently wrote that the attitude of the Prince was a "mix-
ture between arrogance and willfulness which reminds one of the insanity 
of ancient tyrannies." Because of his strong belief in the importance 
of morality and family life, Radowitz believed that the major cause of 
the Prince's problems was his sexual licentiousness and that only a nor-
mal Christian marriage could save him from becoming an absolutist. So 
strong was the dedication to his reli.gion .that the Prussian thought that 
in order to be a good and effective ruler, o.ne must also be a dedicated 
Christian. He found that many believed that .the Prince would follow the 
I 
lead of the King of. Hanover and abolish t~,e constitution upon assuming 
the throne. Despite Radowitz 1 s efforts,' the Prince refused to commit 
himself, and the Prussian envoy returned to his post in Frankfurt. 31 
On March 13, the Federal Diet met to discuss the proposed changes 
in the Articles of War. Aft~r som~, deliberation, the Diet instructed 
the Military Commission to recommend the measures necessary to place the 
Federal Army on a wartime footing.. Through the combined efforts of 
Austria and Prussia, the Commission accepted the recommendations of the 
two leading powers and submitted its report on March 26, 1841. Thus, 
Radowitz I s proposed changes in the Articles of War of the German Con-
federation were approved. Although there was some resistance to the 
inspections, within a few years Radowitz 1s program was in effect, and 
32 
the Germ.an Confederation had a much more effective army. 
31Ibi"d., 344 p. • 
32 . Ibid., pp. 346-348, 315; Protokolle der deutsche Bundesversamm-
lung ~ J ahre 1841 (Frankfurt, 18.41), p. 181. 
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While the proposed changes were accepted, their value was obscured 
by the renewal of the argument over the fortresses. The same day that 
the Articles of War were changed, the Diet voted to build the two for-
tresses and to allow the states; in which they were to be located the 
right to participate in their planning. Thus, Bavaria and WUrttemberg 
oversaw the building of the fortress at Ulm and Baden that at Rastatt. 
The Connnission selected Radowitz to sup.ervise the construction at Ras-
tatt, and the Prussian representative quickly prepared preliminary plans 
33 
for the project. 
Although the Diet had decided to build the fortresses and enacted 
regulations to supervise their operation, the powers of the German Con-
federation were so limited that it could not enforce its decision. Be-
fore Radowitz had a chance to complete his work, he found himself in-
volved in the petty rivalry between Bavaria and WUrttemberg over the pro-
posed fortress. Bavaria wanted the major portion of the project to be 
located on its side of the Danube, while WUrttemberg demanded that the 
center of the fortress be sited on its territory. In the debate, 
Austria threw its support to Bavaria, thus giving Prussia the opportun-
34 
ity to mediate. Since the Confederation was too weak to solve the 
conflict, long negotiations followed. 
Once the struggle between Bavaria and WUrttemberg began, it was not 
long before other elements were added to the conflict. On March 26, the 
Federal Diet had agreed that the two states would share the right to ap-
point the Governor, Connnandant and General Director of the proposed 
33Ibid. 
34 
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fortress at Ulm. This co,mpromise was unacceptable to W\!rttemberg, which 
refused to allow Bavaria to participate in the selection of the command-
ers. Naturally, the Wittelsbach Kingdom could not allow its rights to 
be disregarded by WUrttemberg.,. and a very serious argument ensued. On 
August 12, King Louis I of Bavaria conferred with Radowitz at BrUckenau 
and denounced W\!rttemberg.' s attempts.. to control the fortress. Radowitz 
proposed that the two kingdoms accept. a .compromise: WUrttemberg would 
name the Commandant, Bavaria would ap.p.oint the Governor, and both states 
would share the right to name the General Director. Louis agreed to 
• 
this but expressed doubts that it would ba accepted by William I. He 
asked Radowitz to use his influence to p.eJ;'.suade Berlin to try to win 
35 
Stuttgart's agreement. 
Throughout 18Al, the argument between the two states continued. In 
November, Frederick William IV went to Munich to visit his dying mother-
in-law, Dowager Queen Karoline of Bavaria. While paying his respects to 
her, the Prussian monarch: found the time to attempt an arbitration be~ 
. , 
tween the two south Gennan kingdoms. At Augsburg, on November 15, he 
met King William I,. who attempted to win his support. When Frederick 
William returned to the Bavarian capital, he heard a similar plea from 
Louis I and his ministers. Finally, the Prussian King invited Radowitz 
to intercede once again between the rivals. After studying the issue 
further, Radowitz traveled to Berlin in December to present his re-
36 
port. 
After several weeks in Berlin, Radowitz left for Vienna, Munich and 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid., PP• 353-354. 
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Stuttgart to attempt to find a solution to the conflict. In the Aus-
trian capital, the Prussian envoy found that much had changed since his 
last visit. He encountered suspicion and unf.riendliness at every turn. 
Metternich refused to commit himself on the issue, and after several 
days, Radowitz gratefully left the Habsburg court for his next stop.37 
In Munich, Radowitz found a much more pleasant atmosphere. The 
Prussian messenger met with the Bavarian King, and although Louis I made 
clear his antagonism towards William I, the Wittelsbach monarch was 
willing to compromise and negotiate on the issue. He gave Radowitz a 
treaty to submit to William I as a solution to the conflict. This docu-
. . . h . f . d b R d · 38 ment put in writing t e compromise irst suggeste y a owitz. 
In Stuttgart, the greatest obs.tac le to agreement was. the strong re-
luctance of the King to compromise his position in any manner. William 
l's chief concern was his sovereignty over Ulm, which was the second 
largest city of his kingdom. Radowitz argued that the German Confeder-
ation was not a "foreign power" as the King saw it. Finally, on Febru-
ary 16, 1842, the monarch signed the proposed treaty between his kingdom 
and Bavaria, and.Radowitz ended his mission with success. Therefore, 
Radowitz had been able to finally solve the dispute over the fortresses 
and in so doing, safegu~rd the provisions of the revised Articles of 
War. 39 
His diplomatic efforts during 1841 and 1842 had made Radowitz fully 
aware of the real weakness of the German Confederation. The spector of 
old German particularism threatened to destroy all his work towards a 
common defense against possible attack from France as the German states 
37Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 100. 
38 Ibid.; Hassel, Radowitz, p. 360. 
39Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 100; Hassel, Radowitz, 
pp. 360-361. 
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involved themselves in petty disputes. The settlement of 1815 had 
failed to unite the thirty-seven states, and France would have no trou-
ble dividing Germany as it had done throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Although he had met with success in his efforts 
to reform the Articles of War and had solved the fortress dispute, the 
Confederation still required radical reform, and to this end Radowitz 
began developing a plan which would culminate: in this proposal of 1847. 
While occupied with finding a solution to the fortress problem and 
revising the Articles of War, Radowitz found himself involved in other 
controversial matters. The transfer of Radowitz from Berlin to Frank-
furt in 1836 had not satisfied his enemies at court. Within a year they 
had found a pretext to accuse him of disloyalty. This came about as the 
result of the Cologne episcopal dispute of 1837. Since Prussia had ac-
quired the Rhine Province in 1815, mixed marriages between Protestant 
Prussians and the local Roman Catholic population had become quite fre-
quent. In such cases, the Hohenzollern kingdom had applied the law of 
Frederick II, which required that all male children should be brought 
up in the religion of their father and all females in that of their 
mother. Such a compromise was in direct violation of Roman Catholic 
canon law, however, which required that all children of a mixed marriage 
be taught the Roman Catholic religion. When the devout Clemens August 
von Droste-Vischering was named Archbishop of Cologne in 1837, the con-
flict between Prussian law and Roman Catholic canon law erupted into 
open warfare. The new Archbishop refused to depart from the letter of 
canon law and follow the laws of Prussia. Frederick William III, who 
had allowed him to assume the archepiscopal see on the understanding 
that he would follow the Prussian law, demanded that he resign at once. 
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When Droste-Vischering refused to do so, the King ordered him arrested 
and imprisoned at the fortress at Minden in November, 1837. The dispute 
led to a deepening of the conflict between Rome and Berlin and involved 
all of Germany in a passionate debate. over the rights of the state in 
f 1 . . 40 matters o re 1g1on. 
Since Radowitz was at the same time a servant of the Prussian state 
and a devout Raman Catholic, he was de.ep.J...y affected by the struggle. 
While he objected to the violent reaction of the ultramontane party, led 
by Joseph Gtlrres of Munich, author of the anti-Prussian tract, Athanas-
~' he believed that Berlin had acted unjustly in the case. At first, 
he considered leaving the Prussian serv.ice; had he been at the center 
of the dispute in Berlin he might have done so. But in time his feel-
ings cooled and he decided against resignation. Yet the controversy was 
so bitter that Radowitz broke with a number of his friends, including 
the Gerlach brothers, who were most ardent in their support of the ac-
tion of the King. He also ceased to take part in the publication of 
the Berliner politischen Wochenblatt. 41 
When the Prussian government searched the effects of the Archbishop 
and his supporter, Anton Joseph Bintern, it discovered several papers 
and letters which put Radowitz in a rather compromising position. Among 
these documents were spurious reports that Radowitz had been critical of 
his King in his support of the Cathalic cause. Berlin was full of ru-
mors about these alleged disloyal acts and statements by Radowitz. The 
Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung., the Fr'ankische Merkur, Europas Salon and 
40 
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other newspapers spread rumors to the effect that he had en.gaged in acts 
of treason. Some conservative.Protestants in Berlin demanded his dis-
missal; Radowitz faced what could have been.the end of his career. But 
\ 
he vehemently denied the charges, and fortunately his many friends, in-
eluding the Crown Prince, rallied to his cause and thwarted his enemies. 
The cabinet ordered the--1;,~P:zi:&¥: .. All.g.eme.ine Z eitung to publish a re-
traction of its stories critical oLRadow:itz, and his name was cleared. 
But the whole incident caused him g.i:eat mental turmoil and many sleep-
. 42 
less m.ghts. The most important res.u.lt .. of the Cologne episcopal dis-
pute was that Radowitz separated himself forever from the reactionary 
circles in Berlin and began to: realize that some form of freedom had to 
exist in any state. With this step, Radowitz began the journey that 
would lead him to favor a constitution during the stormy years between 
1848 and 1850. 
The passions stirred by the dispute might have continued to smolder 
had not Frederick William IV become King in 1840 and reached a compro-
mise with the Catholic prelate. As Crown 'Prince, the King had disap-
proved of his father's handling of the affair, so Radowitz hoped for a 
change in the Prussian attitude towards Roman Catholicism once the new 
King could take action on the matter. As head of the Lutheran state 
Church, the Prussian monarch was greatly influenced by developments in 
the Church of England. He watched with anticipation and sympathy the 
development of the Oxford Movement and the.work of Edward Pusey, who had 
emerged as the leader of a group of Anglican priests who called upon 
421b1.' d., 60 62 pp. - • 
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their church to restore its Catholic her.itag.e. The Prussian monarch )lad 
read the works of the leaders of the movement and desired a similar re-
newal in his own church. He was also convinced of the importance of 
bishops and because of this sought a solution of the conflict with the 
43 
Roman Catholics. 
The King first had to reach a reconciliation with the troublesome 
Archbishop. von Dro.ste-Vischedng.. w:hich would leave the monarch I s pres-
tige untainted but at the .same- .. t.ime .not .. al.ien,ate his Roman Catholic sub-
jects. He decided to ask the p.re.late. to .n~e a Vicar General and then 
resign, hoping in this way to win back the support of the Catholics. 
When asked for his opinion, Radowitz sugges.ted that the Archbishop name 
a Coadjutor, a bishop with the right of succession to the .. se.e.,. who would 
be acceptable to both the King and the Pope, and then resign~ Frededck 
William IV accepted this proposal and pardoned the prelate for his ac-
tions in 1837. The Prussian King then asked Radowitz to travel to Rome 
to negotiate with the Vatican on the matter. Believing that it would 
be better for the King to send someone who was not suspect to the Prates-
tants, Radowitz · declined the King I s request,. and Count Friedrich von 
BrUhl went to Rome instead. However, Radowitz continued to mediate the 
dispute behind the scenes. Johannes Geissel received the approval of 
both the King and Rome, and after the death of Droste-Vischering on 
October 19, 1845, became the Archbishop, thus ending the conflict in·a 
manner acceptable to both sides. 44 
Radowitz's religious activity did not confine itself to matters 
43R d. • G h" h b 76 77 a owitz, esc 1c te Meines Le ens, pp. - • 
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relating to his Roman Catholic faith, but also led to the establishment 
of the joint Lutheran-Anglican Bishop.ric in Jerusalem. With the in-
volvement'of Europe in the Near East, it was only natural that religious 
factors should enter into the issue, since the powers were arguing over 
the Holy Land. Mohammed Ali had adopt.ed a policy of religious to lera-
tion· for Roman Catholics, Orthodox and Protestant Christians. Since he 
had. been driven back to his native E.g.yp.t_ .and. the power of the Sultan was 
restored in the Holy Land, Europeans were greatly concerned over the fu-
' 
ture of religious toleration. In order to guarantee the rights of the 
three great branches of Christianity, Radowitz suggested to his King 
that each have a representative in Jerusalem to protect its interests. 
The Prussian King accepted Radowitz's proposal and attempted to win the 
support of Paris and St. Petersburg for this idea, but found that both 
states were unwilling to accord toleration to any other branch of the 
faith. However, Radowitz's suggestion was not fruitless, for the Pro-
testant monarch began negotiations with London with the object of found-
ing a joint Lutheran-Anglican mission to the Holy Land~ In 1841, the 
Bishopric in Jerusalem was found.ed by England and Prussia. Both sides 
agreed that the bishop and clergy should have Anglican apostolic succes-
sion and that the two nations would alternate in the right to name the 
bishop. This joint venture lasted until 1887, when the Prussian Church 
withdrew. But the Anglican support continued, and the Jerusalem see 
grew to become an autonomous member of the Anglican Communion under an 
Archbishop in Jerusalem and several bishops. Through his suggestion, 
Radowitz significantly affected the growth of the Anglican Communion. 45 
45Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 95; Treitschke, History of 
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In addition to bringing a solution to the Cologne episcopal dispute 
and.opening negotiations leading. to the establishment of the Bishopric 
in Jerusalem, 1840 opened a new chapter in Radowitz•s life through the 
ascension of the Crown Prince to the throne as King Frederick William 
IV. He had been a close friend of the new monarch for several years and 
through his. intervention had climbed higher in the service of his 
adopted land. German liberals g.reeted the. new King in the belief that 
his reign would bring about constitutional reform in the Hohenzollern 
lands. Some believed that he would lead Prussia to the foremost po-
sition in the Germanies and. work for unificat.ion, and. his first actions 
as ruler gave credence to these hopes. He restored the exiled poet 
Ernst Moritz Arndt to his chair at Bonn and called the historian Fried-
rich Christoph Dahlmann to a position at the university on the Rhine. 
Dahlmann had won fame and support from the liberals for his resignation 
from his chair at Gtsttingen University rather than accept the absolutist 
government of the King of Hanover in 1837. The Grimm brothers, who had 
joined Dahlmann in resigning their posts at the Hanoverian university, 
were granted posts at the Berlin Akademie. Frederick William also ap-
pointed a new ministry composed of men with .liberal sentiments. He also 
relaxed censorship of the press and restored the provincial estates, 
which he invited to establish committees to advise him. 46 
However, those who believed that the ascension of the new King 
would herald a new age of liberalism in Germany were mistaken. For the 
monarch was not a liberal but a romantic, to whom the modern ideas of 
liberalism were meaningless. His goal was not to provide for the 
46carr, History of Germany, p. 29. 
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welfare of his people in a material or intellectual sense, but rather 
to assist them to live according to the will of God and prepare them-
selves for· the afterlife. The new King dreamed of a restoration of the 
Holy Roman Empire with the Habsburg Emperor on the throne. He also 
hoped to erect a great alliance of all European states to insure peace 
and cooperation. Frederick Willi.am IV was a product of the roman.tic 
age, and his political ideas and actions showed this. He had a tendency 
to vacillate on the issues and to agre.ewith whomever he was speaking. 
It is of no little significance to remember that in 1858, the King was 
declared insane and his brother, the future Emperor William I, made re-
gent. While the study of psychology was not advanced enough in his day 
to obtain a scientific diagnosis of his illness, his symptoms suggest 
that the new King might have been mentally incompetent throughout the 
47 
entire period he sat on the throne. 
Many assumed that Frederick William IV would call Radowitz to Ber-
lin immediately and appoint him to a high post in the government, per-
haps a place on the General Staff or as Minister of War. The Countess 
Voss, Radowitz 1 s mother-in-law, had written Frederick William IV while 
he was still Crown Prince to ask him to relieve her son-in-law of his 
duties in Frankfurt and assign him to Berlin. However, on May 8, the 
future monarch replied that he was very pleased with Radowitz 1 s accom-
plishments on the Military Commission and wished him to continue his 
good work. Speculation on the matter continued, and on June 17, 1840, 
the Augsburger Allgemeine Z~itung lent credence to the belief that the 
4711Resume d'une conve[rsation en septembre 1841 avec Mr. de Radowitz 
a Frandfort sur le Main," Peter von Meyendorff, Ein russischer Diplomat 
an den Ht:Jfen von Berlin und Wien, ed. by Otto Hoetzsch (Berlin, 1923),. --- ---- ---- ---- -----p. :·_184. 
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new King would promote Radowitz through a report that he was to be named 
to an important office in the new government. However, upon the ascen-
sion of Frederick William IV, Radowitz did not receive a new post, but 
. . 48 
continued his work in Frankfurt. 
Although he remained in Frankfurt, Radowitz became one of the new 
King's most important advisors on problems such as that which arose over 
the coup de etat of King Ernest Augustus of Hanover. Since 1837, the 
Kingdom of Hanover had been involved in a bitter dispute between the 
ruler and the Diet. The Guelph monarch attempted to impose an absolutist 
constitution on his kingdom and met with the resistence of the Diet. In 
January, 1848, Frederick William IV traveled to England for the baptism 
of the Prince of Wales and stopped in Hanover. While there, King Ernst 
Augustus won his support in the argument with the Diet. Later that 
year, the Hanoverian King traveled to Berlin seeking additional en,-
couragement from the Hohenzollern ruler. In March, 1842, the Prussian 
King called Radowitz to Berlin to ask his advice on the problem. After 
studying the issue, Radowitz determined that Ernest Augustus was wrong 
and that Frederick William IV would make a serious mistake if he were 
to lend support to the Guelph monarch in his struggle with the Diet. 
Gratified that his sovereign had called him to Berlin to seek his 
opinion. Radowitz used his influence to persuade the Prussian King to 
separate himself from the actions of Ernest Augustus and helped the 
monarch write a manifesto clarifying his position on the issue. This 
document stated that the Prussian King believed that the King of Hanover 
should follow the constitution of his kingdom and that the dispute did 
48 




not involve matters of concern to the Gennan Confederation. Thus 
Radowitz again favored legal methods in the struggle with the liberals 
and opposed attempts to use coercion against them. 
Since Radowitz had enjoyed considerable success in diplomacy, many 
began to believe that he could better serve the interests of his country 
in the diplomatic service. In 1841, Count Mortimer von Maltzan, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, had sugg.es.ted that Radowitz be named Di-
rector of the Political section of the Fore.ign Ministry, but before this 
could be acted upon, Maltzan became ill, and his suggestion was for-
gotten. For several years, Radowitz had wanted to become Prussian Min-
ister to the Courts of Baden, Hesse-Dannstadt and Nassau, with head-
quarters in Karlsruhe. He had long enjoyed the, atmosphere and location 
of the capital city of Baden and hoped to live there, but the dispute 
over the fortresses had delayed any discussion on the matter. While 
Radowitz was in Berlin in March, 1842, discussion began about the 
possibility of assigning him to some diplomatic post. For a time, the 
King considered naming his friend as the new Prussian member of the 
Diet of the Gennan Confederation, but decided instead to give the post 
to Count August von Donhoff-Friedrichsteiri. Disappointed, Radowitz re-
turned to Frankfurt to find that he had been, awarded the post he de-
sired, Prussian Minister to Baden, Hesse-Dannstadt and Nassau. On 
August 1, 1842, Radowitz and his family arrived in Karlsruhe to begin a 
h . h" 50 new c apter 1n 1s career. 
In the years spent at Frankfurt, Radowitz had learned a great deal 
that would shape his political philosophy and prepare him for his work 
SOlbid., PP• 102-106. 
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for German unification. He saw first hand the disunity and weakness of 
the Confede~ation and began to consider how to remedy this situation .. 
He deepened his knowledge of the art of dip.lomacy and of the other Ger-
man states. Through his efforts to: formulate a comnon defense posture 
in the face of the French threat in 1840, he had emerged a well known 
and respected figure in German affairs, a position he would be able to 
use in the years ahead. In short, Radowitz matured greatly in knowledge 
and experience during the years of service in Frankfurt and learned, much 
that would aid him in 1848. He would continue to learn and develop his 




The next chapter in Radowitz 1 s life was an interlude of relative 
calm between his years with the Military Connnission and the events that 
were to follow the Revolution of 1848. By the time Radowitz arrived in 
the capital of Baden on August 1, 1842, the tension caused by the con-
flict over the fortress had been forgotten, and once again Baden and 
Prussia enjoyed a cordial relationship. From one of the centers of the 
German liberal movement he witnessed firsthand the constitutional strug-
. 1 
gles in Baden as well as those in Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. At the 
same time, and despite his distance from Berlin, Radowitz still exerted 
an influence over Frederick William IV and thus contributed to the shap-
ing of German history. Though one often gets the impression that the 
18i40s were a period of such intense reaction that the liberals had no 
alternative but revolution in 1848, this is not really the case. Many 
important reforms had taken place before the outbreaks of March, 1848, 
and even before then Prussia was well on the road to the development of 
a constitutional form of government. From his new position in Karlsruhe, 
Radowitz watched these events with great interest. 
Since the acension of Frederick William IV to the throne, liberals 
had looked to him with the hope that he would undertake much needed 
1Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, PP• 106-107. 
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reforms and lead his s.tate toward a constitutional system. Throughout 
1840 and 1841, the new monarch had indeed con temp lated changes i.n the 
Prussian government and gave evidence that he intended a thoroughgoing 
reform. He believed that the legislative arm of the state should be 
composed of the historical estates which had been in existence since 
medieval times. Since the estates formed the provincial diets which 
only considered matters of a local nature, the cabinet issued an order 
on August 18, 1842, instructing the provincial diets to name connnittees 
to represent their interests at a meeting in Berlin on October 18. The 
King hoped that this action would complement the regional chambers with 
a body to discuss issues of national importance. The United Connnittees 
of the Diets were to have no real power and could only consider matters" 
2 
referred to them by the government, but many interpreted the calling of 
the connnittees to be the first step in providing Prussia with true rep-
resentative government. However, time was to show that the optimists of 
1842 misinterpreted their King's motives. 
Again in September, while the Prussian ruler participated in the 
laying of the cornerstone of the Cathedral at Cologne, he evinced further 
signs of a reformist mood through a speech on the importance of German 
unity. After leaving Cologne, the King traveled to Koblenz where he met 
Radowitz, who acted as his guide as he journeyed through Baden to Neu-
chatel, the Hohenzollern principality in Switzerland, and back to Frank-
furt. While accompanying his ruler, Radowitz discussed with him the 
plans for the upcoming meeting of the United Connnittees and the hopes 
2Treitschke, History of Germany, VI, p. 516; Huber, Verfassungsges-
chichte, II, p. 488. 
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of the liberals that this would lead to true representative government. 
Since many had misinterpreted the calling. of the Committees as a sign 
that the King was on the verge of grantin,g a constitution, Radowitz 
recommended that he make his intentions clear by issuing a manifesto on 
the issue. Radowitz drafted a proposed statement and gave it to the 
3 
monarch while they were in Frankfurt. 
In the meantime, the Austrians became quite concerned with the de-
velopments in Prussia, and Metternich traveled to the Rhineland to dis-
cover the intentions of the Hohenzollern. rul.er. Radowitz met with the 
Austrian Foreign Minister at his estate, Johannisberg, to reassure him 
that Frederick William had not been converted to liberalism. As the 
two discussed the issue, Radowitz realized how different it was to be a 
political leader, for men at the center of politics had to be concerned 
with every possible change in the system that might jeopardize their 
. 4 
position. 
Radowitz's proposed manifesto was couched in very vehement terms 
and stated that the King had no intention of turning his state into a 
liberal constitutional monarchy or yielding·power to the majority. The 
wording of the document was so strong that many of the King's advisors 
believed that it would cause too much antagonism. Therefore, the mon-
arch and his ministers decided that it would be better for the ruler not 
to make a statement to the Committees, but instead to have the Minister 
of the Interior, Count Adolf von Arnim, open the proceedings with a 
less defiant but also more ambiguous statement of the King's purposes 
3 
Radowitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, p. 111. 
4Ibid., p. 110; Hassel, Radowitz, P• 370. 
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in calling the meeting. Furthermore, when the Committees of the Pro-
vincial Diets met at Berlin on October 17, 1842, Frederick William IV 
spent a great deal of time conferring with members of the Committees and 
left them with the impression that he,favored constitutional reforms. 
Consequently, though the government had called the Connnittees merely to 
support the construction of an all-Prussian railroad system, the dis-
cussions soon turned to the matter of constitutional reform. After the 
delegates began to demand the creation of a representative government, 
the King ordered the meetings ended on November 10. Although they had 
actually accomplished very little, the meetings aroused in many the hopes 
5 
of more permanent representative institutions. 
At the end of 1842, Frederick William called Radowitz to seek his 
advice on proposed changes in the censorship law. When the King as-
cended the throne, he favored freedom of the press, but the Karlsbad 
Decrees of 1819 and the Prussian Censorship Law of the same year forbade 
this. The Karlsbad decrees required that all publications of less than 
twenty pages receive the approval of governmental officials before re-
lease. The Decrees also held the local governments responsible for the 
prevention of the publication of any works that might threaten these-
curity of the Confederation. As required by the German Confederation, 
Prussia had created a strict system of national and local censorship 
under the Censorship office of the Ministry of the Interior. The Prus-
sian law required the submission of the manuscript of every periodical, 
tract or book to the censor for approval or change before publication. 
5Treitschke, History .2.f. Germany, VI, pp. 516-517; ibid., pp. 520-
521; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, II, p. 488. 
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In the summer of 1841, the King decided to allow the press in his lands 
as much freedom as possible without violating-the censorship laws of the 
Confederation. He secured the advice of Radowitz, who fully approved 
of his ruler's intentions. On December 24, 1841, Frederick William IV 
instructed provincial officials to re.lax enforcement of the censorship 
6 
law. 
The new freedom of expression resulting from the King's decree 
caused a substantial increase in the publication and importation of 
works critical of the Prussian government. This led the King to support 
several conservative publications which he hoped would act as a counter-
weight to the liberal ones. Since the old conservative Berliner Poli-
tische Wochenblatt had ceased publication in 1841, the government trans-
ferred its support to the Literarische Zeitung, edited by C.H. Brandes, 
Upon recommendation of Radowitz, Frederick William called Victor Aime 
Huber to Berlin, where he founded a conservative journal entitled Janus. 
However, this was unsuccessful, and the increasing criticism of the 
government caused the monarch to begin to reconsider his reform of the 
7 
censorship law. 
Radowitz arrived in Berlin shortly after the beginning of 1843 to 
advise the Hohenzollern monarch on the censorship question. He went im-
mediately to work and within a month produced a draft law for submission 
to the ministry. Radowitz suggested that a system of self-censorship 
6Treitschke, History of Germany, VI, pp. 525-527; "Provisorische 
Bestimm.ungen hinsichtlich der Freiheit der Presse von 20. September 
1819," and 11Preussische Zensur-Verordnung von 18. Oktober 1819," Huber, 
Dokumente, I, pp. 91-93, 95-98. 
7 
Ibid., PP• 527-546. 
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be introduced. Each person in an official or scholarly office would be 
required to censor his own works and g.ive. .. assurauce that they did. not 
contain dangerous ideas. The works of men who could not give this as-
surance would be submitted to the censor for examination. Radowitz was 
not so lenient 'liltith newspapers and pamphlets. These he considered 
business ventures rather than true literature. He propos.ed that news-
papers be placed under the strict control of·the state, which would then 
issue licenses to publish only to respectable men who would guarantee 
that their publications would not contain dang.erous ideas. ·In Radowitz 's 
plan, the publisher would be personally resp.onsible for the contents of 
his newspaper and subject to fine or loss of license for violation of 
8 
the censorship law. 
However, the special commission set up by the King to examine the 
press did not sympathize with Radowitz 1 s proposals. Instead the King 
and his ministers decided to end the limited freedom of the press and 
reinstate strict censorship through enforcing the old law. Still, 
Frederick William did not completely abandon his desire for censorship 
reform and even asked Radowitz to undertake a diplomatic journey to 
Vienna to win Austrian approval for reform of the Federal censorship law·. 
But Radowitz, believing that such an effort would end in failure, de-
clined the request. 9 
His duties in Berlin completed, Radowitz returned to Karlsruhe, 
where he and his family lived in a house on the Kraiserstrasse. The 
Prussian Minister observed very closely the political affairs and 
8 
Radawitz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, pp. 113-114. 
9 
Ibid., PP• 114-115. 
88 
representative institutions of Baden and also traveled frequently to 
Frankfurt to follow the affairs of the. Mi.litary Connnission, on which he 
still represented Prussia. His best friends during this period were 
Julius Gottlob von Nositz, the Saxon member of the Federal Diet, and 
Friedrich von Pechlin, the member of the Federal Diet for Holstein-
Lauenburg. Radowitz 1 s duties were not demanding, and. he had time to be-
come acquainted with the growing radical elemi:µ.it in Baden. He occasion-
ally discussed politics with such men as Johann Adam von Itzstein, the 
chief spokesman of the opposition in the Badenese Diet, and Friedrich 
Karl Hecker, the leader of the democratic faction. The Grand Duke often 
conferred with Radowitz in times of political crisis and was advised to 
'd '11 1 ' lO avo1 any 1 ega actions. 
His observations of German liberalism and radicalism in action led 
Radowitz to think very seriously about political matters, and this led 
him to continue his writing. In 1846, he published anonymously.his most 
important political work of the Vorm~rz, his Colloquies upon State and 
Church. In this book, he constructed a hypothetical discuss among a 
Prussian officer, a liberal, a bureaucrat and a socialist. In spirited 
debate, each states his political position, and Waldheim, the central 
character and a personification of the author, intervenes to condemn 
political factionalism and the divisions it can cause in society. Wald-
heim appeals to each to adopt a moderate course of action. He criticizes 
not only democracy, as a source of partisan division, but absolute mon-
archy as well, as a relic of the past no longer viable as a form of 
government. The disdain for political parties as divisive forces in 
10 
Radowitz (son), Aiifzeichnungen und Erinnerungen, P• 2. 
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society and his appeal to moderation are ver.y important aspects of Rado-
ll 
witz's political philosophy. 
After 1843, Radowitz did not meet . .with Frederick William IV for al-
most two years. Finally, in July, 1845, the Hohenzollern King surmnoned 
Radowitz to Stolzenfels, where he was entertaining Queen Victoria of Eng-
land. The King not only promoted his friend to the rank of Major General 
but took the opportunity to d.iscuss his hop.e.s and plans for Prussia as 
well. Frederick William confided .. to him that he had not forgotten his 
desire to give his land a constitution, but that a group led by his 
brother, the future Emperor William I, fought every suggestion of this. 
But the King was determined; he had begun to consider calling together 
an assembly of deputies from the Provincial Diets to exercise very limit-
d d 1 12 . e powers over taxation an .. aws. 
Since Frederick William had recalled Canitz from his post in Vienna 
and had named him Foreign Minister in July, 1845, speculation circulated 
that the King would name Radowitz either Prussian Minister to Vienna or 
to the Federal Diet. Radowitz himself discussed this possibility with 
the King at Stolzenfels, hoping to use either position to begin reforms 
in the German Confederation. However, Radowitz would have to wait s·ever-
13 
al years for his opportunity, for he remained at Karlsruhe. 
At the end of 1845, sorrow struck the happy home of Radowitz and 
his family. On Christmas day, his daughter, Marie, fell ill and died 
after an illness of several weeks. The Prussian Minister was greatly 
llRadowitz, ~ Gespr'clche Uber der Gegenw'clrt Uber Staat und Kirche 
(2nd. ed. Erfurt, 1851). 
lZR d · G h" h M. Lb 123 124 a ow1tz, esc 1c te e1nes e ens, pp. - • 
13Ibid.;'p, 124 •.. 
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shaken by the loss of his,: child, and during the anxious hours at her 
bedside, the rheumatism which plagued. Radowit~ through his life became 
unbearable. Consequently, he left Karlsruhe for two months in Switzer-
land and Italy during the spring of 1846. Unfortunately, the vacation 
failed to bring Radowitz relief from his pain, and when he returned to 
Karlsruhe his condition was even worse than it had been before his de-
parture. He even changed doctors without success. Finally his old phy-
sician in Hanau, Dr. Klopp, was able to treat him and relieve the an-
guish.14 Although he obtained some temporary relief from his rheumatism, 
Radowitz's health would never cease to cause him problems. 
The conflict between the liberals and the Grand Duke Leopold I of 
Baden continued to grow, and Radowitz soon found himself involved. Since 
the election of 1843, the liberals had a majority in the Diet of the 
Duchy and had attempted to erect a parliamentary government. The first 
move of the liberals was to force the removal of the reactionary Minister 
of the Interior, Frederick von Blittersdorf. This was the first instance 
of the dismissal of a minister through a vote of no confidence in German 
history. The Diet then relaxed censorship_and limited the power of the 
police. One night the ruler secretly visited the Prussian Minister to 
ask his advice on the continually explosive situation. Radowitz sug-
gested that the ruler follow legal channels to reestablish his power over 
his lands, develop close ties with Berlin and Vienna, appoint ministers 
in agreement with his basic goals and secure a sympathetic Diet through 
new elections. The Duke accepted this advice and removed the Minister 
of the Interior, Karl Friedrich Nebenius, the lea,dat" af the liberals, 
"I 
141bid., pp. 126-127. 
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and named a moderate, Johann Baptist Beck, in his place. However, Rado-
witz's advice praved to be ineffective, because the new minister soon 
champianed liberal programs and was himself in canflict with his ruler. 15 
The clash between the liberals and conservatives would continue through-
out the Vorm~rz and spread ta other areas, including Prussia. 
Thraughout the 1840s, rumors continued ta fly that Frederick William 
IV was considering the introduction of constitutional forms. On February 
3, 1847, many believed that their hopes had come true when the King 
called the Provincial Diets to meet in Berlin as a United Diet, to dis-
cuss the financing of a propased railroad between Berlin and East Prus-
sia. However, the enthusiasm of the liberals soon caoled, for as saon 
as the meeting was announced, the King began to limit the Diet's power. 
He annaunced that a Curia af Lords would be placed over it, and that he 
retained the power to determine matters to be considered. He also re-
fused to guarantee that the United Diet would hold supreme legislative 
authority in the Kingdom. 1& 
Despite the limitations on the pawer af the Diet, many still be-
lieved that its apening in April, 1847, would begin a new era of consti-
tutionalism in Prussia. However, this cooled when the King addressed 
the assembled delegates. He asserted that these who believed that Prus-
sia was on the road ta constitutional gavernment were mistaken, for he 
would allow "no paper document to come between him and his peaple. 11 When 
the United Diet demanded a guarantee that it would continue to meet 
regularly before it would approve.loans for the construction of the 
15Ibid., p. 128. 
1611Prussian Politics,"~ Times. (London), February 17, 1847, P• 4. 
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railroad, the King ordered the body adjourned after only two months in 
. 17 
session. 
Despite its failure, the Prussian United Diet of 1847 opened the 
door to representative systems in the Hohenzollern lands, and once opened 
it could not be shut. The Diet had provided a forum for liberal ideas 
and a platform for aspiring leaders of J:>r.ussian liberalism. Sueh men · 
as the Westphalian Baron :Georg V'dn·:vincke ·and.'the· Rhe'riish merchants 
Lucolf Cainphausen an:d Hetmanri Beckerath liose to positions of national 
prominence thro.ugh t.hei:r activities in 1847. : The coriservatfve·'Side · · 
a'.lso developed new leader.s, ·one .of which was an obscure young Junker -
d O . , 18 naI11e tt.o ··von, Bismarck,,. · - • ·._: •. , .I • • ~ -· . 
Although Radowitz did not actually take part in the meetings of the 
United Diet, he watched its activities from Karlsruhe with great inter-
ests. By publishing a series of four Speeches Undelivered in the ~ 
~ in Berlin, he was able to connnent on the business before the body 
and the arguments of some of the participants. In his first address, 
Radowitz defended the King's opening remarks, charging that when the 
liberals demanded a representative system in return for approval of the 
loans to finance the railroad, they were guilty of using means that would 
lead to the destruction of the standing monarchy. Radowitz next com-
t 
! 
mented on a proposal that would open membership'in the United Diet to all 
regardless of religious affiliatian. While favoring religious tolera-
tion, Radowitz also believed that it was essential for Prussia to remain 
a Christian state. Because he believed that it was impossible for the 
17Hajo Holborn, ! History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945 (New York, 
1969), pp. 33-35. 
18Ibid. 
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state to assume. the right. to judge.-.whi.ch branch of Christianity followed 
the true teachings_.of Christ, he argued...-that the state should recognize 
the legal rights of all s.ects prof es sing. loyalty to Christ and allow 
their members the. opp.ortunity to p.articip.at.e--in state affairs. One rea-
son for Radowitz I s position was his own adherence to a minority religion. 
Although he favored t1;>leration of all Christian denominations, he was 
not in favor of all religious freed.om.. He- strongly believed that the 
state must remain in the hands of Chr_istians and opposed allowing Jews . 
to participate in government or hold teaching positions, for this would 
undermine the Christian nature of the state. 19 
In his third address, Radowitz dealt with the most important issues 
before the United Diet: the proposed railroad and the liberal demands. 
The spokesman for Prussian conservativism bitterly denounced the liber-
als, who were blocking a necessary railroad with their demands that the 
United Diet be accorded more power. Radowitz argued that posing such 
conditions would allow a political faction to dictate to the people of 
Prussia. He believed that the King was the highest power in the state 
and that he alone could govern in a manner that would be in the best 
20 
interests of the people as a whole. 
In the conclusion of his work, Radowitz assessed the importance of 
the United Diet. He praised Frederick William IV for calling the meet-
ing, because Radowitz believed that the estates should have some ad-
visory power, but condemned the liberals because he opposed the creation 
19 
Radowitz, Red en welche in dem St'1inde-Salle zu Berlin nicht gehal"I'. 
~ worden, in Gesammelte Sch;I"t"~, III, pp. 206~16, 235-252. 
20Ibid., pp. 217-234. 
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of a representative government. The leading.canservative declared that 
a state based on rule by the majority alone.. .. w:ould soon turn into a tyran-
ny, but he also opposed unlimited desp.o.tism, which he believed to be 
equally dangerous. To Radowitz the highes.t p.rinciple upon which to base 
a state was the law, and he cons.istently op~i;;ed any attempt by liberal 
21 
or conservative groups to violate the basic laws of the land. 
The events of 1847 brought .. Radowitz o.ut of the inactivity of Karls-
ruhe and once again into the political arena. In September, Radowitz was 
once again at the side of Frederick William IV, who had called him to 
join him as he traveled in the Rhineland. As they journeyed from Mainz 
to MUnster, they found time to discuss the outcome of the United Diet 
and German politics in general. Radowitz realized that the monarch had 
lost much prestige by the unfortunate outcome of the United Diet and re-
solved to find a means whereby this could be regained and at the same 
time make important changes in the German Confederation. 22 
For years, Radowitz had realized the many flaws of the Confedera-
tion, and in the fall of 1847, he decided that the time was ripe for re-
form. On October 12, he sent a detailed program to Frederick William 
IV. In this document, he pointed out the defects of the old organiza-
tion and argued that by being tied to Austrian interests, Prussia was 
prevented from taking any actions to protect herself in the event of a 
serious crisis. He asked the King to use his influence to;call a con-
gress of princes to discuss a set of proposed changes in the composition 
of the Confederation. Radowitz suggested that a majority of t~o-thirds 
21Ibid., pp. 253-265. 
22 . 
Radow1tz, Geschichte Meines Lebens, P• 135. 
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of the Federal Diet be granted the power to change the Federal Act in-
stead of the absolute unanimity required by the settlement of Vienna. 
This would make it impossible for one state to block changes in the or-
ganization of the Confederation. He also proposed to develop a new 
structure on the basis of the Customs Union, created between 1818 and 
1846 under Prussian auspices, to replace the Confederation. This would 
result in a more unified state and eliminate Austrian control over Prus-
sian interests. To settle any dispute betweenmember states, he proposed 
the establishment of a Supreme Court, thus preventing the reoccurrence 
of an incident like the argument over the. s.ite of the fortress at Ulm. 
Radowitz also proposed to limit the sovereignty of the states through 
the creation of common criminal and commercial law codes, emigration 
23 
regulations, and a· unified p.ostal and military system. Thus, his re-
forms would replace the weak and disunited German Confederation with a 
Federal state, which would not destroy the separate identity of the 
states but would limit their ability to indulge in the old particularism 
that had plagued Germany for such a long time. 
Radowitz defended his proposals in "Thoughts on the Pressing Needs 
of the German Confederation," published in November, 1847. In this 
work, he pronounced the German Confederation a complete failure. To 
support this contention, he cited its inability to face the threat posed 
by the Revolutions of 1830, the lack of agreement concerning military 
precautions in response to the French threat of 1840, and the rivalry 
among the small states and between Austria and Prussia. Radowitz 
23Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Frankfurt, October 12, 1847, 
Radowitz, Nachgelassene Briefe ~ Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der 
Jahre 1848-1853 (OsnabrUck, 1967), pp. 3-4. 
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maintained that it was very important that the old divisions cease and 
24 
that Prussia remain a strong state. 
However, before serious consideration could be given to Radowitz's 
plan for reform, events in Switzerland created a crisis that required 
immediate attention. Civil war rocked the small state in the fall of 
1847, and the powers of Europe became involved. The troubles had begun 
in 1841, when the Protestants and Roman Catholics of Aargau came into 
conflict during the process of revising the cantonal constitution. The 
Catholics, who were displeased with the final form of the document, re-
sorted to a rebellion in which several monasteries were involved. This 
was quelled, and the government of the canton ordered the offending con-
vents disbanded. The Catholics next appealed to the Federal Diet of 
Switzerland which upheld the decision of the cantonal government. 25 
The events in Aargau and the decision of the Diet caused the con-
flict to spread throughout the rest of Switzerland. On December 11, 
1845, the cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Freibourg and Valois 
formed a society called the Sonderbund to protect Roman Catholic inter-
ests. On July 20, 1847, the Protestant-dominated Diet demanded its dis-
solution. When the members of the alliance resisted, a civil war broke 
out. The Protestant army led by General Guillaume Dufour of Geneva con-
ducted a well-organized campaign from November 10 to 26, 1847, and de-
26 
cisively defeated the Sonderbund forces. 
24Radowitz, "Denkschrift Uber die von deutsche Bunde zu ergriefen-
den Massregeln," Deutschland und Friedrich Wilhelm IV, in Gesammelt.e 
Schriften, III, pp. 334-337. 
25charles Gillard,! History of Switzerland (London, 1955), P• 86. 
26Ibid., PP• 89-90. 
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Because of the important geographical.position of Switzerland, a 
civil war there could not be overlooked by the other Europe.an.nations. 
Prussia was especially concerned because the King of Prussia was also 
sovereign Prince of the Canton of Neuchatel. Although a Protestant 
country, the Hohenzollern Kingdom,. along with France and Austria, sided 
with the Sonderbund because of the liberal tendencies of the Protestant 
forces. 
27 
England, on the other hand, supported the Protestants. 
With the beginning of. actual fighting, the concern of the powers 
deepened. On November 4, the French Foreign Minister, Francois Guizot, 
sent a note to London, Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg demanding that 
the Protestants cease immediately all military actions against the re-
bellious Roman Catholic cantons. He also required that the Sonderbund 
be given special representation on the Diet and that the religious con-
flict be resolved by the Pope. The French minister suggested that the 
proposals for the reform of the Swiss constitution be submitted to a 
28 
conference of the five great powers for approval. 
The next day the Prussian Foreign Minister, Canitz, summoned Rado-
witz to Berlin. Radowitz tried to use his appearance before the minis-
try to urge immediate action on his proposals for the reform of the 
German Confederation, but the King and his ministers were too concerned 
with the outcome of events in Switzerland to become. involved in Rado-
witz 1 s projects. Instead, they decided to send him to Vienna to reach 
an agreement with the Habsburg court on a common position on Switzerland 
and the location for the conference of the five great powers. Frederick 
27Lina Hug and Richard Stead, The Story tl Switzerland (New York, 
1893), p. 392. 
28 
Hassel, Radowitz, p. 458. 
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William IV hoped that the powers would agree to meet in Neuchatel, be-
lieving that this would emphas.ize .the ... neutrality of the principality. 
The Prussian monarch also hoped that if the German Confederation could 
act with unity during the crisis, this would be a step toward establish-
i . E 29 ng it as a uropean power. 
Traveling by rail, Radowitz arrived in Vienna in November to begin 
negotiations with Metternich. Aft~r a month of discussions on the 
Sonderbund war, the two men agreed. that the conference would take place 
in Neuchatel according to the wishes of the .:e.russian monarch. They also 
decided that if.intervention became necessary, the great powers should 
impose a commercial embargo and occupy. the frontier cantons of Ticino, 
30 
Geneva and Basle. 
His work finished in Austria, Radowitz returned to Berlin on Decem-
ber 17, 1847. He found the King more alarmed than ever by the events in 
Switzerland. Frederick William believed that the anti-Sonderbund coal-
ition was seething with radicalism which could infect Europe as far as 
the Hohenzollern kingdom. The King consequently decided to send Radowitz 
to Paris to win approval for the agreement reached between Berlin and 
31 
Vienna. 
Radowitz arrived in the French capital on Christmas Eve, and met 
Foreign Minister Guizot for the first time the next day. This official 
agreed that order must be restored in Switzerland and that the European 
powers must combat radicalism wherever it developed. But Radowitz found 
29Ibid., PP• 458-459. 
30Ibid., p. 463; Treitschke, German History, VII, P• 588. 
31Ibid. 
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King LouisPhiHppe far less resolute; he showed himself singularly un-
enthusiastic about military involvement in the Swiss dispute. The ruler 
explained that the French people had a great fear of war; as long as 
they believed th~t:the monarchy would not involve the country in armed 
conflict and that a return to a republican government would inevitably 
lead to war they would support the monarchy. However, if Louis Philippe 
led his nation to war over the Sonderbund crisis, this belief would be 
destroyed and the monarchy would be in danger of being overthrown. Dis-
cussing domestic politics, the French King informed Radowitz that the 
radical party in the French Chamber was not dangerous, but that Adolphe 
Thiers, the leader of the Left Center Party who invoked the glories of 
the Napoleonic era and had the support of the youth and the army, repre-
sented a potential threat. 32 
After meeting with the King and his Foreign Minister, Radowitz was 
able to report to Berlin that Guizot had the will to destroy the radi-
cals in Switzerland, but wanted to postpone action until he had more 
support in the Chamber. He suggested that Austria and Prussia delay any 
action until France was willing to support them. The wait was not long, 
for on January 2, 1848, Guizot submitted to Radowitz a note for his con-
sideration. The French Foreign Minister demanded that the anti-Sonder-
bund troops immediately evacuate the Sonderbund cantons and demobilize 
and that all changes in the Swiss constitution be made by unanimous 
agreement. Two days later the text was transmitted to Vienna and Ber-
lin. Radowitz suggested that Austria and Prussia reinforce the French 
note with one in German, because he believed that the German language 
32Hassel, Radowitz, pp. 413-.474. 
33 
would carry with it a more earnest and majestic ;tone. 
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While awaiting the outcome of his diplomatic efforts, Radowitz also 
found time for other activities. Hi's wife had joined him in Paris at 
the end of December. He studied in the French National Library and 
spent his evenings at the salon of Princess Dorethea Lieven, where he 
met the leaders of the government and imp.ortant diplomatic officials. 
In the Rothschild mansion he met Adalphe Thiers, whom he considered a 
d f . b f h" f" F h · 1· 34 angeraus anat1c ecause o is 1ery renc nat1ona ism. 
Finally, the powers agreed to accept. Guizot I s note, France, Prussia 
and Austria signed the document on January 18, 1848, and it was promptly 
dispatched to the Swiss Diet. However, the outbreak of the revolution 
in Paris the next month and its spread to Germany in March prevented 
the powers from enfarcing their will on the Swiss, and the anti-
Sonderbund forces won a complete victory. Despite the failure of the 
powers to force the Swiss to accept their demands, Radowitz 1 s efforts in 
international diplomacy had been a success. His work in Paris com-
pleted, the Prussian diplomat returned ta Berlin on January 31.35 
With this matter out of the way, he could now turn his attention 
to his reform proposals for the Confederation. Upon his return to the 
Prussian capital, Frederick William kept his word and sent Radowitz to 
Vienna.to attempt to win Austrian acceptance for changes in the German 
Confederation. Radowitz arrived in Vienna on March 4, 1848, to discuss 
his program with Metternich. The 4ustrian Foreign Minister received 
33Ibid., p. 474. 
34Ibid., pp. 476-479. 
35rreitschke, German History, VII, p. 58. 
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him and his proposals with unusual cordiality, for revolution had broken 
out only a week before in France and Louis Philippe had been deposed. 
France was in a state of dangerous turmoil, for an ominous Second Repub-
lie had been established, and Metternich was anxious to come to an ac-
-· 
cord with Prussia in the event of renewed French aggressiveness. They 
agreed to call a congress consisting of either the German Princes or 
their representatives to meet in Dresden. The ministers also decided 
36 
to sunnnon a military congress to meet on March 30. However, while 
Radowitz and Metternich pondered the future of the German Confederation 
in Vienna, events in other cities were rendering their discussions ob-
solete. 
The fall of King Louis Philippe on February 24 soon triggered the 
outbreak of revolution in Germany, as the revolutionary fervor spread 
to the south German states. Public meetings in Mannheim and Heidelberg 
issued demands for freedom of the press, trial by jury, the introduction 
of constitutional government in all German states, and the calling of a 
national parliament to discuss the revision of the German Confederation. 
In these states, well-known progressives, or "March Ministers," were ap-
pointed to high positions in the goverrunent. In Baden, Karl Mathy be-
came prime minister, and Karl Theodor Welcker was appointed the new 
minister to the Federal Diet. In WUrttemberg, King William I elevated 
Paul Pfizer to a cabinet position. In Hesse-Darmstadt the Grand Duke 
named Heinrich von Gagern, who later became the President of the Frank-
furt National Assembly, prime minister. In Munich, indignation over the 
36Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Vienna, March 4, 6 and 13, 
1848, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 11, 12, 24-25. 
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affair between Louis I and.the notorious Lola Montez accelerated the 
revolution and forced the King to abdicate. From the south the revolu-
tion spread to other German states. In Hanover, King Ernest Augustus 
appointed liberal ministers, thus undoing the authoritarian coup of 
1837. From southern Germany, the revolution then found its way to Aus-
tria. On March 13, after a series of disturbances centered around the 
City Hall, Metternich was forced ~o resign. Within a week, all of 
Radowitz•s carefully conceived proposals for a reform of the Confedera-
tion were thus overtaken by events; his first attempt at German unifica-
tion had been a failure. 37 
Radowitz first re'acted to the Revolution by pressing for the call~ 
ing of his proposed congress at Dresden which he believed would revise 
the Confederation, unify Germany and thus solve the problems posed by 
the insurrection. By March 17, however, he realized that things had 
progressed to such a point as to make this impossible. In a letter to 
his wife, the Prussian statesman expressed the fear that the result of 
the revolution would be the end of the Prussian monarchy and also of 
his years of service. On the same day, he informed the King of the re-
fusal of the south German states to participate in the proposed meeting 
at Dresden. In this situation, Radowitz could do no more than advise 
monetary capitulation to the triumphant forces of revolution. On March 
16, he urged Frederick William to appoint several ministers dedicated to 
constitutionalism and open discussion in the cabinet. He further sug-
gested that censorship be terminated and that the Prussian United Diet 
be summoned to prepare a new constitutional system based on 
37 
Holborn, Germany 1840-1945, p. 48; Valentine, Deutsche Revolution, 
I, PP• 402-405. 
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representative government. In the event of an uprising in Berlin, Rad-
owitz advised the King to call the troops back to their barracks at 
Spandau, since a prolonged battle in the city would only demoralize the 
38-
soldiers and their leaders. 
Radowitz 1 s ideas represented the thoughts of a realist. He be-
lieved that once the forces of revolution had been unleashed, a return 
to the old order was impossible. He had witnessed the fall of Charles 
X in 1830 and more recently that of Metternich, and d<id not want to see 
the same thing happen to Frederick William IV. He was also progressive 
because he supported changes that would remove the major causes of dis-
content. Even before the Revolution, he had realized that the existing 
Confederation had to be revised in order to enable it to meet the de-
mands of the modern world. 
As Radowitz feared, the Revolution which had swept the rest of Ger-
many soan reached Berlin. The center of revolutionary activity in the 
Prussian capital was a park along_ the Spree River, called the Zelte, 
after the tents which had once staod on the location. On March 7, the 
King issued a decree annauncing the regular meeting of the United Diet 
and calling upon his people to stand behind him rather than revalt as 
the peaple af ether German states had done. The crowd in the Zelte re-
plied by drafting a petitian demanding the immediate calling of the 
United Diet and freedom of the press. It is significant that the leader-
ship in the crowd decided to mail this document to their sovereign 
38Radawitz to Canitz, Vienna, March_ 16, 1848, and Radawitz to 
Frederick William IV, Vienna, March 17, 1848, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 
31-36; Radawitz ta Frederick William IV, Vienna, March 16, 1848, Hassel, 
Radowitz, pp. 572-574. 
39 
rather than march on the palace. 
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This initial protest was followed by a series of clashes between 
the demonstrating crowds and the troops guarding the city. These 
reached a climax on March 16, when a company of soldiers killed two per-
sons while attempting to clear a square. On the evening of March 17, 
Frederick William IV signed a patent announcing the opening of the Diet 
on April 2, conceding to it the authority to control finances and to 
meet regularly, as the first United Diet.-had demanded in 1847. The King 
ordered soldiers from as far away as Mag.deburg to move to the city to 
quell any possible trouble. At 10: 00 on the morning.. .of March 18, a 
crowd assembled in front: of the palace, and the monarch appeared to re-
ceive its demonstrations of loyalty. But because of an insult either 
to the King or his troops, an officer commanding a cavalry regiment 
ordered his men to open fire. After the soldiers fired two volleys 
which killed several in the crowd, the people dispersed and began to 
erect barricades in the streets. The troops attacked these and the 
fighting continued throughout the night., but little was actually ac-
1 . h d b . h . d 40 comp 1s e y e1t er s1 e. 
The sight of his subjects involved in fratricidal combat greatly 
distressed Frederick William IV. During the night of March 18, he 
drafted a proclamation, "To the Inhabitants of my Beloved Father City," 
which promised to withdraw all troops from Berlin if the people would 
demolish all barricades and send him men of "the true old spirit of 
39Priscilla Robertson, The Revolutions of 1848: A Social History 
(Princeton, 1967), pp. 116-117. - --
40Ibid.; Andrew Jackson Donelson, "The American Minister in Berlin 
on the Revolution of March, :.1848," American Historical Review, XXIII, 
No. 2 (January 26, 1918), p. 360. 
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Berlin." He also promised t.o devote himself to the creation of a new 
Prussia and through it, a new Germany. The people formed a procession 
bearing the bodies of those killed in the fighting and marched to the 
palace, where the King was forced to review this demonstration and re-
41 move his hat in its honor. While it would be an oversimplification 
to suggest that the letter from Radowitz on March 16 was the sole reason 
for these actions by the King, it is indicative of the influence 
wielded by Radowitz that the course he suggest.ad was that taken in the 
end. 
At first the news from Berlin greatly distressed Radowitz, but af-
ter the full details of what had taken place reached him, he began to 
approve of the King's actions. He believed·, that through his statements 
to the people, Frederick William IV had p.laced himself at the head of 
Germany and had finally separated the destiny of Prussia from that of 
Austria. He felt that the King should now steer a middle course be-
tween the extremes of radicalism and reaction, depending ~~9n his 
leadership of the army in time ef-war as a basis for his restoration of 
pewer. He believed that the monarch sheuld remain above the petty 
fighting among parties, gain support fram·, the monarchists of the 
liberal-constitutional faction, and most important, show his cencern 
for the plight of the working class. Radowitz believed that the workers 
were not opposed to the monarchy and would fight for their King if he 
champiened reform in their favor. From Vienna, the Prussian emissary 
advised his ruler to support the adoption of a constitution similar to 
4111Berlin 16 Mllrz," Deutsche Zeitung, M~rch 23, 1848, p. 659; Hans 
Blum, Die deutsche Revolutien, 1848-1849 (Leipzig,• 1897), p. 190. 
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that of the· English. He also suggested that he remain aloof from the 
argument over the constitution; when the combatants of the various fac-
tions were numb from the struggle, he should intervene as a leader and 
thus restore his power. Radowitz 1 s proposals caused no little discus-
sion among the more intimate members of the court. Indeed, after a ses-
sion in the Queen's tea room during which Radowitz•s ideas formed the 
topic for conversation, General Leopold von Gerlach, who was now the 
King I s Adjutant General and who had p.arted with Radowitz over the 
42 
Cologne episcopal dispute, concluded that the King's friend was cracy. 
As was his style, rather than rush to Berlin to advise the King in 
person, Radowitz chose to counsel his friend through letters and to help 
him through his writings. He joined his family at Giewitz and busied 
himself with the completion ef the manuscript of his work, Germany~ 
Frederick William IV, which was published on April 13. In this tract, 
the King's friend summed up his attitude toward the revolution and his 
hopes for the future. He developed the idea of the Prussian King as the 
future leader and unifier of Germany: 
King Frederick William IV will unite himself and Prussia as 
well as the German princes and their people to the greatest 
and holiest work that lies before us. He placed this as the 
goal ?fall, for all, and to which all sacrifices must be 
made. 3 
On April 26, 1848, Radowitz asked to be relieved of his position 
in the Prussian service. He believed that this action was necessitated 
42Radowitz to his wife, Vienna, March 24, 1848, Nachgelassene 
Briefe, p. 42; "Denkschrift, 28 M'l:lrz 1848," and Radew.itz to Frederick 
William IV, April 2, 1848, Hassel, Radowitz, pp. 57, 580; Leopold von 
Gerlach, DenkwUrdigkeiten (Berlin, 1891), VI, p. 153. 
43Radewitz, Deutschland und Frederick Wilhelm IV, in Gesammelte 
Schriften, III, p. 277. 
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by the new strength of the republican forces; he also wanted more time 
. 44 to, devote to his writings. It may seem that he failed to live up· to 
his obligations to his King by this decision. This is partially true 
for Frederick William need.ed the loyalty of his officers as he prepar,iad 
to face the Revolution, and Radowitz was willing to leave him at this 
crucial point. However, Radowitz did not cease to advise his friend in 
his customary manner, through. letters. He.quit because he was convinced 
that once the forces of rebellion had been unleased little could be done 
to stop them; with the Revolution, the time had come for younger men to 
assume positions ·.af responsibility. :In this Radowitz was mistaken, for 
the Revolution opened to him new opportunities to carry on his work at 
the Frankfurt National Assembly. 
44Radow:l,tz, to Frederick William IV, April 26, 1848; Hassel, Rado-




THE FRANKFURT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
Although Radowitz believed that the revolution had ended his ca-
reer, it actually heralded the beginning of his most important work. 
One of the major demands of the revolutionaries was the election of a 
national parliament to build a united German nation-state. On March 5, 
1848, fifty-one leaders of German liberalism met at Heidelberg to issue 
a call for a national constitutional convention. They also chose a com-
mittee of seven to issue invitations for a Pre-Parliament to make the 
final plans for the elections to the National Assembly. 1 It would be as 
a member of this body that Radowitz would continue and enlarge his ef-
forts toward a reform of the Confederation. 
While on an unofficial level plans were being made for the parlia-
ment, important changes were taking place in the composition of the 
Federal Diet. Through the influence of the liberal "March Ministers, 11 
the supporters of Metternich and his principles were removed and more 
progressive men appointed to the Diet. Among the new members of the 
highest body of the German Confederation were Friedrich Christoph Dahl-
mann, a historian and one of the Gtlttingen Seven, the poet Ludwig Uhland, 
Friedrich Daniel Bassermann, a leading supporter of German unification 
in Baden and Georg Gervinus, a historian and editor of the liberal 
1 . . Frank Eyck, The Frankfurt Parliament (New York, 1969), PP• 36-41. 
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Deutsche Zeitung. The new progressive members of the Diet supported the 
call for a national parliament and on March 30 instructed the state 
go.vernments to hold elections for the National Assembly. Using the 
census of 1819 as a basis, the. D.iet p..rop.os.ed that the larger states be 
divided into electoral districts of 70,000 people, each of which would 
elect one delegate to the parli.ament. The sixteen states which were too 
small to form a district were allowed to choose one delegate each to 
represent them. However, the Diet made no decision concerning the date 
of the elections or the nature of the franchise. 2 
The next day 574 delegates met in Frankfurt as a Pre-Parliament to 
make preparations for the election of the National Assembly. Most of 
those assembled represented small s.outh German states: Austria sent 
only two men, while eighty-four came from little Hesse-Darmstadt. After 
a debate between the liberals and the radicals, the Pre-Parliament de-
cided to allow every free, self-supporting adult male to vote in the 
elections, which were to take place on May 1. This body also appointed 
a comm.ft tee of fifty to make final arrangements for the Assembly and 
oversee elections. However, the Pre-Parliament did not stipulate that 
the method of election would be direct; in many states the voters were 




On May 16, the voters of Arnsberg-Ruthen, a Westphalian constitu-
ency, informed Radowitz that they had chosen him as their delegate to 
the National Assembly. Roman Catholics had supported him in the 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., PP• 41-45. 
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election because of his religious affiliation, and Protestants had fa-
vored him because of his well~known friendship with Frederick William 
IV. When he heard that a population af both faiths had elected him to 
the Assembly, the elated delegate wrote the King af his hopes to use 
this as a vehicle to further his work for German unification. 4 
After several false starts, the National Assembly convened on May 
,' 5 
18, 1848, in St. Paul's Protestant Church in Frankfurt am Main. The 
men assembled in this first freely elected German parliament would con-
sider all the problems that had arisen as a result of the Revolution. 
The ald German Confederation had for all. practical purposes ceased to 
exist and had handed its power over to the men at Frankfurt, who now had 
to create a new Germany to replace it. This means that they had to de-
cide first who were to be considered "Germans" and what areas should be 
included in the new state. They also had to define the roles of the .old 
states and to decide whether ar not they were even to remain in exist-
ence. Once this had been accomplished, the most important task before 
the National Assembly was the erection of a new central government and 
a decision concerning the form this government was to take: republican 
or monarchal. Perhaps the most serious matter before the men at Frank-
furt was that of determining which of the two great powers would lead 
the new Germany: Austria or Prussia. In short, the Frankfurt National 
Assembly faced the task of creating a new nation-state on the ruins of 
the old discredited Confederation. 
4Meinecke, Radawitz, p. 79; Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Gie-
witz, May 17, 1848, Nachgelassene Briefe, p. 45. 
5Franz Wigard, ed., Stenographischer Bericht ~ die Verhandlungen 
der deutschen constiturenden Nationalversanunlung ~ Frankfurt ~ ~ 
(Frankfurt, 1848-1849), I, p. 4. 
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When men gather to make political de.~isions, they usually divide 
into factions or parties. The men in Frankfurt were no different; they 
formed political groups which came to be identified by the names of 
their meeting places. The Democratic Left, which emphasized the power 
of the people and had its roots in the radical movement of the Pre-March 
period, met at the Deutscher Hof, a restaurant, under the leadership of 
Robert Blum. However, as a result of internal quarrels, the Left soon 
divided when Franz Raveaux led his followers out of the Deutscher Hof to 
form the Donnersberg ~' or extreme Lef.t. Both factions believed in 
the absolute right of the National Assembly to construct the new con-
stitution, the strict limitatian of the powers of the states and the 
importance of universal manhood suffrage. They differed in that the 
Deutscher !!2!. was willing to court .the support of the moderate liberals 
through a less dogmatic interpretation of the importance of popular 
sovereignty, while the extreme Left refused to compromise its princi-
6 
ples. 
The moderate liberals of the Vorm~rz also divided into several 
factions. The Right Center "Kasino-Partei" consisted of moderates, like 
Dahlmann, who desired the modification of existing German institutions 
rather than their destruction. The Left Center favored the creation of 
a strong central government with a popularly elected legislative branch. 
This group consisted of the more doctrinaire liberals, like Robert von 
Mohl, and insisted that the ministry of the new national government be 
dependent on the support of the legislative branch. The chief differ-
ence between the two factions was the willingness of the Right Center 
6 
Eyck, Parliament, pp. 137-139. 
to cooperate with the Right and that of the Left Center to work with 
7 
the Deutscher Hof. 
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Radowitz, who had arrived in Frankfurt on May 20, became the leader 
of the right-wing faction, or Steinernes Haus. Although he did not ap-
prove of the formation of parties at the Assembly, he felt it necessary 
to associate with men in agreement with his ideas, since the Left and 
Center had already organized. On June 6, a group of his friends formed 
a conservative association at the restaurant Steinernes Haus~~ 
near the St. Paul's Church. In order to emphasize that they were not 
attempting to organize a political party, these men called their group 
a "society" (Verein). The major plank in the platform of the Steinernes 
~ was the unification of Germany under a constitutional monarchy in 
which the states would retain a measure of their old powers. Radowitz 
' 
and his conservative friends met regularly to discuss the issues and 
plan a coIIDI1on strategy to follow during debates. 8 
It would be a mistake to consider Radowitz and his fellow conserva-
tives reactionaries. His earlier plan for a revision of the Confedera-
tion shows that the leader of the Right realized the inadequacies of the 
7 
Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, II, pp. 615-616. 
8Radowitz to Countess Voss, Frankfurt, June 6, 1849, Radowitz Nach-
l'Asse, Bundesarchiv, Frankfurt. The original copies of these papers, 
with the rest of Radowitz's correspondence are now in the possession of 
the Zentralarchiv of the German Democratic Republic in Merseburg. Be-
fore World War II, these papers formed Section 92 Roll 58 of the Prus-
sian State Archive in Berlin-Dahlem. The author has made several un-
successful attempts both personally and through correspondence to ob-
tain access to these papers, but the East German officials have denied 
this request; Prince Felix Lichnowsky to August von der Heide, June 23, 
1848, Lichnowsky Nachlasse, Bundesarchiv, Frankfurt, Number 131; Rado-
witz to his wife, Frankfurt, May 25 and June 6, 1848, Nachgelassene 
Briefe, pp. 51, 53; Meinecke, Radowitz, p. 103. 
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old order and the importance of change. On June 23,. he spoke to this 
question in the Assembly: 
I ask yau: who is a reactionary? ••• Is there any such party 
in Germany? It cannot be found in the Assembly; no one here 
is a reactionary. To be sure, Gentlemen, there are.men here 
who have faithfully and sincerely served the old monarchies. 
However, they are not blind to their failures and have not 
attempted to hide all the fault.s of the police state. They 
know very well that only a state based on justice is the 
just political order and carry this thought constantly in 
their hearts. They wish that the reorganization might follow 
the path of legality. They desire evoiution, not revolution • .() 
Thus the political groups of the pre-revolutionary period found formal 
representation in the Frankfurt National Assembly, with the exception 
af the sacialists who were still too weak to organize. The formation 
of political factions at Frankfurt is much more important than it may 
seem at first glance,. for these embryonic organizations represented the 
first formal definition of the five German political ideologies which 
had begun their development in the pre-revolutionary period. At Frank-
furt, the division into parties laid the foundation for parliamentary 
life f+om the era of Bismarck to the Weimar Republic. 
In addition to his role as the leader of the Right, Radowitz also 
became the chief spokesman for the Roman Catholics in St. Paul's Church. 
On June 14, he, Malchoir von Diepenbrock and August Reichensperger or-
ganized a society of Roman Catholic members of the National Assembly. 
This Catholic Society, which consisted of sixty members, including nu-
merous academicians and four bishops, elected Radowitz as their presi-
dent. He was not a universally popular choice. Many bitterly critized 
him because he refused to support the conversion. ,of ·the s.ociety into 
9wigard, Bericht, p. 478. 
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a separate political party. His chief critic was Wilhelm von Ketteler, 
later Archbishop of Mainz and Bismar.ck I s opponent during the Kultur-
kampf, who accused the Prussian of being more concerned with the inter-
10 
ests of Berlin than those of the Church. 
Radowitz 1 s duties as leader of the Steinernes Haus and of the 
Catholic Society, along_ with his resp.onsi.bHities as a delegate to the 
National Assembly took a great deal of time. He usually arose at 6:30 
A.M., and by 7: 00 vfsi't.ors· had begun to arrive. The leader of the Con-
servatives found himself a popular source of advice, and often people 
whom he did not even know came to seek his opinion on matters before the 
parliament. At 9:00 A.M. he usually went to St. Paul's Church for the 
session of the National Assembly. At 3:30 P.M., the delegate left the 
i 
Church for~ nearby restaurant, where he invariably dined on roast with 
carrots or "viper's grass," a carrot-like vegetable. Radowitz usually 
consumed his meal alone, and this gave him a few minutes to think. At 
5: 00 he returned to the meeting, which usually lasted two hours. After 
the end of the day's session, Radowitz spent his evenings with either 
the Catholic Society or_ the Conservative Society and did not return hom~ 
11 
until after 10:00, often not before midnight. 
The first important task faced by the National Assembly was the 
creation of a provisional government to rule Gennany while it defined 
the boundaries of the new state and completed the constitution. The de-
bates over the issue, which began on June 19, are very important in 
lOMeinecke, Radowitz, p. 146; Radowitz to his wife, Frankfurt, June 
15, 1848, Radowitz Nachl~sse; Eyck, Parliament, p. 145. 
11Radowitz to his wife, Frankfurt, July 3 and August 28, 1848, Rad-
owitz Nachl~sse; Radowitz (son), Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen, p. 4. 
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showing at the same time Radowitz 's devotion to German nationalism and 
his moderate approach. The major issue at stake was the position of 
the old German states in the new order. Representatives of the Liberal 
Center and Left argued that the revolution had terminated the authority 
of the states, and therefore the power to create a;new government for 
Germany rested solely with the National Assembly. 12 
On the first day of the debate, Radowitz took the liberals to 
task, stating that the German people would not allow the destruction of 
their states. He believed that Germany·had two sets of interests: re-
gional concerns, which should be represented by the state governments, 
and national aims, which should be the province of the federal govern-
ment. The leader of the Right maintained that in the new organization 
of Germany, national interests should be served by a House of the 
People and those of local importance by a House of States. But since 
the present structure of Germany failed to provide a body to represent 
national interests, he believed that the state governments should be 
given the power to name the provisional government. Radowitz argued 
that this would not mean that all power would belong to the princes in-
stead of the people; it would simply provide that interim authority 
would be in the hands of the individual states instead of the National 
13 Assembly. His position reveals the moderation of Radowitz 's politics. 
He supported the formation of a stronger .national government but also 
realized the importance of the states. 
After Radowitz had completed his speech, the debate continued. On 
12Eyck, Parliament, p. 174. 
13Wigard, Bericht, I, pp. 375-376. 
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June 21, George von Vincke, a member of the Conservative Society, pro-
posed that the states name a Federal Director to govern Germany while 
the drafting of .the constitution proceeded. The next day, Radowitz 
spoke in favor of the proposal. He opp.osed the creation of an executive 
conmittee, as advocated by Ludwig. Simon and .the Left, and favored in1-
stead the appointment of one man as head (of state. Finally, on June 27, 
Heinrich von Gagern intervened in the debate with a bold affirmation of 
the authority of the Assembly alone to create a provisional government, 
and mast delegates responded to his statement with loud shouts of ap-
proval. He also reconmended that the head of the provisional govern-
ment be a prince who would serve as Imperial Regent. 14 This meant that 
the National Assembly would take upon itself full authority to govern 
Germany without any interference from the states. It would also mean 
that the Assembly would conmit itself to a monarchy, since Gagern wanted 
a prince to become Regent and thus eliminate a republican solution to 
the German problem. Most important, Gagern's suggestion ended a dead-
lock that might have lasted for weeks or even months. 
The Assembly began at once to vote on the issue. The forces of 
the Right, including Radowitz, attempted to soften the blow to the tra-
ditional power of the states through a motion that would have rendered 
the Assembly's actions on .the provisional government subject to the ap-
proval of the states. The members of the National Assembly defeated 
this by a vote of 577 to thirty-one, a division which showed the rela-
tive weakness of the Right in St. Paul's Church. Later, Radowitz voted 
with the majority against an attempt by the Left to abolish the National 
14 
Ibid., pp. 444, 479, 521-522. 
117 
Assembly after the creation of the provisional government. This was 
followed by a motion granting the provisional government the authority 
to declare war and peace and negotiate treaties with foreign powers, 
thus depriving the states of one of the major symbols of their sover-
eignty. Radowitz, acting. in his role as leader of the Right, rose to 
object to the consideration of this motion on the grounds that the mem-
bers of his faction had not been given pr.i.o.r notice of its consideration 
at that time. The Assembly overruled his protest, and approved the pro-
posal by a vote of 408 to 143. Resigned to the strong tide of central-
ization and true to his strong belief in German unification, Radowitz 
. . 15 
voted with the maJority. 
Radowitz remained a strong supporter of the rights of the German 
states, however, and opposed a motion which would empower the head of 
the provisional government to form a ministry. Nevertheless, this 
passed by a vote of 498 to 143. He also dissented when the Assembly 
gave itself the right to elect the Imperial Regent by a division of 403 
to 135. Discussion of the issue continued the next day with the passage 
of a; measure making the Regent independent of the Assembly. This cur-
tailed the Assembly's powers and meant that the provisional government 
would not become a complete parliamentary democracy; it would remain a 
monarchy with the Imperial Regent in the position of sovereign. In the 
next vote, the Assembly dissolved the Diet of the German Confederation 
by a vote of 510 to 35, thus eradicating the last remains of the old 
order. In his position as leader of the Right, Radowitz opposed this 
action. However, when the final division on the creation of a central 
15Ibid., pp. 576-602. 
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authority began, he rose to call for its passage in a grand effort to 
preserve the unity of the Assembly. The law passed by a vote of 450 to 
100. Next the men at St. Paul's Church elected Archduke John, the 
brother of Emperor Ferdinant of Austria, Imperial Regent. The people 
of Frankfurt greeted this victory for German unification with cheers, 
the ringing of church bells, the firing of a cannon and the waving of 
fl f h . . d 16 ags rom t eir win ows. 
After the election of the Habsburg Archduke, rumors flew around 
Frankfurt concerning his choice of members of the new ministry. One 
such rumor was that the Regent would name Radowitz as Minister of War. 
Naturally the, ,Steinernes ~ attempted to use its influence in favor 
of the candidacy of their leader to this important post. However, the 
Left declared their violent opposition to the appointment of a man with 
such well known conservative opinions. When leaders of the Center an-
nounced their belief that Radowitz 1 s religious and political opinions 
were incompatible with the office, the possibility of Radowitz becoming 
the new Minister of War disappeared. It was all just as well, for de-
spite the support of his conservative friends, Radowitz was never en-
thusiastic about his candidacy for the position. He wrote his wife that 
the new ministry would have so many problems with the various parties 
of the National Assembly that he would prefer to avoid association with 
17 
it. 
With this issue decided, the National Assembly was free to consider 
16Ibid., pp. 576-638; Lichnowsky to Heide, Frankfurt, June 29, 
1849, Lichnowsky N achl'4sse. 
17Radowitz to his wife, Frankfurt, July 8, 10 and 14, 1848, ~-
witz NachHlsse. 
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other important problems, one of which was the position of the Church 
in the new Germany. In Prussia and several other states, Protestantism 
was the established state religion, while Roman Catholicism occupied a 
similar position in Austria and Bavaria. On August 24, the Assembly be-
gan discussions on Article III of the Basic Rights, the provisions de-
signed to guarantee religious freedom. Some members, such as Hermann 
von Beisler, opposed the article as being too vague; indeed, both" 
friends and foes of the established Churches supported it. A few Prot-
estants feared that a separation of church and state would weaken their 
religion. Wilhelm Weissborn answered this contention by arguing that 
religious compulsion was a part of the past and that the time had come 
for the churches to make adjustments. Radowitz deplored a division be-
tween Catholics and Protestants on the article, and pleaded that free-
dom of religion receive the same consideration as freedom of the press 
and other basic rights. In response to those who maintained that the 
church required state support in order to exist, he declared that no 
power on earth had the strength to destroy either the Protestants or 
Roman Catholic Churches. He also assured the Protestants that the fol-
lowers of his faith had no desire to use religious freedom as a pretext 
to introduce the hated Jesuit order. The. leader of the Catholic Society 
argued that the division of Germany into rival Protestant and Catholic 
states as a result of the Peace of Wesphalia was no longer justified. 
He ended his speech with a plea for freedom for every religious group 
no matter how large or small. The debate ended with the passage of the 
18 
article. Thus, the new Germany would guarantee freedom of religion 
18wigard, Bericht, III, PP• 1662-1772. 
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to al 1 Germans. 
To create a new Germany, the men at Frankfurt had first to define 
the territories to be included in the new state. One of the problems 
involved was the fate of the minorities living under German princes. 
One such group was the Czech population living in the Habsburg Kingdom 
of Bohemia. There had been centuries of rivalry between the Slavic 
Czechs and the Sudetenland Germans who populated the territory. Czech 
nationalism, growing out of the religious reforms of John Hus, had been 
one of the chief causes of the Thirty Years' War. At the Battle of 
White Mountain in 1620, the Ha~sburg had"defeated the Czechs and es-
tablished German rule. 19 In the nineteenth century, this nationalism 
had experienced a rebirth, thus leading to a renewal of conflict be-
tween the German and Czech Bohemians. 
Instead of responding to the call to elect delegates to the German 
National Assembly in Frankfurt, the Czech nationalists had summoned 
their own Slavic Congress in Prague. Its organizers issued a manifesto 
on May 1, 1848, calling for the unification of all Slavic peoples into 
a new and independent state. When the Slavic Congress opened on June 
2, it passed a resolution demanding the submission of the nationalities 
problem to a general European conference. It also asked that all Ger-
man states grant self-determination to Slavs living in their lands. An 
uprising in Prague on June 12, which many Germans believed was the out-
growth of the passions aroused by the Congress, temporarily halted its 
20 
proceedings. Since Bohemia was under the rule of a German prince and 
19 Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914 (New York, 1951), 
PP• 6-16. 
20 
Eyck, Parliament, pp. 70, 160-161. 
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had a substantial German population, the problems posed by the Slavic 
Congress were of prime importance to the men at Frankfurt. The na- . 
tionalist element among the delegates saw the question in terms of 
"German versus Slav" and believed that the granting of the Czech de-
mands would result in the persecution of the Sudetenland Germans. 
The debate at Frankfurt began on July 1, with Radowitz arguing 
that the Germans should not allow the disruption of the six-hundred-
year association of Bohemia with the German Reich. He believed, how-
ever, that the Assembly should wait for the Austrian officials to indi-
cate their position toward the Slavic Congress before taking any inde-
pendent action. He held that the Habsburg government had a duty to see 
to it that elections for the Frankfurt Assembly be held in Bohemia;". if 
Austria should request help in restoring order, the Assembly should give 
it without hesitation. After the debate ended, the men at St. Paul's 
Church voted their approval of Radowitz 1 s position, but the question was 
never resolved. Although the revolt in Prague was crushed by the bom-
bardment of the city by Austrian troops under Prince Alfred von Windis-
chgr~tz on June 17, the elections were held only in the German-speaking 
21 
areas of Bohemia and never in the Czech areas of the kingdom. 
The next national question to be considered at Frankfurt was the 
problem revolving around the status of Prussian Posen, with its Polish 
population. During the partitions of Poland by Austria, Prussia and 
Russia from 1772 to 1795, Posen had been awarded to the Hohenzollern 
kingdom. However, it was not included in the territory of the German 
Confederation. During the early years of the nineteenth century, 
21wigard, Bericht, I, pp. 666-667; Stearns, 1848, PP• 110-113. 
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Palish nationalism had intensified. · After the abortive revolt of 1830-
1831 in Russian Poland, the strugg.le.. .. by the....Poles for self-determination 
won the support of many German liberals. Prompted by the demand of Po-
lish nationalists for local self-gove:r.nme.q.t., Fr~derick William IV. had 
appointed a German .. Polish commission to reors~nize the government of the 
~uchy on March 24,. 18481 The G.ermans, feeling threatened by the possi-
bility of Polish d~mination, demanded the inclusion of the whole of Posen 
in the German Confederation. However, the. .. Prussian King decided to com-
promise between the demands of the rival nationalities by dividing the 
t·erritory into several areas. Only those districts with a German ma-
jority would become a part of the Confederation. But this measure 
failed to meet the terms of the Poles, who longed for the creation of an 
independent state and felt that Posen should be treated as a completely 
Polish area. .They also abjected when the German National Assembly as-
i d 1 d 1 h d . 22 s gne twe ve e egates to represent t e conteste territory. 
In this way, the controversy found its way into the discussions in 
the St. Paul's Church. On May 22, the Polish National Committee, head-
quartered in Paris, protested against election of delegates to the Na-
tional Assembly on the grounds that Posen had not been a part of the 
German Confederation prior to 1848. Jacob Venedey, of the Left, pre-
sented a motion denying the .right. of the. representatives of the Duchy to 
participate in the Assembly. After a series of debates and conflicting 
motions,, the delegates approved the recommendations of the President, 
Heinrich von Gagern, to refer the matter to the credentials committee 
for further consideration. On June 24, the committee reported its 
22 
Eyck, Parliament, p. 269. 
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findings and charged that the Poli.sh nationalists were seeking to re-
store Poland·to its pre-1772 boundaries and thus place about two million 
Gennans under Polish domination, To avoid this, the committee proposed 
the division of Posen into counties (Kreisen) .based on the. nationality 
of the population, much as the King of Prussia had earlier recommended. 
Those counties with a Gennan majority would become part of the future 
23 
Gennan Reich. The report led to a long debate. 
On the second day of the discussion, Radowitz rose to speak on the 
controversial issue. He first deplored the attempts of some delegates 
to introduce the religious question into the matter and turn it into a 
quarrel between Catholics and Protestants. The leader of the Right de-
mantled that the.Posen problem be considered solely on the basis of law 
and not as a confessional question. He stated that the separation of 
Posen from Germany would force many Gennans to live under Polish domina-
tion, thus giving rise to a serious injustice. He also opposed the re-
establishment of a Polish state as being against Germany's best inter-. 
ests. However, he also felt that it would be equally unjust to force 
the Poles to live under complete German control. He concluded his speech 
with a statement in support of the recommendations of the committee. 
This would allow the majority ethnic group in an area in the Duchy to 
24 
control the, lo,cal government in each country. Thus Radowitz took a 
reasonable and moderate position on the Posen question and refused to 
support the extreme views of either the German or Polish nationalists. 
The debate ended with a series of votes. The Assembly rejected a 
23w· d . 1gar, Bericht, I, pp. 196-229, II, P• 1127 • 
24Ibid., II, pp. 1155-1156. 
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motion by Robert Bltunto send a special commission to Posen to further 
investigate the matter. Radowitz voted with a majority of 333 against 
139. Next they voted to recognize the. incorporation into the German 
Reich of those areas proposed for inclusion by the Prussian government. 
Radowitz voted with the majority on the measure. They also approved the 
demarcation line between Polish and German sections of Posen as drawn by 
Berlin, with a stipulation that a final investigation take· place before 
· implementation. Next, the delegates appxQved a motion by Prince Felix 
Lichnowsky, of the Right, calling on Berlin to agree to protect the · 
rights of its PoUsh subjects. Finally, the Assembly rejected by a vote 
of 331 to 101 a resolution backed by the radicals which stated that it 
was the "holy duty of Germany to work for the re-creation of Poland •11 
Naturally, Radowitz yoted against this proposal. 25 
These votes did not e:nd the controversy over the position of Posen. 
On February 6, 1849, the committee asked the National Assembly. to ap-
prove the final line of demarcation between the German and Polish coun-
tries of the Duchy. Ignaz von DlHlinger, a member of the Catholic So-
ciety, criticized the boundary because it had placed most of the Poles 
in German areas. Radowitz rose to defend the line on the grounds that 
its location was in the best military inte'rests of Germany. After sever-
al delegates from the Left spoke in defense of the Poles, the Assembly 
voted 280 to 124 to approve the division. As before, Radowitz voted with 
the majority. However, the debate made little difference, for after the 
defeat of the Polish rebels by Prussian forces, the plan was never put 
25Ibid., II, pp. 1228-1247 • 
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into effect. · 
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Some historians have seen the debate on Posen as a turning point in 
the history of the Frankfurt National Assembly. Veit Valentin charged 
that in its decision to reject the plea of the Poles for self-
determination, the parliament repudiated the very principles of the Rev-
olution that had created it. Another writer finds the roots of Nazism 
in the decision of the National Assembly to reject the national aspira-
tions of the Poles. Indeed during the Vorm~rz, the German liberals had 
strongly supported the Polish cause. However, when Polish nationalism 
conflicted with the best interests of Germany, the men in the Paulskirche 
chose to lay aside the principles of the past and support German nation-
alism above liberalism. Yielding to the demands of the Poles would have 
created many serious problems. Such a step would have placed many Ger-
mans under Polish domination and jeopardize relations with Russia. The 
Slavic empire ruled over the largest portion of the former Kingdom of 
Poland and violently opposed any action that would further Polish na-
tionalism. Therefore, the decision to divide the area into Polish and 
German districts and to allow each a degree· of local autonomy repre-
sented a realistic compromise which avoided the extremes of a complete 
27 
denial of Polish rights or the creation of a Polish state. 
The final majority group to be considered at Frankfurt were the 
Italians of South Tyrol. At first the Italian population of this 
26Ibid., VII, pp. 5066-5089; Alexander Gieysztor, !! al., History 
of Poland (Warsaw, 1968), p. 143. 
27Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, II, p. 127; Hans Kohn, The Mind of 
Germany (New York, 1960), p. 143; Lewis Namier, 1848: The Revolution of 
The Intellectuals -(Garden City, 1964), pp. 103-112. 
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Habsburg territory had refused to elect representatives to the ;National 
Assembly, though Baron Giovanni, a Roman Cat·holic priest, had conducted 
a campaign in support of the Assembly. After the defeat of a short-
lived Italian uprising in Tione in April, the people of Trent realized 
that Vienna would never relinquish control of South Tyrol without a 
tight which the Italians knew they could not win. So they elected men 
to go to Frankfurt. However, other areas in Habsburg Italy were not so 
cooperative. In Lombardy and Venetia, which had been under Austrian 
rule since the Congress of Viertna, the people rose in revolt on March 18. 
This won the support of the Italian nationalists of other areas. They 
found a leader in King Charles Albert of Sardinia-Piedmont, who marched 
his army into Habsburg territory on March 23, thus beginning a war be-
tween his small state and the Austrian Empire. 28 
The National Assembly began discussions on the Italian question on 
August 12. After some debate, they voted against the separation of South 
Tyrol from the German Reich. Radowitz proposed that the German Provis-
ional Government offer its services to mediate between Sardinia and 
Austria, since he believed that the war in Italy was of national im-
portance. If Austria lost control over northern Italy, it would open 
the way for French hegemony in southern Europe and pose a serious threat 
to Germany's flank. He also stated that a loss of Venice would endanger 
the Dalmatian coast and Trieste, both areas necessary for German secur-
ity. For these reasons, he advocated the retention of the German hold 
irt the area. Both the Right and Center ,greeted his speech with loud ap-
plause. After the conclusion of the debate, the delegates voted to pass 
28Eyck, Parliament, p. 74; Robinson, Revolution, p. 346. 
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these motions on to the Provisional Government for consideration. But 
once again the actions of the Frankfurt National Assembly made little 
difference, for Austria held its own in northern Italy. On July 24 at 
the Battle of Custozza, the Austrian General Josef Radetzky decisively 
defeated the forces of Charles Albert. Other victories followed, Radet-
zky continued to subdue the Italians and after a siege occupied Venice 
29 
on August 28, 1849. 
After considering the problems posed by non-Gennans living under a 
Gennan ruler, the National Assembly now turned its attention to the case 
of a German majority living under a non-Gennan ruler: the complex 
Schleswig-Holstein question. Owing to claims dating as far back as the 
Middle Ages, the Danish King was also Duke of Schleswig, though the Duchy 
itself was an autonomous territory. During the territorial settlement 
following the Napoleonic Wars, the powers had also awarded Holstein to 
the King of Denmark as partial compensation for the loss of Norway to 
Sweden. Since Holstein had a completely German population, it became a 
part of the Gennan Confederation, while Schleswig, with its mixed Danish-
German population, remained outside the organization. This solution 
failed to please either nationality. The Germans resented living under 
a foreign prince and took every opportunity to assert their rights, ar-
guing that both territories should become a part of the German Confeder-
ation since they had been united throughout modern times. They also 
challenged the right of the Danish dynasty to continue to rule the 
Duchies. The male line of the Danish house was about to die out and 
future kings of Denmark would base their right to rule on succession 
29Wigard, Bericht, II, pp. 1560-1568. 
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through the female line of the family. According to the Germans, only a 
prince descended from the male side of the family could rule over a Ger-
man territory. The Danes, on the other hand, sought to strengthen the 
30 
ties between the Duchies and Copenhagen. 
When the revolutionary fever of 1848 spread to Scandinavia, the 
I 
Danish nationalists, or Eider Danes, led by Orla Lehmann, came to power. 
They persuaded their King to announce the incorporation of Schleswig in-
to Denmark on March 21, 1848. Two days later, the Germans in the 
Duchies revolted and formed a provisional government at Kiel. Heinrich 
von Arnim-Suckow, the Prussian Foreign Minister, recognized the provis-
ional government of Schleswig-Holstein and sent General Friedrich von 
Wrangel with troops to support it. This led to a war between Prussia 
and the Nordic kingdom. The intervention of Sweden, the effectiveness 
of the Danish blockade and the protests of Russia and England forced 
Prussia to finally sue for peace and conclude an armistic at Malm8, 
Sweden, on August 26. In this truce Prussia agreed to rescind its rec-
ognition of the provisional government and to place the Duchies under a 
mixed commission dominated by the Danes. Thus, the Germans in 
Schleswig-Holstein were abandoned; German nationalism had suffered a 
31 
major defeat. 
Since Prussia had signed the treaty in the name of the German Con-
federation, it required the approval of the Frankfurt National Assembly. 
On September 4, the parliament began its discussion of the issue. Johann 
301awrence D. Steefel, !!!!. Schleswig Holstein Question (Cambridge, 
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Gustav Heckscher, the Foreign Minister under Archduke John, read the 
provisions of the Malml::l agreement to the delegates. After a fiery de-
bate, the Assembly referred the matter to a special committee with in-
structions to report the next day. However, the connnittee was unable to 
reach agreement. The majority, speaking through Friedrich Christoph 
Dahlmann, opposed the endorsement of the truce. The Left supported him, 
believing that Germany had an obligation to fight for the rights of the 
G ' h D h' 32 ermans int e uc ies. 
On the other hand, the Right, led by Radowitz, favored the armis-
tice. The leader of the Conservative Society was well aware of the 
Schleswig-Holstein problem. In 1846, he had written an article en-
titled, "Who Succeeds in Schleswig?" In his essay,. he traced the claims 
of the Danish royal family to the Duchy back to 1110, but cited histori-
cal evidence to prove that it was united with Holstein rather than with 
Denmark. He also argued that the Schleswig succession, along with that 
of Holstein, could lawfully pass only through the male line of the Danish 
royal house rather than the female as recognized by the Danish law of 
succession. But Radowitz believed that the Prussian response to the re-
volt in the Duchies in 1848 had been confused and self-defeating. In 
the National Assembly, Radowitz argued that the question was of such in-
ternational significance that a failure of negotiations could lead to a 
general war which would do great harm to Germany. The Truce of Malml::l, 
therefore, must be sustained. In his arguments, he cited the strength 
of the Danish fleet and reminded the delegates that the provisions of 
32wigard, Bericht, II, pp. 1_857-1868. 
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the final peace were still to be decided. 33 
The members of the Right greeted their leader's speech with cheers, 
while the Left and the galleries replied with hisses. Radowitz sup-
ported a motion calling for a postponement of action by the Assembly un-
til agreement could be reached on the final terms of peace. His motion 
failed, and a proposal by Dahlmann condemning the MalmH armistice passed 
by a vote of 238 to 221, with Radowitz voting with the minority. But 
this condemnation did not stand. On September 16, after a serious crisis 
caused by the resignation of the ministry and the failure of attempts to 
form a new one, the parliament reversed its decision and ratified the 
M 1 u . . 34 a mu armistice. 
This action provoked a violent response from the people of Frank-
furt. Mobs flowed across the Main bridges from the workers' quarter of 
Sachsenhausen to attack St. Paul's Church itself, while others erected 
barricades. Alarmed by the reaction against the armistice, the Minister 
of the Interior, Anton von Schmerling, with the approval of the Assembly 
and the city authorities summoned troops from the federal fortress at 
Mainz to restore order and protect the National Assembly. In spite of 
these precautions, a group of protesters actually broke through the mili-
tary cordon around the Paulskirch and stormed the building. As they 
pressed through the doors, Heinrich von Gagern shouted in desperation, 
"I declare every transgressor against this holy place a traitor to the 
Fatherland,." and the startled mob turned back. But the violence 
33Radowitz, "Wer ebt in Schleswig?" Gesannnelte Schriften, III, 
167-194; Radowitz to Countess von Voss, September 5, 1848, Radowitz 
Nachl~sse; Wigard, Bericht, III, pp. 1895-2149. 
34Wigard, Bericht, III, PP• 1895-2149. 
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continued outside the National Assembly and grew in_ intensity. After 
leaving the site of the parliament, groups of radicals roamed the streets 
attacking know conservatives, and one group actually printed copies of a 
picture of Radowitz in order to assist the radicals to hunt him down. 
The unrest reached a climax with the murder of Prince Felix Lichnowsky, 
35 
who had been mistaken for Radowitz by some members of the crowd. 
The violence made a deep impres'sion on the leader of the Right. He 
witnessed the storming of a barricade by some Prussian troops and wrote 
his wife of his strong desire to join them. The outbreak strengthened 
his dissatisfaction with the whole undertaking of the National Assembly. 
As early as June 19, 1848, he had written his wife that he had accom-
plished nothing through all his work. As we have seen, the Left greeted 
his speeches with jeers. He was so unpopular that a fellow conservative 
had urged him not to speak at a particular session because of the strong 
f ·1 h" 36 ee ing against im. 
Seeking refuge from the tumult of Frankfurt, Radowitz left on Sep-
tember 23 for Mecklenburg to join his family. When he returned with 
them the next month, he found that the passion against him had not died 
down. His children could not go out on the streets without being met 
with shouts of "Prussian" and "Reactionary." By December it reached 
such a point that his friends in Berlin sent his family helmets and 
military equipment to protect themselves as they walked around town. 
35Eyck, Parliament, p •. 312; Neue Preussische Zeitung, September 21, 
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Faced with such opposition, Radowitz ceased to take an active part in 
the affairs of the National Assembly. He even resigned his post as 
leader of the Steinernes Haus faction. Under the presidency of Georg 
von Vincke, the conservatives changed their meeting place to the Milani 
restaurant in order to disassociate themselves from Radowitz and the 
Catholic Society. 37 Throughout the remainder of his time in Frankfurt, 
Radowitz played but a passive role in the deliberations of the National 
Assembly. 
The September riots marked a turning point in the history of the 
Frankfurt National Assembly. When the parliament, itself a product of 
the Revolution, was forced to call upon the troops of the old order to 
protect it from the very people it claimed to represent, it lost the 
support of many Germans who saw this as a betrayal of the principles of 
the Revolution. From this moment on, it was only a matter of time until 
the forces of the old order, upon which the National Assembly was now 
dependent for its existence, would be able to undermine the parliament 
and the principle of popular sovereignty which it represented. 
Though Radowitz was himself absent from Frankfurt during most of 
October, the debates in St. Paul's Church droned on. After erecting a 
provisional government and dealing with the nationalities problem, the 
men at Frankfurt had to decide upon the role of the Habsburg Empire in 
the new Germany. The Emperor in Vienna ruled lands that included a 
number of non-German areas such as Hungary, Slovenia, Galicia and 
Croatia. It was necessary to reach an agreement on the relationship be-
tween these non-German territories and the new German· state. One 
37Eyck, Parliament, p. 313. 
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faction, called the Greater Germany (Grossdeutsch) Party, favored a na-
tion which would include most if not all of the Austrian Empire. The 
other so-called Small German (Kleindeutsch) Party advocated the exclusion 
of the Danubian Monarchy from Germany, thus making it possible for Prus~ 
sia to assume German leadership. 
Radowitz had long supported the Small German position, because he 
believed that the Hohenzollern kingdom, as a true German state and a 
European power, was the natural head of the German nation rather than the 
multinational Habsburg Empire. On October 27, 1848, after a long debate, 
the National Assembly voted 340 to 76 to prohibit the union under one 
government of a part of the German nation with a non-German area, thus 
excluding the non-German lands of Austria. They also accepted by a 
_large majority a proposal which provided that a German state under the 
same ruler as a non-German one could be joined only by a personal union. 
Although Radowitz had not yet returned to Frankfurt from Mecklenburg, 
his subsequent actions would show that he approved of the decisions of 
38 
the parliament. 
The decision of the National Assembly to bar the inclusion of non-
German areas from the new German Reich placed it on the side of the ad-
vocates of Prussian hegemony and automatically ruled out any further 
Austrian support of its activities. After playing a major role in German 
affairs for several hundred years, the Habsburgs refused to acquiesce to 
their expulsion from Germany. Even while the National Assembly was de-
bating the role of Austria in the future Germany, forces we,re coming to 
3811Privataufzeichnunge von Radowitz, 11 September 1848," Nachgelas-
sene Briefe, pp. 60-63; Wigard, Bericht, IV, pp. 2918-2936. 
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power in Vienna that would defy the attempts of the Paulskirche tp di-
vide the Danubian Monarchy into German and non-German areas. Following 
the outbreak of the Revolution in Vienna, Emperor Ferdinand had called 
an Austrian Constitutional Assembly on March 15. When the Emperor at-
tempted to force the adoption of a constitution before the promised As-
sembly had met, a revolt in Vienna had forced him to flee to Innsbruck 
on May 17. After crushing rebellions in Hungary, Bohemia and Italy, 
Metternich's successor, Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg, could concen-
trate on recapturing control of his capital city. On October 13, Prince 
Windischgr~tz occupied Vienna and executed the radical leaders, including 
Robert Blum, the leader of the Left in Frankfurt, who had traveled to 
Vienna to lend his support to the revolt. The Austrian Constitutional 
Assembly moved to Kremsier, where, in defiance of the decisions of the 
Frankfurt National Assembly, Schwarzenberg declared that the unification 
of the Habsburg lands was a matter of both German and European neces-
. 39 sity. Thus the largest and most powerful German state had declared 
its opposition to the proceedings in Frankfurt. 
After dis.cussing the future of Austria, the National Assembly could 
now turn to its most important work, the consideration of a final draft 
of the constitution. On January 17, 1849, the Constitution Committee, 
which had been working since the summer of 1848, submitted its report. 
Owing to its inability to agree, the membership of the committee was di-
vided into two groups. One favored an hereditary emperor, while the 
other supported government by a five-member Imperial Directory 
39Robinson, Revolutions, pp. 223, 248-249; Heinrich von Sybel, The 
Founding of lli German Empire~ William! (New York, 189.C)), I, p. 301. 
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representing the major states. Those who favored an hereditary emperor 
supported the candidacy of Frederick William IV of Prussia for the post. 
Owing to his absence from Frankfurt following the September riots, Rado-
witz did. not serve on the Constitution Committee, but he had committed 
himself to this position at least six months earlier. On January 5, he 
had written his King: "When Germany's princes and people call you to 
this throne, I will pull your carriage on my shoulders to old St. Barth-
olomew' s Cathedral," the former coronation site of the Holy Roman Em-
perors. The Assembly debated the issue from January 17 until March 27, 
1849, when it voted 2.67 to 263 in favor of th~ establishment of the of-
fice of hereditary emperor. The next day, they elected Frederick William 
IV to this position; naturally Radowitz voted for his friend. The Na-
tional Assembly selected a delegation of twenty-four to inform the King 
40 of his selection, and waited for the monarch's answer. 
While awaiting word from Berlin, the Assembly promulgated the final 
version of the constitution. The new central government of Germany was 
endowed with considerably more power than the old German Confederation. 
It would have the exclusive right to handle all diplomatic matters, and 
the states were forbidden to receive any representatives of foreign 
governments. The new government was also to be given the right to de-
clare war or peace and control the military forces of the nation, al-
though the individual states retained a degree of power over their con-
tingents in the national army. The national government also would have 
exclusive control over fortresses and naval concerns, as well as the 
40wigard, Bericht, VI, p. 4675; Radowitz to Frederick William IV, 
Frankfurt, January 5, 1849, Nachgelassene Briefe, p. 72; Wigard, Bericht, 
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power to regulate: foreign and interstate commerce, including railroads 
and harbors. The new Germany was to form a customs union, with the cen-
'tral government in control of duties. Finally, the postal and monetary 
systems of all the states were to be consolidated under the federal 
. 41 
authority. 
The head of the German state was to be a hereditary prince with the 
title Emperor of the Germans. His place of residence was to be the cap-
ital of Germany, and he was required to remain in the capital when the 
Reichstag was in session. When away from the capital, one of the minis-
ters was to accompany him. The Emperor had the power to appoint all 
diplomatic personnel, to declare war and negotiate all treaties with 
foreign powers. He also had the right to call and close meetings of the 
Reichstag and to dissolve the House of the People. As chief executive 
of Germany, the Emperor was to propose legislation to the Reichstag and 
enforce all laws. He had the right to issue pardons and to name minis-
ters, who were answerable to the Reichstag for both their own actions 
42 
and those of the ruler. 
The chief legislative body of the new Germany was to be a Reichstag 
consisting of a House of States ,and a House of the People. The member-
ship in the House of States was to be divided between the member states. 
Prussia was to be given the largest representation with forty members, 
followed by Austria, which would have thirty-eight. Bavaria would have 
eighteen, and Saxony, Hanover and WUrttemberg each would have ten. Baden 
would receive nine representatives, and Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt 
41 "Frankfurt Reichs,verfassung, 11 . Huber, Dokumente, I, pp. 304-310. 
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and Holstein six. Mecklenburg would receive four delegates, Luxembourg 
and Nassau three, and Brunswick, Oldenburg and Saxe-Weimar each were 
awarded two members. The other German states would have one member of 
the House of States. Should Austria refuse to join the new German Em-
pire her thirty-eight seats were to be divided among the smaller states. 
The members were to serve six-year terms, and half the membership was to 
be elected every three years. The state governments were to appoint 
half the members and the local diets the remainder. In those states 
which would send only one member to the House of States, the state 
government and the state assembly would jointly appoint its representa-
. 43 t1ve .• 
The House of the People would consist of representatives of the 
German people to be elected according to a franchise law promulgated on 
April 12. Every free German at least twenty-five years old had the 
right to vote directly for a representative, to exercise this right, a 
person must have lived in the district at least three years. The states 
were to be divided into electoral districts each with a population of 
approximately 100,000. However, if a state had at least 50,000 more 
than needed to form a district, a special district would be created. 
States with less than 50,000 would receive one representative in the 
44 
House of the People. 
The Reichstag was to meet every year at a time announced by the 
Emperor and elect a President, Vice President and Secretary. Meetings 
of both houses were to be open to the public. Members would receive a 
43Ibid., PP• 312-314. 
44 
"Reichswahlgesetz, 11 Huber, Dokumente, I, PP• 324-325. 
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salary and travel expenses and were required to swear their allegiance 
to the Constitution. Legislation would be passed through a majority 
vote of both houses. The Emperor would have the right to veto a law, 
but this could be overridden by three successive sessions of the Reich-
stag. The parliament also would have the power to amend the Constitu-. 
45 
tion by a vote of two-thirds of its membership. 
The third branch of the new central government was' the Supreme 
Court, which had the right to hear cases involving the states and the 
central government and arguments between the houses of the Reichstag 
concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. The court also had 
the power to consider all matters pertaining to the rights of individual 
citizens as well as all matters relating to the federal government and 
46 
· federal law •. 
The final portion of the Frankfurt Constitution contained a set of 
the Basic Rights guaranteed to all citizens of the German Reich. These 
included equality before the law and the right to a fair trial. The po-
lice could not hold a person more than one day without bringing formal 
charges and could not search a home without a proper search warrant. 
Every citizen was to have complete freedom of opinion and expression, 
and censorship of the press was forbidden. The document also assured to 
all Germans absolute freedom of religion as well as academic freedom. 
Finally the Constitution granted freedom of assembly, protected private 
property and assured all citizens the right to communicate with their 
45"Frankfurter Reichsverfassung," Huber, Dokumente, I, pp. 314-
323; Eyck, Parliament, pp. 378-380. 
46 . 
"Frankfurter Re1chsverfassung," Huber, Dokumente, I, pp. 3.24-
325. 
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. . h R ... h 47 representatives int e eic stag. 
The Frankfurt Constitution contained many provisions which Rado-
witz favored. He approved of the expansion of the powers of the federal 
government, and strongly supported the choice of Frederick William IV 
as hereditary Emperor. Even before the discussion of the Constitution 
had begun, Radowitz had suggested the establishment of a bicameral leg-
islative branch consisting of a House, of States and a House of the 
People. But there was one aspect of· this frame of government with 
which he was most dissatisfied: he considered it a major mistake to 
complete work on the Constitution before some sort of agreement with 
48 
Austria had been reached. 
Radowitz 1 s concern over the attitude of Austria was based on facts. 
Since October, the strength of the anti-revolutionary forces had growri. 
On December 2, the incompe~ent Emperor Ferdinand abdicated and his 
eighteen-year-old nephew, Francis Joseph, ascended the throne. On March 
1, the Austrian Constitutional Assembly adop'ted a frame of government 
which conflicted directly with the provisions of the Frankfurt Constitu-
tion by reaffirming the indivisability of the Habsburg Empire. Four 
days later, Schwarzenberg dissolved the Austrian Assembly and promul-
gated a constitution that was even more centralized in nature and thus 
more incompatible with the document being written in Frankfurt. After 
the publication of the Frankfurt Constitution, the government of the 
Habsburg Empire sent a note to Frankfurt rejecting the document and 
47Ibid., PP• 317-323. 
48Wigard, Bericht, I, pp. 375-376; Radowitz to Clemens von Diepen-
brock, Frankfurt, March 30, 1849, Radowitz to Frederick William IV, 
Frankfurt, January 5, 1849, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 76-77, 70-71. 
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demanding its amendment in accordance with Austrian demands. Schwarzen-
berg also refused t_o recognize the election of Frederick William IV as 
head of the German Empire. Instead, he proposed that Germany be ruled 
by a seven-member directory under a Habsburg president. In the Austrian 
plan, the Reichstag was to be replaced by a chamber of seventy members 
49 
elected by the state governments. 
Since Austria refused to accept the Frankfurt Constitution, its 
fate was placed in the hands of. King Frederick William IV. The Prussian 
King had several alternatives. He could accept the crown and risk a 
major war with Austria and her supporters among the German states; he 
could reject it outright; or he could temporize and wait for a solution 
to present itself. Radowitz, like the King, was beset by doubts con-
cerning his position. He could have rushed to Berlin to be at his 
sovereign's side, but he preferred to remain at his post in Frankfurt 
and put his recommendations: in writing as he had done in the past and 
would continue to do throughout his years of service to the Prussian 
monarch. But even this advice was uncertain and indecisive. On March 
13,: 1849, he had outlined the possible actions of the King should the 
National Assembly elect him Emperor. He realized that an open break 
with Austria might lead to war but maintained that the Habsburg monarchy 
had already isolated itself from the rest of Germany. In the end, Rad-
owitz refrained from. advising him on what course to take if elected 
Emperor, explaining that he was not fully informed on the attitude of 
h A . 50 t e ustrian government. 
49 
Sybel, TJ:ie Founding of the German Empire, I, pp. 340-341. 
50Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Frankfurt, March 31, 1849, 
Nachgelassene Briefe, p. 75. 
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Despite his friend's uncertain advice, Frederick William needed 
him in Berlin for the King was confused as to which alternative to 
choose. The Hohenzollern monarch questioned seriously the right of the 
men at Frankfurt to grant him the imperial crown; he would have pre-
ferred to receive it from the hands of the German princes. On April 3, 
he received the official invitation to become the Emperor from the 
representatives of the Assembly. He did not actually reject the crown 
outright, but rep lied with a carefully worded: message. He thanked the 
National Assembly for its work and his election as Emperor, but in-
formed its delegation that he believed it would be a great disservice 
to the German people, the princes and the free cities of Germany, were 
he to accept the crown without their approval. Therefore, he could not 
accept either the Constitution or the imperial crown until both were 
approved by the princes and the German states. 51 
This stipulation was not really unreasonable. It should be remem-
bered that even in the United States, the Constitution required the 
ratification of the states before it could go into effect. So despite 
the claims of some historians, Frederick William did not reject outright 
the leadership of Germany, and in fact would fight for German unifica-
tion and a revised form of the Frankfurt Constitution in the year ahead. 
Nevertheless, many at Frankfurt interpreted the King's statement as a 
rejection. After this, the Assembly went into swift decline. Most 
delegates including Radowitz, left Frankfurt with a sense of disillusion-
ment. On May 30, the remaining fraction of the original members still 
in Frankfurt decided to move to Stuttgart, where they took an ever more 
5~einecke, Radowitz, pp. 216~217; Pinson, Modern Germany, P• 104. 
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radical position. Finally, WUrttembergian troops dissolved the rump 
parliament on June 18, 1848, and the Frankfurt National Assembly faded 
52 
from the scene. 
The reasons for the failure of the Frankfurt National Assembly to 
achieve its goals were .. many and varied. The men in the Paulskirche 
had no real power to farce the adoption of their constitution. The As-
sembly cauld debate and adopt motions as much as it wished, but it had 
no army; in Germany in 1848, he who controlled the army controlled the 
natian. The stat.es possessed the troops and refused to use them to 
support their own destruction as semi-independent entities. The Assem-
bly had alsa alienated many German revolutionaries by its decision to 
support the Malm8 Armistice; it could not now call up~n them for sup-
port ·.against :the states. In reality, the Frankfurt National Assembly 
had adopted a maderate solution to the German problem, and in doing so 
had alienated bath the German states and the revolutionaries. 
Similarly, from a study of his work at Frankfurt, Radowitz emerges 
as a moderate. He was the leader of the Right, but refused to support 
a reaction that would reinstate the ald order and its ineffective Con-
federation. He fought for the establislnnent of a monarchy and the re-· 
tent ion of the position of .. the states, but at the same time was willing 
to wark far the erection of a freely elected parliament as a voice for 
the German people. As he neared the end af his work in St. Paul's 
Church, Radowitz viewed the results of the Natianal Assembly with mixed 
emotions. He was deeply disturbed by the factionalism and the inter-
mediate debates at Frankfurt which had delayed the decision on the 
52 . 
Eyck, Parliament, pp. 383-386. 
143 
Constitution until the time for effective actio~ had passed. At the 
end of March, 1849, he wrote despairingly: "As it is always my fate, 
I will go .my lonely way and put this brew of hell out of my mind •••. To 
the people here, I am a stranger and a Catholic; this makes any effect-
ive work with such elements impossible." Finally on April 23, Count 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg, the Prussian Minister President, re-
53 
called him to Berlin. In spite of his disillusionment, however, he 
did not feel that the Assembly had been a total failure. He was en-
couraged by the foundations for unification laid by the Constitution 
and would incorporate a revised version of this document in his own 
proposals of 1849 and 1850. It is clear that he would have preferred 
the acceptance of the Constitution and of Frederick William IV as Em-
peror, but he was too realistic to expect such a thing in the face of 
such strong Austrian opposition. In the next chapter of his career, 
Radowitz would be forced to carry on his fight for German unification 
through other channels. 
53Wigard, Bericht, VII, P• 5807; Meinecke, Radowitz, p. 229; Rado-
witz to Countess von Voss, Frankfurt, March 21, 1849, Radowitz Nach-
Hlsse. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE LEAGUE OF THREE KINGS 
The end of the Frankfurt National Assembly left a political vacuum 
in Germany. The Revolution had destroyed the old German Confederation 
of 1815, and the attempts at Frankfurt to replace it with a unified Ger-
man constitutional state had been unsuccessful. In the spring of 1849, 
there were still three possible solutions to the German problem: the 
reestablishment of the defunct Confederation, as favored by the reaction ... 
aries, the creation of a republic, as advanced by the radical elements, 
or the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. Radowitz fa-
vored the third option, and he was subsequently criticized from several 
quarters for his efforts to achieve this goal. Although he would later 
unify Germany on the basis of a program very similar to Radowitz 's Otto 
' 
von Bismarck became one of his chief critics. The reactionary Junker 
accused Radowitz of deliberately trying ;to lead the Hohenzollern king-
dom to humiliation, either from a desire to harm the Protestant cause 
or else as a result of his selfish determination to curry the favor of 
Frederick William IV regardless of the consequences. Others, such as 
the historian Veit Valentin, have charged that Radowitz was completely 
out of touch with reality owing to his strong romantic leanings. 1 Yet 
1otto von Bismarck, Gedanken und Errinerungen (Berlin, 1915), I, 
p. 84; Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, I, pp. 320-321. 
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during the spring and summer of 1849, it appeared for a time that the 
Radowitz plan for German unification might still succeed. 
After his participation in the unsuccess.f.ul meetings in Frankfurt, 
Radowitz returned to Berlin disillusioned and chastened. He wrote to 
his wife that he felt like a soldier who had gone into battle with the 
foreknowledge of certain defeat. He had .s.een his high hopes. in the 
possibilities of the National Ass.embly. crumble into dust just as he had 
also met with defeat in his earlier efforts to bring about a reform of 
the Confederation. In this state of mind, without any idea of what lay 
before him, he returned to the Prussian capital in April, 1849. 2 
In Berlin, he made one final effort to save the work of the Na-
tional Assembly. On Aptil 26, he met with Count Frederich Wilhelm von 
Brandenburg, the Minister President of Prussia, and the King. Radowitz 
proposed three possible solutions to the disagreement between Berlin and 
Frankfurt. First, Prussia could break completely with the Assembly and 
dictate a German constitution from above. Secondly, the Hohenzollern 
kingdom could appeal directly to the German people. And finally, Ber-
lin could reach an understanding with the middle German states while 
coming to some sort of separate agreement with Austria. Both Branden-
burg and the King entertained serious doubts as to which alternative to 
choose. Four days later, the ministry met to discuss the issue. In the 
debate over the problem, Radowitz championed the last alternative, ar-
guing that since the men at Frankfurt had taken the initiative and 
drafted a constitution, the ministry should act to unite Germany on the 
basis of a revision of that document. He also emphasized the importance 
of reaching an accord with the Habsburg Empire. Because the King and 
his ministers considered other matters, such as the sporadic revolts in 
2Radowitz to his wife, Eis.enach, April 24, 1849, Nachgelassene 
Brief.a, p. 18. 
146 
the Rhineland more pressing, they delayed action on Radowitz 1 s sugges-
tions, but discussi~ns on the issue continued. On May 5, he again met 
with the King, who proposed the restoration of the defunct Holy Roman 
Empire with the Habsburg Emperor at the head and the Prussian King as 
chief of the ~inistry.3 This plan was impractical, because the Revolu-
tion had unleashed forces that would never settle for this solution to 
the German problem. The men of 1848 had fought to create a strong uni-
fied nation and would never accept the linkage of German fortunes with 
those of the multinational Habsburg Empire. Also, the possibility of 
Austrian approval of the King's program was most remote. 
Even the Pruasian.ministry rejected the King's proposal to resur-
rect the Holy Roman Empire. Instead, they instructed Radowitz to draft 
a plan of union. He based his proposal on the Frankfurt Constitution 
and on his consultation with members of the ministry and the King. On 
May 13, he presented the fruits of his work to the ministry, which ac-
4 
cepted it after two days of discussion. This proposed constitution 
was to be submitted to a conference of representatives of the German 
states which had been called to assemble in Berlin, an approach which 
was very realistic. The states held the real power in Germany, and any 
solution to the German problem would have to meet with their approval. 
The representatives of the states were invited to gather in Berlin 
on May 17, 1849. Of the thirty-seven sovereignt:ies:r,:,however,,oµly Han-
over, Saxony, Bavaria and Austria responded to the Prussian invitation. 
The other German states replied that events no longer justified the 
3Diary, April 26 and 30, ibid., pp. 83-84. 
4Diary, April 30, May 4, 5, and 6, ibid., pp. 90, 92. 
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convening of a conference. Radowitz opened the session in the name of 
Prussia with a proposal that the Frankfurt Constitution provide the 
5 
basis for negotiations to form a new German confederation. 
The conference had before it several important issues. First, 
Radowitz had to, convince the participating states to agree on the im-
portance of forming a new German union. This accomplished, he would 
then have to lead them to agreement on his revised form of the Frankfurt 
Constitution. The Prussian officer realized that the other German 
states would never recognize Frederick William IV as Emperor, so he de-
cided to propose a College of Princes to act as the executive of the new 
Germany. One of the major questions would be the attitude of Austria 
and the willingness of other German states to follow Prussian leadership 
should the Habsburg Empire refuse to participate in the new union. This 
issue would almost break up the conference before it had even begun its 
work, and would hover over Radowitz's efforts to unite Germany through-
out the next year and a half. 
Radowitz led the talks throughout the conference and began by mov-
ing that the German Reich consist of those states of the former German 
Confederation which recognized the constitution. With the exception of 
Austria, the conferees agreed to this proposal and began to revise the 
Frankfurt Constitution. Bavaria objected to the provision barring dip-
lomatic correspondence between states in the confederation and foreign 
countries on the grounds that the Wittelsbach kingdom had special rela-
tions with Rome owing to religion, and Greece because of dynastic ties. 
511Konferenz-Protokolle," AktenstUcke betreffend das B\lndniss von 




Hanover supported the Bavarian argument with the contention that it too 
had special interests in certain foreign countries. The delegates then 
decided to amend the proposed constitution to allow the states to ap-
point diplomatic personnel to represent their special concerns in for-
eign countries. The session next decided that the states should main-
tain control over taxation and the postal system within their territor-
ies, with the Reich retaining the authority to levy taxes for national 
matters and to supervise interstate postal traffic. The first session 
ended with Anton von Prokesch, the Austrian Minister to Berlin, declar-
ing that his country would refuse to relinquish its sovereign rights to 
the new German union and walking out of the conference. 6 
The next day the delegates from Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover and Sax-
ony met to continue their business. Radowitz opened the session by 
reading a note from the Austrian Minister informing the conference that 
his country would not participate as long as the Frankfurt Constitution 
formed the basis for the talks. He further declared that the Habsburg 
Monarchy would oppose any attempt to force German unification on the 
basis of the Frankfurt Constitution. The Austrian statement prompted 
protests from other states and threatened to undo Radowitz's work before 
it had even begun. Von Beust, the delegate from Saxony, came forward 
with a declaration that his country could not bind itself to accept any 
agreement reached in Berlin. Gustav von Lerchenfeld of Bavaria further 
proposed that the meetings be discontinued until Austria agreed to par-
ticipate. Fighting to save the proposed union, Radowitz argued that the 
events of the past year had made reform of the Confederation absolutely 
6Ibid., pp. 13-17. 
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necessary and that the delegates should not allow Austria to force them 
to abandon their important work. After some spirited discussion, they 
decided to continue their efforts toward a revision of the constitu-
7 
tion. 
The delegates first agreed to reject the decision of the National 
Assembly to place an Emperor at the head of the new Germany. Radowitz 
proposed instead that a College of Princes under the presidency of the 
King of Prussia hold executive power. This body was to consist of seven 
members with one each from Prussia, Austria and Bavaria. The other four 
members were to be divided among the member states. WUrttemberg, Baden, 
Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen would share a vote. 
Saxony, the Saxon duchies, the Reusses, the Anhalts and the Schwarzburgs 
would form on~ unit, as would Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenburg, the Mecklen-
burgs, Holstein and the Hansa Cities. Finally, the Hessian states, Nas-
sau, Luxembourg, Waldeck, Detmold, Schaumburg and Frankfurt would share 
one member. In the event that the Habsburg Empire should continue in its 
refusal to join the new Germany, the College of Princes was to consist 
f 1 . b 8 o on y six mem ers. 
This proposal led to a debate on the position of Austria towards 
the proposed union. Johann StUve, the representative of Hanover, became 
the chief spokesman for those who were willing to go any lengths to avoid 
offending Vienna. He stated that his country would oppose any step 
which would exclude Austria from Germany and proposed that the Habsburg 
Emperor rather than the King of Prussia serve as the presiding officer 
7 
Ibid.~ PP• 18-20. 
8Ibid.~ PP• 20-21. 
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of the College of Princes. But Beust argued that although the way 
should remain open for a later adherence of Vienna to the union, no de-
cision concerning its position should be made immediately, since the 
Danubian monarchy had denounced the proceedings. Further Radowitz re-
minded the delegates that the new Austrian Constitution had provided for 
a centralized state comprising both German and non-German lands. Aus-
tria had announced its refusal to join any German union which would re-
quire it to divide the Empire in any way. Prussia, he said, was ada-
mantly opposed to Austria forcing its preferred version of the reorgan-
ization of Germany on the other states. He also asserted that Berlin 
had decided that if the other states did not agree they could go their 
own way. After further discussion, the delegates voted to reduce the 
membership of the College of Princes to six. They also concluded that 
the constitution should state clearly the special relationship which 
. 9 
would exist between Austria and the future German union. 
With the problem of Austria at least temporarily shelved, the 
delegates continued to explore other revisions designed to render the 
Frankfurt Constitution more compatible to their aims. On the question 
of the site of the meetings of the Reichstag, the Hanoverian delegate 
objected to the consideration of Frankfurt as the center of the new 
Germany. Eventually all agreed to the city of Erfurt, in southern 
Prussia, as the ideal location: it was centrally located in a militar-
ily secure region. The meeting then adjourned until the following morn-
10 
ing, when the delegates would spend several more hours in discussion. 
9Ibid., PP• 21-24. 
lOibid., pp. 26-31. 
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On May 20, Radowitz proposed that the delegates issue a public 
statement to the effect that Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Hanover had 
formed an alliance for the purpose of internal and external security. 
The document declared that the member states had accepted Prussian 
leadership and the revised Constitution and invited other German states 
to join the alliance. After StUve registered the reservations that the 
members reaffirm their obligations under the Federal Act and the hope 
that Austria would decide to join the alliance, the delegates signed 
11 
the statement. 
Five more meetings followed until the negotiations were concluded 
on May 26, 1849. At 10:00 that evening, after ironing out the last de-
tails of the Constitution, Radowitz and his colleagues from Bavaria, 
Saxony and Hanover formally signed the final protocol of the conference, 
which certified their acceptance of the revised Constitution and the 
election law. However, since the delegates believed that the Constitu-
tion of the Union could not go into effect until agreement had been 
reached with Vienna and the other states, they concluded a temporary 
alliance to govern the new Union and work for the acceptance of the 
Constitution through negotiations with Austria and the other states. 
Because the Bavarian delegate refused to endorse this agreement until 
receiving approval from Munich, only Prussia, Hanover and Saxony signed 
this treaty, and the alliance came to be known as the League of Three 
Kings or the Alliance of May 26, 1849. The three kingdoms also invited 
f h . 12 the other German states to join them in arming t e new German union. 
11Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
12Ibid., pp. 34-54. 
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The treaty established an Administrative Council to direct the af-
fairs of the League, admit new members and issue the call for the meet-
ing of the Reichstag. For the sake of expediency, the King of Prussia 
was named the leader of the League and given the responsibility for 
carrying out all diplomatic and military measures necessary with the 
assistance of the Administrative Council. As soon as possible, the ar-
mies of the member states were to be united to form a League Army. The 
Reichstag, elected in accordance with the election law, was to meet to 
give final approval to the Constitution of the Union at a time and place 
to be announced by the Administrative Council. The Treaty also es tab-
lished a supreme court of the League to consist of three Prussians, two 
Saxons and two Hanovarians. The oldest Prussian member would act as the 
presiding officer of the court which was to meet in Erfurt beginning on 
13 
July 1, 1849. 
Thus, Radowitz seemed well on the way toward achieving his goal of 
a united Germany. Three of the most important German states had agreed 
to adopt a revised form of the Frankfurt Constitution and had established 
an organization to govern Germany until that Constitution could go into 
effect. There were many problems yet to be met, such as the objections 
of Austria and the reluctance on the part of some states to depart from 
the strong tradition of Austrian leadership; but at least for the moment 
it seemed that Germany had begun the process of unification and that the 
principles of the Revolution of 1848 had not been totally repudiated. 
Four days after the signing of the Treaty of the League of Three 
Kings, the proposed constitution was made public. This document declared 
1311Statut des BUndnisses vom 26. Mai 1849," ibid., PP• 85-88. 
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that the German Reich would consist of those states which were members 
of the Confederation and which ratified the Constitution. In an obvious 
reference to Austria, it provided that if a German land shared a common 
monarch with a non-German land, it must have a separate government, and 
that only a German land could become a member of the German Reich. The 
Constitution also required any German ruler assuming the throne of a 
non-German area to lay aside his right to rule the German area. The 
individual German states retained their independence except where this 
. 14 was specifically limited by the constitution. 
The powers of the central government included all diplomatic cor-
respondence and the right to name ministers and consuls. While the mem-
ber states would have the right to receive special diplomatic corres-
pondence and negotiate with other German states, all diplomatic inter-
course of a national character was to be carried out by the central 
government, which also had the right to declare war and negotiate 
15 
peace. 
Since Radowitz had seen firsthand the importance of military agree~ 
ment between the German states during his years on the Military Commis-
sion, it was only natural that the proposed constitution would specifi-
cally state the military powers of the central government and the obli-
gations of the member states. It was empowered to name a field marshal 
and generals to lead the Federal Army, which was t·o consist of the ar-
mies of the member states. The Reich would bear the cost of maintenance 
of the military and establish and support federal fortresses. Although 
14 "Entwurf der Verfassung des deutschen Reiches;II ibid., p. 55. 
15Ibid.,, p. 56. 
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the individual states did retain the right to keep their armies, subject 
to the regulations of the Reich, they would have no power over the navy, 
16 
which would be a federal concern exclusively. It was hoped that these 
provisions would avert a squabble like that of the fortress dispute of 
1840. 
The Central Goverrunent was also given all authority over commercial 
matters: this embraced control of water transportation, including the 
rivers, which would be open to all German states. The relatively novel 
concern involving the regulation of railroads fell also within the com-
petence of the national government, which had the power to construct new 
lines should they be needed. The new German state would form a customs 
union, with the Federal Goverrunent controlling duties and the customs 
police; the individual states would lose the right to collect customs 
duties. The postal and telegraph systems of Germany fell under the aus-. 
pices of the Federal Goverrunent, which was also to determine weights and 
17 
measures and issue money. 
The most important difference between the Frankfurt Constitution 
and the Constitution supported by the League of Three Kings involved the 
executive branch. Instead of an Emperor, the conference had agreed on a 
six-member College of Princes under the King of Prussia as the head of 
the new German goverrunent. This body was to control all diplomatic cor-
respondence and had the right to declare war and negotiate peace. The 
College of Princes had the right to convene and prorogue the sessions of 
the Reichstag and to dissolve the House of the People. Decisions of the 
16Ibid.~ PP• 56-57. 
17Ibid • , 59 61 -PP• .. • 
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College of Princes were to be reached by an absolute majority of the 
membership. The executive branch also could issue pardons and connnute 
18 
sentences and would serve as connnander-in-chief of the Federal Army. 
As in the case of the Frankfurt Constitution, Radowitz's Constitu-
tion provided for a legislative branch consisting of a House of States 
and a House of the People. However, the division of votes in the House 
of States differed under the new charter. As long as the Habsburg Em-
pire refused to join the new German union, the House of States was to 
consist of 159 members, with Prussia having forty representatives and 
Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and WUrrtemberg twenty each. Hesse-Kassel and 
Hesse-Darmstadt each had seven, Holstein six, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and 
Nassau four and Luxembourg three delegates. Hamburg, Brunswick, Saxe-
Weimar and Oldenburg were awarded two seats. The other German states 
each received one member. Half of the delegates to the House of States 
would be selected by the state governments and the remainder by the lo-
cal diets. In those states with only one seat, the government of the 
state would nominate three men, one of whom would be elected by the diet. 
Members of the upper house would have to be residents in the states they 
represented and at least thirty years old. The term of office would be 
six years, and elections for half the delegates would be held every 
three years. Members of the House of the States would not be bound by 
19 
instructions from the states. 
The lower house, or the House of the People, was to be elected on 
the basis of a separate election law also approved by the delegates. 
18 . 
Ibid., PP• 62-63. 
19Ibid., pp. 64-66. 
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This statute followed the Frankfurt electfon law in its apportionment 
of electoral districts, but prescribed a more limited franchise. Al-
though ·.the law granted every financially independent German over twenty-
five the right to vote, it excluded from the franchise all persons who 
were under the protection of a guardian, receiving welfare payments or 
involved in legal proceedings arising from indebtedness. Unlike the 
election law .oLthe Frankfurt Nitfunal-:Assembly, elections would not .be 
direct. The voters would choose only electors, who then would elect the 
delegates to the House of the People for four-year terms. Despite 
these limitations, at least the German people would have some control 
over their national government, and there was a possibility of a more 
. 20 democratic election procedure in the future. 
The Reichstag would be the supreme legislative body of the new Ger-
man Reich. Laws would require the approval of a majority of both houses 
and acceptance by the executive branch. Any statute passed by the 
Reichstag but rejected by the College of Princes could not be recon-
sidered during the same session. The budget would be proposed by the 
College of Princes and submitted to the House of the People for consid-
eration. After receiving the approval of the lower house, a budget 
would be sent to the House of States which could accept it or return it 
to the House of the People for further discussion. Financial matters 
would be considered every three years. The Reichstag would meet once a 
year in the seat of government, and each house would elect its own pre-
siding officer, vice president and secretary. All meetings of the 
2011Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend die Wahlen der Abgeordneten · 
zum Volkshause;n ibid., pp. 79-81. 
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legislative branch were open to the public, and each house would be the 
21 
final authority on the validity of the credentials of its members. 
The Constitution completed the central government by the erection 
of a judicial branch with the same powers as those provided by the 
Frankfurt Constitution. The single addition1:1l right of the Supreme 
Court would be to hear cases involving charges against citizens of mem-
ber states in matters outside the competence of the local courts. Thus 
the new government of Germany would consist of three independent 
branches, each having its own prescribed powers and none able to com-
22 
pletely dominate another branch. 
The last part of the Constitution of the Union dealt with the basic 
rights of the German people and was taken almost word for word from the 
Frankfurt Constitution. The single difference was that the police would 
have the power to forbid outside meetings that might threaten the peace 
and security. All other basic rights, such as freedom of speech and of 
the press, freedom of religion and assembly, trial by jury and the right 
of habeas corpus were guaranteed. The Constitution accepted by the 
Prussian King and his ministers and the other members of the League had 
many liberal features and contained a detailed statement of the rights 
23 
of the people. It belies the historical cliche that the months fol-
lowing the fall of the Frankfurt National Assembly constituted a period 
21 
"Entwurf der Verfassung des deutschen Reiches," ibid., pp. 68-
69. 
22Ibid., pp. 69-70; "Die Frankfurter Reichsverfassung," Huber, 
Dokumente, I, pp. 316-317. 
23 "Entwurf der Verfassung des deutschen Reiches,"-AktenstUcke be-
treffend ~ BUndniss, I, pp. 71-76. 
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of brutal reaction. Considering the fact that this chapter was the ere-
ation of the representatives of the Gennan princes, it becomes clear 
that 1849 was far from being a year of unrelieved reaction. 
Since Radowitz had supported the election of Frederick William IV 
as Emperor. in Frankfurt, it may seem strange that he made no substantial 
effort to preserve this feature of the Frankfurt Constitution during 
the negotiations of May, 1849. The explanation lies in the fact that he 
was simply realistic enough to comprehend that the other German states 
would never accept giving this much power to the Hohenzollern king. In 
fact, Saxony and Hanover even had reservations about placing the Prus-
. . 24 sian monarch in the presidency of the Council of Princes. 
In accord with Radowitz 1 s view as to their importance, the power of 
the states was secured by several features of the Constitution. The 
House of States, through the election of its membership by the state 
governments, was the major source of this protection. The position of 
the states was also guaranteed by the representatives of their rulers 
in the Council of Princes. However, the states were also limited by 
Radowitz 1 s Constitution. Their most important symbol of sovereignty, 
the right to carry on diplomatic relations with foreign powers, was 
substantially curtailed. The Union was designed to create a united 
Germany while preserving the rights of the.states. 
The limited grant of power to the people also reveals Radowitz's 
political philosophy. While a generous franchise was a part of the 
Constitution, the method of indirect election and the subordinate po-
sition of the House of the People combined to limit the actual impact 
24 
Sybel, The Founding of~ German Empire, I, p. 382. 
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of the general public on the proposed Union. Radowitz and his fellow 
ministers were willing to allow the electorate to get its foot in the 
door, but stopped short of giving it free entrance to the government. 
Yet, when one considers that before 1848 the people had no right to 
participate in the national government at all, the Constitution of the 
Union represented a major step towards democratic institutions. 
A very important aspect of the Union, and one which eventually 
would contribute to its failure, were the provisions of the Constitution 
which would exclude Austria. Vienna had made clear its refusal even to 
consider dividing the government of the Empire into German and non-
German sections. If Austria were to join the Union this would be re~ 
quired, and this had the effect of excluding the Habsburg Monarchy from 
participation. Even if this were not a sufficient obstacle, the ruler 
in Vienna would never agree to the primacy, or even the equality of the 
Hohenzollern king in Germany, nor would he ever accept the limitations 
of his power contained in the Constitution. Thus the Constitution of 
the new German Union had the effect of assigning Austria to the status 
of a foreign state and placing Germany under Prussian leadership. 
At first the League seemed to be a success. On June 6, King Fred-
erick Augustus II of Saxony announced his decision to join. On June 28, 
the Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach sent his representative to Berlin to 
announce his adherence to the League. By July 20, the two Mecklenburgs, 
Oldenburg, the Saxon duchies, the Hessian states, and the Anhalt duchies 
had declared their intention to become a part of the League. On Septem-
ber 6, the Prussian government informed the remaining German states that 
they had fourteen days to reply to the invitation to become a part of 
25 
the alliance. · 
160 
During the sunnner Radowitz feverously worked: in Berlin for the sue-
cess of his program, realizing that the attitude of Vienna would be cru-
cial to the survival of the Union. Even before the conference had com-
pleted its work, Ra~owitz persuaded the Prussian government to begin its 
efforts to win Austrian acceptance of the program, and on May 10, Canitz, 
the Foreign Minister, had traveled to Vienna to present two diplomatic 
26-
notes to the Emperor and his advisors. 
The first of these documents stated the position of Prussia con-
cerning the future of Germany and the second was a proposed treaty. 
The Prussians argued that the influence of the democratic revolutionaries 
would be nullified as soon as the German governments demonstrated their 
interests in the welfare of their people. According to Berlin, the way 
to do this was to form a unified German federal state with an elective 
parliament. The document emphasized two factors which had to be con-
sidered when discussing German affairs: the relationship between the 
individual states and the relationship between the two great German 
powers. It was the Prussian position that since Austria was a multi~ 
national state and Prussia an almost exclusively German state, Prussia 
stood in closer connection to the other German states than the Habsburg 
Empire. Canitz proposed, therefore, that two organizations be formed: 
a federal state, on the one hand, and a wider German union which would 
25 "Prussia," .!!!!, ~ (London), June 6, 28, July 20 and September 
6, 1849, p. 6. 
26 
11 Instruktion fUr den General Leutnant von Canitz," AktenstUcke 
betreffend ~ BUndniss, I, pp. 130-131. 
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include Austria, on the other. 27 
Accompanying the formal statement was a draft treaty which would 
have formalized the structure of the wider union between the Danubian 
Monarchy and the German federal state. Eternal peace was to exist be-
tween the two members, and either member could resign from the union. 
Prussia also suggested that the.leadership of the new German union be 
entrusted to a Directory of four members: two for Austria and two for 
Prussia and the other states. The representative of the Empire would 
"d i f h D' 28 presi e over sess ons o t e irectory. 
Uiifortunat:ely for Radowitz I s simultaneous efforts to launch the 
League of Three Kings, Canitz found a cold reception in Vienna. On May 
16, the Austrian government issued two statements on the issue. The 
first stated that Austria had hoped to work together with Prussia to 
rid Germany of democratic revolutionary action, but the actions of Ber-
lin had made this cooperation impossible. The second Austrian statement 
declared that force was the only method of dealing with the revolution-
. 29 aries. 
Canitz spent several days in discussions with Prince Felix von 
Schwarzenberg, but was unable to persuade the Austrian chief minister 
to change his position on the Prussian proposals. The government in 
Vienna took the stance that before any discussion of the German question 
could take place, the·last remnants of the revolution must be crushed. 
2711Denkschrift der K8niglich Preussischen Regierung, Berlin, 9 Mai 
1849," ibid.,. pp. 131-137. 
2·811Grundlinien zu einer Unions Akte," ibid .• ,. pp. 131-137. 
2911Denkschrift der K.K. Oesterreichischen Kabinets, Wien, 16 Mai 
1849 ," and "Zweitz Denkschrift des K. K. Oesterreichischen Kabinets, 
Wien, 16 Mai 1849," ibid.,. pp. 140-145. 
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Canitz also discovered that the Habsburg court still regarded Archduke 
John to be the Imperial Vicar. The Danubian monarchy insisted that af-
ter the revolution was defeated, the first order of business must be 
the erection of a new central authority for th¢ German Confederation, 
and refused to consider any attempt to win the support of the people 
h h . . 1 f 30 t roug any const1tut1ona orm. 
While these negotiations were taking place in Vienna, Prussia made 
an effort to persuade the Bavarians to join the League. Brandenburg 
sent Leopold von Gerlach to Munich to carry on talks with the Wittels-
bach court. Here he found an attitude similar to that found by Canitz 
in Vienna, which he attributed to the influence of agents of the Aus-
trian government. Accordingly, he reported to Radowitz that Bavaria 
. ld b . d d · · h A · 31 cou e cons1 ere 1n agreement wit us.tr1a. 
However, Gerlach's report did not close the question, for there 
was still some hope that the south German kingdom might reconsider and 
join the Union. On June 22, 1849, the Bavarian Foreign Minister, Lud-
wig van der Pfordten, met with the Prussian Minister President in Berlin 
to discuss the issue, informing him that his country wishes to reach an 
accord with Prussia. He also hoped to act as a mediator between Vienna 
and Berlin and help the two great German powers come to an understanding 
32 
. about the German question. 
3011Promemora des General Leutnant van Canitz an den K. K. Minister 
Prtlsidenten, FUrsten von Schwarzenberg," and "Promemora des K.K. Minis-
ter Prtlsidenten an den General Leutnant von Canitz, Wien, 19 Mai 1849," 
ibid., pp. 146-150, 151-153. 
31 
Gerlach, DenkwUrdigkeiten, VI, p. 329. 
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Pfordten to Brandenburg, Berlin, June 22, 1849, Brandenburg to 
Pfordten, Berlin, June 23, 1849, and Pfordten to Brandenburg, Berlin, 
July 1, 1849, AktenstUcke betreffend das BUndniss, I, 2nd~ Ed., pp. 29-
33. 
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The Bavarian minister also wanted to persuade the Prussian govern-
ment to make several revisions of the Constitution, which he thought 
might make it more acceptable to both his state and Austria as well. 
Meeting with Radowitz, he proposed that the section which prohibited 
the union of a German area with a non-German area be replaced with a 
provision which would simply exclude the non-German area from the Union. 
This would remove one of the major Habsburg objections to the Constitu-
tion. Pfordteri also wanted the document changed to allow the member 
states the right to send and receive diplomatic :representatives. Show-
ing the effects of the long dispute over the fortresses, the Bavarian 
official requested that the Constitution carry a provision requiring the 
approval of a member state before a federal fortress could be built on 
its territory. He also wanted the Constitution to clearly specify that 
in the event of Austrian participation in the Union, the College of 
Princes would consist of seven members, one of which would represent 
Vienna. In a further effort to make the Constitution acceptable to the 
Habsburg Emperor, Pfordten proposed that the two German powers alternate 
as the presiding officer of the executive. council. He also requested 
that the individual states be allowed to make a distinction between 
33 
citizens of the Reich and citizens of the state. 
Although the Bavarian proposals might have removed many of the 
Austrian objections to the Constitution, Prussia was unwilling to ac-
cept them. Radowitz replied that Berlin felt an obligation to resist 
any attempts to change substantially the spirit of the Constitution from 
that accepted by the conference. On July 1, he informed Pfordten that 
33 ''VorsUlge des Ministers v.d. Pfordten dem General von Radowitz 
zu vertraulicher :Besprechung Ubergeben, '' ibid., pp. 39-43. 
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the Hohenzollern kingdom lacked the authority to change any portion of 
the Constitution without the app,roval of the other member states. Rad-
owitz also argued that the Bavarian proposals would lead to a weakening 
of the Union in such a way as to render it ineffective. Though he was 
willing to change the Constitution to provide for Bavarian primacy in 
the College of Princes in case of Prussian absence, he refused to agree 
to alternate this power between Berlin and Vienna, as the Bavarian rep-
34 
resentative had requested. 
After concluding his talks in Berlin, Pfordten returned to Munich 
to report to King Maximilian II on July 12, 1849. The Foreign Minister 
maintained that in spite of Prussian arguments to the contrary, the 
Union violated the Federal Act and that Austria was right in its ob-
jections to the proposal. After the Prussian Minister renewed the in-
vitation to join the alliance, Pfordten responded on September 8 that 
Bavaria could not join as long as the Constitution remained in its pres-
ent form. He also stated that participation in the conference did not 
obligate a state to join the League, and that the south German state 
could never agree to an association of states that did not have the full 
approval of Austria. 35 Bavaria officially rejected the League until the 
Constitution was changed to such an extent that it would be little better 
than the old German Confederation. 
Austria and Bavaria were not alone in their opposition to the Prus-
sian Plan of Union. In September, the ministry of WUrttemberg informed 
3411Vertrauliche Schreiben des Generals von Radowitz an Herrn von 
der Pfordten," ibid., pp. 44-48. 
3511Staats-Ministerium des Kt,nigl. Hauses und des Aeussern. Auf 
Seiner MajesUlt des KBnigs Allerh8chsten Befehl; "Pfordten to Rosenberg, 
Munich, September 8, 1849, ibid., pp. 49-51, 
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Berlin of its decision to decline the invitation to join the League. 
On September 14, the small central state of Hesse-Homburg added its re-
jection to those of the southern states. Bavaria and WUrttemberg de-
clined membership in the League partially owing to a fear of earning 
the displeasure of Vienna, while Hesse-Hornberg guarded its sovereignty 
jealously out of the fear that in becoming a part of the alliance the 
36 
tiny country would be absorbed by other larger states. 
Not only was the League rejected by several states, but its program 
had determined critics from within. StUve of Hanover objected violently 
to plan, demanding that any draft constitution which did not receive the 
blessing of Vienna be rejected. While in Berlin, the Hanoverian at-
tempted to persuade Frederick William IV to revise the Plan of Union to 
delete aspects offensive to the Habsburg ruler. However, the monarch 
only met with him fifteen minutes and rejected StUve's request. The 
Hanoverian minister believed that Radowitz had arrived at the Palace 
first and arranged it so that his session with the King would be 
37 
short. 
The strongest opposition to Radowitz's plan came from his powerful 
foes within his own country, especially among the Junker class. Since 
1848, a group led by the Gerlach brothers had published a newspaper to 
combat the revolution. Their Neue Preussische Z eitung or "Kreuzzei-
tung,'' so-called from the large cross on its masthead, became the chief 
3611ErkHlrung der Ktlniglich WUrttembergischen Regierung," "ErkHlrung 
der Landgr"1flich Hessen-Homburgischen Regierung," ibid., pp. 7-72. 
37 
StUve to Pagenstecher, Hanover, June 20, 1849, Johann StUve, 
Briefe Johann Carl StUves, ed. by Walter Vogel (Gtlttingen, 1960), II, 
p. 667. --
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critic of the Plan of Union, denouncing its founder as an agent of the 
Revolution and a spy from the Paulskirche. This opposition ultimately 
reached Frederick William IV, who began to entertain serious doubts 
about Radowitz and his ideas. The nature of this hostility to the 
Union and its architect is a further demonstration that Radowitz was 
far from being an agent of reaction. Had he been so, the Junkers would 
have lent him their support, but as a major spokesman for those who 
realized that the old order had outlived its usefulness and had to be 
replaced by a new and united Germany, he was the very antithesis of 
38 
the reaction. 
Junker animosity toward the Union had been expressed in the Prus-
sian Diet even prior to the Austrian rejection of the plan in May. Al-
though the Diet lacked the authority to enact or veto the program, its 
support was still important, because by winning its favor Radowitz could 
gain leverage in his fight with the reactionaries. On August 25, he 
presented his program in a speech before the assembly. Sunnnoning all 
his talents as an orator, Radowitz pleaded for the delegates' approval, 
citing the growth of German nationalism during the War of Liberation 
and the need for a united German foreign policy. So effective was his 
impassioned speech that Bismarck, then a delegate to the Diet, reported 
scornfully that by its conclusion there was hardly a dry eye in the 
39 
house. 
38Diary, May 19 and 31, 1849, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 100, 108. 
3911Rede in der zweiten Kammer der preussischen StMnde am 25sten 
August 1849," Gesammelte Schriften, II, pp. 388-420; F. Darmstaedter, 
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Despite this enthusiastic reception of Radowitz's statement, the 
League still had many foes. Typical of the opposition was Bismarck him-
self, who delivered a speech vehemently denouncing the Union and its 
Constitution, which he. believed would destroy the greatest piller of 
German power, Prussia. He passionately invoked the old Prussian vir-
tures of loyalty and military discipline as a guide for action rather 
than the despised Constitution, which he charged was a creation of the 
Revolution. He concluded his denunci~tion of Radowitz and his proposal 
with the words: 
What is this Germany? The people, who have risen out of the 
army, whose true representative is this army ••.• have no de-
sire to see their Prussian Kingdom dissolved in the rotten 
fermentation of south German indiscipline. Their loyalty 
is not a paper presidency of a Reich; they cling to the free 
and living King of Prussia. I know that I express with these 
words the sentiment of the Prussian army and the majority of 
my fellow countrymen, and I hope to God that we will long re-
main Prussian, and that this piece of paper will ZB forgotten 
like a dry autumn leaf which falls to the ground. 
Still, as late as the fall of 1849, it seemed that Radowitz had at 
last achieved his goal despite such stubborn opposition. On June 18, 
the Administrative Council had begun to meet. On July 2, the Supreme 
Court of the League of Three Kings had taken up its work in Erfurt. 
Radowitz also found support from many liberals, who had accepted his 
ideas as a means to preserve the accomplislunents of the Frankfurt Na-
tional Assembly. After the unsuccessful conclusion of the meetings in 
the Paulskirche, Heinrich von Gagern, the former President of the As-
sembly, had invited his supporters to a meeting at Gotha to examine 
means by which the Frankfurt Constitution might be saved. On June 26, 
4011Ueber Preuss en und die deutschen Kleinstaaten," Otto von Bis-
marck, Gesannnelte Reden (Berlin, 1894), I, pp. 24-25. 
1849, 130 men had assembled, including Georg Friedrich von Vincke, 




Those attending the Gotha Congress quickly realized, however, that 
most states would reject the Constitution as adopted by the National 
Assembly, and after two days of discussion decided that the best chance 
for German unification would be through the Prussian Plan of Union and 
the work of Radowitz ~ Therefore, they adopted a resolution supporting 
the League of Three Kings and its Constitution and announced their de-
cision to participate in the elections for the Reichstag. 42 In this 
way, Radowitz had found allies in the chief spokesmen of the moderate 
liberals. 
Throughout the fall of 1849, the Union continued to gain support. 
By October, in addition to the three original members, twenty-two Ger-
man states had announced their intentions to join the League. Prussia 
was no longer alone, but joined by the majority of the states in its 
first tentative steps toward an acceptable plan of union under a consti-
tution with many liberal features~ When viewed in this light, it is 
clear that 1849 was far from a year of unrelieved reaction: on the 
contrary, for the first time since 1815, there existed a strong possi-
bility that many of the liberal hopes would achieve reality. The ve-
hicle for this aspiration was not a weak parliament without any real 
power, but the second most powerful German state and its ruler. Rado-
witz could look to the future with considerable optimism. 
41 "' · . .• ;·, · · · 
AktenstUcke betreffend das BUndniss, II, p. 5; Gustav Brunnert, 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE ERFURT PARLIAMENT 
In the late SUIIUller and fall of 1849, it appeared that German uni-
fication was at last on the verge of becoming a reality. The majority 
of the states had pledged themselves to create a unified nation and had 
endorsed a constitution which granted the people basic rights and the 
opportunity to participate in the national government. Although Aus-
tria had done its best to stultify the Prussian Union and had won the 
support _of Bavaria, WUrttemberg and Hesse-Homburg in its efforts, Vi-
enna's attempts to frustrate the Prussian Plan had thus far failed. 
Radowitz viewed the apparent success of his work with great satisfac-. 
tion, for after almost two years of effort, at last it seemed that his 
labor would bear fruit. Hawever, his high hopes would soon turn to 
despair, for by November it wo~ld appear that the Habsburg Empire had 
succeeded in her endeavor to kill the new Germany at its birth. 
On June 18, the Administrative Council of the League had been es-
tablished, but it did not begin its important work until October 5 when 
the representatives of the new member states joined the proceedings. 
By this date, in addition to the original three members, Baden, Anhalt-
Bernberg, Saxe-Weimar, Nassau, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Hesse-Kassel, 
Brunswick, Saxe-Altenburg, Hamburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 
Reuss, (Older Line), Oldenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt-Dessau, 
• 
Anhalt-Cijthen, Schwarzenburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzenburg-Sondershausen, 
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Saxe-Meiningen-Hildburgshausen, Lippe, Hesse-Darmstadt and Reuss, 
(Younger Line) had joined the alliance. Frankfurt, LUbeck, Schaumburg-
Lippe and Waldeck had not yet declared. their intentions. Thus twenty-
five out of thirty-seven German states had thrown their support to 
P . l russia. 
The first issue before the expanded body was that of planning the 
election for the lower house of the Reichstag. Vollpract, the repre-
sentative of the Duchy of Nassau, opened the session with a proposal 
that the Council make all arrangements necessary for the election of 
the House of the People. After the smaller states had spoken on the 
issue, Hanover and Saxony objected to holding the elctions until agree-
. 2 
ment had been reached with Austria. 
Throughout the following month the two kingdoms continued to ob-
struct the proceedings of the Administrative Council by this demand. 
For example, on October 17, the representative of the Guelph monarchy 
declared that without Austrian approval any attempt to unify Germany 
would end in failure. Two days later, the Saxon delegate informed the 
members of the Council that his country had decided to withdraw from 
the electoral commission. Finally, on October 23, the two kingdoms in-
formed the Administrative Council of their refusal to participate in 
any further sessions and recalled their ministers from Berlin the fol-
lowing day. Saxony further declared that it had participated in the 
formation of the League with the understanding that agreement would be 
reached with Austria and the south German states. However, since this 
l AktenstUcke betreffend .2!! Bttndniss, II, pp. 1-5. 
2Ibid., pp. 10-21. 
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had failed to materialize, the situation had changed drastically; the 
Saxon government objected to plans to call the Reichstag into session as 
long as this condition had not been met. Since Dresden cQnsidered· it 
impossible to create a united Germany without the support of Vienna, 
Munich and Stuttgart, there was no alternative but to withdraw from the 
League until the obstacle of Habsburg objections was removed. 3 
Although Radowitz did not participat.e in the sessions of the Ad-
ministrative Council, he watched its progress very closely. When the 
two largest members of the League besides Prussia refused to cooperate, 
Radowitz was forced to make a decision on his next steps. He could have 
given up his fight for German unification, but with the admission of 
LUbeck on October 12, the League still had twenty-four members. His 
support in Berlin was still strong, so he attempted to salvage his work. 
The day that Hanover and Saxony withdrew their Ministers from Ber-
lin, Radowitz rushed to the Prussian Diet with a program designed to pre-
serve the Union. Speaking for the government, he reaffirmed its dedica-
tion to the success of the Union. Radowitz admitted that his earlier 
efforts had met with initial failure and that a new approach was neces-
sary. He now proposed that Germany consist of two unions: the Confed-
eration of 1815 and a smaller organization within this body. This limi-
ted confederation would adopt the Constitution of the League of Three 
Kings but would not separate itself from the larger German union. He 
concluded this important speech by claiming that this proposal was in 
agreement with the terms of the Federal Act and that every attempt would 
be made to gain the approval of Vienna. As the dedicated worker for 
3Ibid., pp. 21-86, 113-122; \11.Prussia," The Times (London), October 
29, 1849, P• 6. 
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German unification spoke, the hall was silent, but when he announced his 
. 4 
new program, the delegates shouted their enthusiastic approval. 
Radowitz•s "new" plan.was really a recasting of his original pro-
posal for the revision of the German Confederation first brought forth 
in 1847. It. nevertheless represented a serious attempt to avoid antag-
onizing Austria by allowing it to remain in a position of authority in 
Germany. Also calculated to please the Habsburgs was his appeal to the 
Federal Act, for the Austrians based their opposition to the League on 
the grounds that it violated this agreement. In his arguments, Rado-
witz cited precedents to bolster his case. Saxe-Coburg had united with 
Saxe-Gotha to form Saxe-Coburg-Gotha: Saxe-Meiningen had joined Saxe~ 
Hildburghausen to form Saxe-Meiningen-Hildburghausen; and Anhalt-Dessau 
and Anhalt-KHthen had merged into Anhalt-Dessau-KBthen since 1815. If 
the smaller states could unite without violating t~e Federal Act, .then 
other German states could form a la~ger union without violating it 
either. 
The response of the two former members of the League to Radowitz 1 s 
new plan was not favorable. On November 1, 1849, Hanover denounced the 
proposal as a violation of the spirit of the League of Three Kings. The 
Hanoverian.government contended that Radowitz•s idea would only widen 
the split in the German Confede;ration and thus betray the hopes of the 
German people. However, the Guelph kingdom did not carry its opposition 
to the extent of rejecting the Constitution, which it would support pro-
vided Austria withdrew her objections. 5 
411Prussia," The Times (London), October 30, 1849; "Kanunerbericht," 
Neu~ Preussische Wtung, October 25, 1849. 
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Four days later Saxony formally objected to the domination of the 
League by Berlin and the failure to win the support of the south German 
states and.Austria. Dresden charged that the smaller union, which would 
consist almost entirely of north German states, would only intensify 
the disunity of Germany. Saxony was also concerned about the difficulty 
of differentiating between the authority of the wider and narrower 
union in such issues as the maintenance of federal fortresses. But in 
spite of the opposition of their king and his ministers to Radowitz 1 s 
program, many in Saxony still favored the Union. A group in Dresden 
supported the Prussian Plan of Union had. distributed a flyer throughout 
the kingdom criticizing the government for its obstructionism. 6 
Despite the withdrawal of Saxony and Hanover, the meeting of the 
Administrative Council on November 17 was well attended by the repre-
sentatives of eighteen states, and this provided a sufficient majority 
to override Hanoverian and Saxon opposition to the calling of elections. 
The Council decided to conduct the voting on January 31, 1850. It also· 
agreed that the Reichstag would meet in Erfurt at a time to be an-
nounced. The withdrawal of the two. kingdoms had not led to a mass exo-
dus from the League as had been feared, and the remaining members at 
last agreed to take the first step toward making the Constitution more 
than just a piece of paper. The announcement of the election brought 
angry protests from the two former members of the League as well as 
from Austria. To these- the Prussian ministry replied that the proposed 
smaller confederstion was only a beginning and not the final solution 
6 
"Der Erlass des K\Sniglich Sachischen Ministers f\lr die ausw'clrtigen 
Angelegenheiten," ibid., pp. 142-148; Neue Preussische Zeitung, November 
20, 1849. 
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to the German problem. It justified the calling of the parliament on 
the grounds that the movement for German unification must continue. 7 
Although the new Prussian Plan of Union represented an attempt at 
compromise with the Austrian demands, the~ Danubian Monarchy continued 
to object. On December 12, 1849, the Habsburg Court agreed that the de-
cision of Prussia and her allies to call the parliament was in violation 
of the Federal Act--the same law cited by Radowitz to justify his pro~ 
gram. Vienna also protested .in advance to any action taken by the 
Reichstag and challenged the right of Prussia to create a union of 
states without prior consultation with the Emperor and his ministers, 
Austria hinted at the possibility of armed intervention should Prussia 
continue its effo.rts to unite G·ermany under its leadership. The Prus-
sian reply defended the legality of its actions as being in full accord 
with the provisions of the Federal Act and charged that by its combina-
tion with non-German territories, .Austria had vacated its position as 
the leader of Germany. A.s evidence for this contention, the Prussian 
statement cited the decision of the Frankfurt National Assembly to place 
the Hohenzollern sovereign rather than his Habsburg counterpart at the 
8 
head of Germany. 
At the same time that Prussia was trying to form the smaller union, 
it was involved in negotiations with Austria concerning the fate of the 
larger German Confederation over which Archduke John still governed as 
Imperial Vicar. On September 15, 1840, Prokesch, the Austrian Minister 
7 
AktenstUcke betreffend das BUndniss, II, pp. 160-162; nprussia," 
The Illustrated London News, ~.ember. 24, 1849, p. 338; ''Prussia, n The 
~es (London), November 24 and 26, 1849. 
811Prussia and Austria," The Times (London), December 24, 1849, p. 
6. 
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to Berlin, had proposed that the two great German powers form a joint 
commission to govern Germany until May 1, 1850, after which a mo·re de-
finitive decision regarding the organization of the German Confederation 
could be made. This authority was to consist of two Austrians and two 
Prussians and would take office as soon as the Archduke resigned his 
post. The Prussian government had welcomed the Austrian proposal with 
enthusiasm and instructed its Minister to Vienna, Count Albrecht von 
Bernstorff, to begin negotiations on the issue. Finally on September 
30, 1849, the two powers had 
plementation of the Austrian 
signed an'agreement 
9 proposal. 
providing for the im-
Frederick William IV named Radowitz as one of the Prussian members 
of the commission, and he left Berlin for Frankfurt in December to as-. 
sume his new position. On December 20, Archduke John handed over his 
office to the commission, which agreed to meet daily to discuss the 
German preblem. However, it accomplished nothing toward solving the 
conflict between the two powers; all it could do was establish two. com-
mittees to deal with military and naval matters, commercial concerns, 
foreign relations, and financial problems. While in Frankfurt, Radowitz 
was second only to the Austrian Minister in rank but was unable to win 
support for his program. Finally, on January 28, 1850, Radowitz•s su-
periors recalled him to Berlin to participate in the preparations for 
911Note des Kaiserliche KHnigliche Gesa,ndten, Berlin, 15 September. 
1849," "Entwurf des Kaiserliche KHnigliche Oesterreichischen Kabinets," 
"Vertrauliche Instruktion an den KHniglichen Gesandten in Wien, II "Rati-
ficirte Konvention, 11 AktenstUcke betreffend ~ BUndniss, I, 2nd. Ed., 
PP• 3, 4-5. 
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th . f h R . h lO e opening o t e eic stag. 
In his absence, the ultraconservatives had been actively campaign-
ing against the Union. On January 6, 1850, Ludwig von Gerlach published 
a pamphlet stating that the real issue was "law or revolution, true Ger-
man freedom or the March Revolution, and a kingdom by the grace of God 
or the sovereignty of the masses." Like Bismarck, Gerlach emphasized 
the importance of Prussian traditions and loyalty to the King, charging 
that the concepts embodied in the Constitution were the products of 
revolutionary ideas from France. He called for a defeat of the Revolu-
tion and the Constitution it had produced. He contended that in order 
for Germany to remain strong, Austria and Prussia must work together; 
the smaller states and the division of the nation which they perpetu-
ated, he declared, should not be considered an evil, for they had grown 
f G h . 11 out o erman istory. 
Discussions concerning the Austrian objections to the Union reached 
a highpoint in February, 1850. Realizing the strength of his opponents, 
Radowitz wrote Foreign Minister Schleinitz a letter on February 14 re-
questing his support in the fight to save the Union. Two days later, 
the King, very concerned about the possibility of war with the Habsburg 
Empire, informed Radowitz of his doubt concerning the wisdom of continu-
ing to attempt German unification on the basis of the Union and its 
10 
Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Berlin, December 11, 1849, 
Nachgelassene Brief e, p. 144; "Prussia and Austria," and "Germany," The 
Times (London), December 24, 1849 and January 12, 1850, p. 6; ~ 
Preussische Zeitung, December 22 and 29, 1849. 
1111Die Erfurter Wahlen," in Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, Von der Revo-
lution~. Norddeutscher Bund. Politik und Ideengut der preussischer 
Hochkonservativen 1848-1866. Aus dem Nachlass ~ Ernst Ludwig~ Ger-
lach, ed. by Helmut Ditwalk (Gtlttingen, 1970), II, pp. 646-648. 
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Constitution. Radowitz, realizing the importance of maintaining the 
King's support, responded with a reply repeating his customary arguments 
in favor of the Plan. He also corresponded with Count Brandenburg and 
discounted the possibility of war on the grounds that the guarantees of 
other European states to Berlin would act as a deterrent to any aggres-
sive intent on the part of Vienna. Influenced by Radowitz 1 s pleas, the 
King decided to instruct Schleinitz to send a note to his Austrian 
counterpart defending the Union. 12 
Radowitz realized that the Habsburg Empire would never voluntarily 
vacate its position as the leader of Germany but hoped that his proposal 
for a "wider and narrower union" would provide a middle ground between 
unification without Austria and continued disunity. He also knew that 
the Frankfurt Constitution would never gain th.e approval of Vienna and 
h h ff i b . d d A . 13 t us soug t to e ect a comprom s.e etween its a vocates an . ustr1a. 
However, Radowitz did not fully appreciate the strength of his ultra-
conservative opponents or their unwillingness to compromis.e with what 
they considered the spirit of the Revolution. 
At this point, Austria tried a new strategy against Prussia, as 
Schwarzenberg used his influence to persuade the south German states 
to form a rival to the League. On February 27, Bavaria, W\lrttemberg 
and. Saxony formed their own alliance, naming it the "League of Four 
12Radowitz to S:chleinitz, Frankfurt, February 14, 1850, Frederick 
William IV to Radowitz, Charlottenburg, February 16, 1850, Radowitz to 
Frederick William IV, Frankfurt, February 18, 1850, and Radowitz to 
Brandenburg, Frankfurt, February 20, 1850, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 
161, 165, 167, and 170; "Prussia,"~ Times (London), March 5, 1850, 
p. 6. 
13Private Notes of Radowitz, March 2, 1850, N achgelassene Briefe, 
p. 174. 
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Kings" in the hope that Hanover would join. The members of the new al-
liance proposed to build a German government consisting of a council of 
seven members named by Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, WUrt-
temberg, Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Kassel to act as the executive 
branch. The members of the council would not be independent delegates, 
but would be bound by instructions from member states. The legislative 
branch of the confederation would be a representative body of 300 mem-
bers; 100 from Prussia, 100 from Austria and 100 from the other states. 
The delegates to the representative body would be elected by the state 
14 
diets rather than the people. 
The south German Union would have given considerably less power to 
the national government than the Constitution of the Prussian Union. 
It envisioned central control over declarations of war and diplomatic 
affairs, the customs and measurements and coinage, but all other powers 
were to be reserved to the states. A very important difference between 
the two plans was the lack of a bill of rights in the south German pro-
15 
gram. Thus, Bavaria, Saxony and WUrttemberg had agreed to oppose the 
League of Three Kings with a rival organization of their own, which 
eliminated many of the liberal elements of the Prussian program, includ-
ing the right of the German people to participate in their national 
government. 
In March, King William I of WUrttemberg removed any doubts of the 
intentions of his state and its allies through remarks delivered during 
1411uebereinkunft zwischen Bayern, Sachsen und WUrttemberg Uber die 
Hauptgrunds"tze fUr ein Revision der Bundesverfassung," Huber, Doku-
mente, I, pp. 444-446. 
15Ibid. 
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his annual speech from the throne. The Swabian monarch condemned the 
League of Three Kings in very strong tenns, caliing the attempts to 
create a united German state a project of dreamers and the most danger-
ous proposal yet produced to solve the problem of German unity. Berlin 
reacted sharply to this rhetoric by recalling its Minister to Stutt-
16 
gart. 
In the meantime, the elections for the House of the People were 
held in all states still adhering to the League, and the Prussian gov-
ernment made plans for the opening of the Reichstag. Although. t.he lib-
erals at Gotha had decided to participate in the elections and the par-
liament, the democrats had declared their intention to boycott both the 
elections and the meeting of the Reichstag because their objections to 
the Union, which they saw as a betrayal of the principal of popular 
sovereignty. The Erfurt Parliament opened on March 20, 1850, amid the 
ringing of church bells and a festive procession through the city led 
by the. Erfurt Choral Society singing MHring' s "Deutsches Wort ~ h8r 
ich wieder." At 10:00 the celebrants of German unity arrived at St. 
Augustine's Church, which had been decorated appropriately to resemble 
the Paulskirche in Frankfurt. At the church, the members of the Parlia-
ment and their 
furt Reichstag 
guests joined in an opening worship service, and the Er-. 
17 
began its work. 
The Parliament consisted of 195 delegates, of which 138 represented 
Prussia. Radowitz had been elected to a seat by the voters _of Erfurt 
16BrUnnert, Unions Parliament, pp. 6-7; Sybel, The Founding of the 
German Empire, I, p. 417. 
1711Prussia, 11 The Illustrated London News, February 2, 1850, p. 66; 
"Prussia," lli Tim-;;-(London), January 12~ February 9, 1850, p. 6; 
BrUnnert, Unions Parliament, p. 8. 
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itself. Besides the Hohenzollern Kingdom.; twenty-five states sent dele-
gates to the Reichstag. The. formation of the rival alliance by the 
south German states had not yet undermined the Prussian League. Even 
the Saxony duchies refused to follow the lead of the Kingdom of Saxony 
because of the strong pro-unification sentiment to be found there. The 
membership of the Erfurt Parliament represented a clear majority of the 
18 
German states. 
Radowitz formally opened the Parliament with a somewhat dry legal-
istic statement in which he quoted Article IV of the treaty establish-
ing the League of Three Kings. After this, the two houses divided for 
their organizational sessions. The House of States elected Alfred von 
Auerswald of Prussia as its President by a vote of sixty-three to fifty 
and then adopted a set of rules. Radowitz: himself presided over the 
opening of the House of the People, which elected Eduard Simson, a lead-
ing liberal, President, and Otto von Bismarck, Secretary. The next day, 
the lower house busied itself with the report of the credentials com-
19 
mittee. 
As at Frankfurt, the membership of the Erfurt Parliament divided 
into political factions or embryonic parties. The Right was led by the 
Gerlach brothers, Friedrich Julius Stahl, the leading conservative po-
litical theorist, Bismarck and Hans von Kleist Retzow. This group was 
ultra-royalist and favored the formation of a federation of German 
18stenographische Bericht Uber die Verhandlungen des deutschen 
Pa:i::liaments !..!! Erfurt ~ der Er.8ffnungs Sitzung !!!!_ 29 M'Arz .£!.! .!..!:!:!!! 
Schluss !!.!!! 29 April 1850 (Erfurt, 1850), pp. 331-324. 
19Ibid., p. l; Br\lnnert, Unions Parliament, p. 11; "Deutschland," 
~ deutsche Zeitung, March 22., 1850,. p. 2-4; "Prussia, 11 The Times 
(London), March 26, 1850, p. 6. 
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states rather than the union advocated by Radowitz. The Catholic-
Conservative Party, led by Franz Joseph Buss and August Reichensperger, 
took a similar position to that of the Right. Radowitz and his sup-
porters, including Count Brandenburg, Otto von Manteuffel and Ernst 
20 
Bodelschwingh, formed the State Conservative Party. 
The Left at Erfurt was known by the collective name of Bahnhof-
spartei, because they dined together at the railway station. This 
group was further divided into the Liberal-Conservative Party, led by 
Alfred and Rudolf von Auerswald and Georg Vincke, and the National 
Liberals, led by Eduward Simson, Ludolf Camphausen, Friedrich Dahlmann, 
Heinrich and Max von Gagern and Heinrich von Sybel. The chief differ-
ence between the two factions of the Left lay in the participation of 
the National Liberals in the Gotha Conference. The first demonstration 
of the relative strength of these groups was the election of Simson as 
President of the House of the People with a vote of ninety-eight against 
a combined total of fifty-four for his opponents. 21 
The delegates had two important matters before themi the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution and the drafting of a new law to provide for 
the elections of the House of the People. On March 26, Radowitz ad-
dressed the assembly in behalf of the Executive Council, of which he 
was President. Pleading his case on the basis of constitutional law, 
he stated that Prussia was completely within its rights in seeking uni-
fication on the basis of a closer union of states within the confines 
20Ludwig von Gerlach, Von der Revolution zum Norddeutscher Bund, 
I, p. 258; Huber, Verfassunsise~ichte, II, pi;-:-895. 
2111Prussia," The Times (London), March 29 and April 13, 1850, P• 
6; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, II, pp. 895-896. 
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of the Confederation of 1815. Radowitz ended this speech with an ap-
peal for reconciliation between the two leading German powers. After 
he finished, the Parliament voted to recess for Easter. 22 
The reaction to Radowitz I s ,appeal was enthusiastic. Even the Neue 
Preussische Zeitung, normally Radowitz 1s chief critic, was overwhelming 
in its praise. It called him the "Father of the Union" and stated that 
he had become the leader of the moderate forces in Germany against the 
extremes of the Left and Right. Radowitz was pictured as a friend of 
justice and honor and his program was portrayed as a rational solution 
ta the German problem. Other newspapers, such as the National Zeitung 
took a somewhat different position. The editors of this organ of the 
moderate democrats charged that the Prussian Plan of Union merely added 
to the already existing confusion in Germany and declared that the Er-
furt Parliament lacked the support of the German people. The liberal 
Deutsche Zeitung praised the abilities of the father of the Parliament, 
but wondered if he had not burned his ship out from under him by his 
moderation. Upon hearing of the address, Frederick William IV wrote his 
friend a letter of praise and thanked him for his work. 23 
Despite the enthusiastic reception of Radowitz's speech, the power 
of the opposition continued to grow. The representative of Hesse-Kassel 
on the Executive Council informed his fellow ministers that his state 
considered any actions taken by the Parliament to be but tentative and 
2211Rede in dem Parliaments zu Erfurt am 26sten MMrz 1850," Gesam ... 
melte Schriften, II, pp. 433-449; "Prussia," The Times (London), March 
29, 1850, P• 6. 
2311Prussia, 11 The Times (London), March 29, 1850, p. 6; "Erfurt," 
Deutsche Zeitung, March 29, 1850, p. 2; Frederick William IV to Rado-
witz, Potsdam, March 27, 1850, Nachgelassene Briefe, p. 189. 
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refused to conunit either himself or his state to their support. These 
reservations as well as the rival League of Four Kings raised increas-
ing doubts in the mind of Frederick William IV as to the future of 
Radowitz 1 s program. On March 26, he warned his friend that the decision 
reached at Erfurt could only take effect through the agreement of the 
German princes. The father of the Erfurt Parliament reacted to the 
24 
King's letter with anger and resolved to fight for his work. 
Many in Berlin still worried about the opposition of Austria and 
her allied to the Union and the possibility of the development of a 
serious split in the Parliament were a dispute to arise during the dis-
cussions on the Constitution. Some members of the ministry feared that 
such an occurrence would seriously weaken the fabric of the League and 
cause still more states to withdraw. In an effort to minimize contro-
versy, the ministry at first decided to lay the document before the 
Parliament for adoption as a whole rather than article by article. But 
under the influence of Radowitz 1 s persuasion, the ministry reversed 
their decision and on March 30 resolved to present the Constitution 
article by article to the members of the Reichstag for revision. The 
results were then to be submitted to the representatives of the princes 
on the Executive Council for review. The procedure, the ministry held, 
25 
would avoid antagonizing any member states. 
The new plans of the ministry were certain to meet with serious 
24 . . Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, I, pp. 408, 417; Rado-
witz to Schleinitz, Erfurt, March 27, 1850, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 
186-187. 
25 
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opposition from the liberals, for it meant that the popularly-elected 
representatives in the Erfurt Parliamen.t would be denied the final 
authority to adopt a constitution: this was to be- rese-rved for the 
princes. With this, one of the central and as yet unresolved issues of 
the Revolution intruded itself into St. Augustine's Church: In whom 
did sovereignty reside, the elected rep.resentatives of the people or 
the princes? When the Erfurt Parliament reconvened after Easter, its . 
liberal.·. majority refused to accept the recommendations of the ministry 
and forced the adoption of the complete and unamended Constitution on 
April 14, 1850. As Leopold von Gerlach observed at the time, the lib-
erals had taken a position "a la Paulskirche, 11 by their insistence of 
the authority of the Reichstag to revise the Constitution and force its 
adoption by the member states. A week later, the Parliament voted a 
recess of two days to allow time for consultations between Radowitz and 
h . . 26 t e ministry. 
The course of events in Erfurt had placed Radowitz in a difficult 
position. He had written the Constitution adopted by the League and now 
ratified by the Reichstag, but as a member of the King's circle, he was 
forced to disavow it because of the way it had been adopted. He was 
realistic enough to know that without the support of Berlin he could 
accomplish nothing. The Parliament could take any action it wished, but 
it lacked the power to put that action into effect. Radowitz also knew 
that the conservative ministers had enough influence over the King to 
cause him to seriously consider the abandonment of the whole project. 
2611The German Parliament," and "Prussia and the German Parliament," 
Th! Times (London), April 18 and 26, 1850, p. 6; Leopold von Gerlach, 
DenkwUrdigkeiten, VI, p. 463. 
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At the same time that opposition was gaining strength at home, the pro-
tests of Austria were becoming ever more insistent. 
After the recess, the members of the Parliament began amending the 
Constitution they had previously adopted. Many believed that the Prus-
sian ministry would support the Parliament. This assumption was rein-
' 
forced by a declaration by the ministry on April 23 which endorsed the 
proceedings of the meeting at Erfurt. But after gaining victory in the 
forced adoption of the Constitution, the liberals split among them-
selves and thereby allowed Radowitz and the Prussian ministry to domi-
nate the remaining meetings of the Parliament. Though as a member of 
the Executive Council, Radowitz did not take an active part in the de-
bates of the Reichstag, his influence was crucial. On April 26, for 
example, during a debate on a proposal to force the member states to 
adopt the national election law for local elections, Carl van Manteuffel 
opposed the provision. After Radowitz agreed with him, the delegates 
rejected this requirement. In fact The Times of London reported that on. 
every controversial question, a stand by Radowitz was enough to. sway the 
27 
membership to support his position. 
The Parliament continued its revision of the Constitution to fit 
the requirements of Radowitz's wider and narrower Union and hopefully 
remove the major causes of Austrian opposition. For example, the first 
change in the text of the Constitution was a proposal by Otto von Bis-
marck to substitute the word "Union" for "Reich" everytime it appeared 
in the doctnnent. Bismarck had the support of the ministry, and after a 
2711Prussia," "Prussia and the German Parliament," and ''Prussia," 
The Times (London), April 18, 20 and 26, 1850, P• 6. 
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28 
short debate the Reichstag accepted this change. This alteration of 
the Constitution was intended to remove a major Austrian objection to 
the Prussian Union, fer use of the word "Reich" carried with it the con-, 
netation that the member states composed the entire German nation. The 
revised Constitution reaffirmed the loyalty of the member states to the 
German Confederation of 1815 and their obligations for the connnon de-
fense and welfare. Finally, on April 30, the Executive Council ad-
jeurned the assembly, but not before it had promised to submit the 
Constitution to the governments of the member states for.considera-
29 
tion. Thus the liberals were thwarted: the final decision on the 
Constitution remained in the hands of the member states, and the Erfurt 
Parliament was unable to force the states to agree to adopt the results 
of its labor. 
Both the Frankfurt National Assembly and the Erfurt Parliament had 
met to solve the problem of German unity; both drew up constitutions 
and developed party structures. And both ended without seeing their 
objectives realized because neither had the power to force the states 
to accept their reconnnendations. The major difference between the two 
bodies was the presence of the Executive Council at Erfurt, a body with 
official power to propose legislation. Another difference was the pre-
sentation of a previously written draft constitution to the assembly at 
Erfurt. At Frankfurt, no one had enjoyed this authority, and the result 
was a full discussion of every aspect of the German question in all its 
28Ludwig von Gerlach, Y.2!!: der Revolution~ Norddeutscher ~' I, 
p. 263; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, II, p. 897. 
2911The Prorogation of the Erfurt Parliament," The~ (London), 
May 4, 1850, p. 6. 
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many facets, a feature which was absent from the deliberations at Er-
furt. Still another difference between the two meetings was the domi-
nation of a representative of one German state over the proceedings at 
Erfurt. While it is true that Heinrich von Gagern played a very im-
portant role in the delibe.rations at Frankfurt, he did not exercise the 
influence enjoyed by Radowitz at the Erfurt Parliament. 
Finally, the political factions present at each were different. 
At Frankfurt, the ultra-conservatives were hardly represented at all. 
At Erfurt, the reactionary Right was present, but the radical Left re-
fused to participate. In conclusion, although the Constitution as 
amended at Erfurt did not go into effect immediately as the liberals 
had hoped, the Reichstag was a success because the second most powerful 
German state had pledged that the Union created by the Constitution 
would become a reality. Throughout the meetings of the Erfurt Parlia-
ment, Radowitz had fought for its success and after its adjournment 
would not cease his work but would continue his fight for German unifi-
cation through every possible channel. 
CHAPTER VII I 
. -
THE CONGRESS OF PRINCES 
Even as the debates continued at the Erfurt Parliament, Radowitz 
was exploring another means for achieving.his goal. The inspiration 
for these efforts was Duke Ernest 11 of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who had 
championed German unification and constitutionalism throughout 1848 and 
1849. It was to his residence city, Gotha, that the liberals had gone 
in 1849 to plan further action after the failure of the Frankfurt Na-
tional Assembly. He was a strong supporter of the Prussian Plan of 
Union and followed the developments in Erfurt closely. On April 12, 
1850, while the Parliament was debating the proposal to adopt the Con-
stitution as a whol~, Duke Ernest traveled to Erfurt to present his plan 
to save the Union. After attending a session of the Reichstag, he met 
with Radowitz to propose that a Congress of Princes would be the only 
way to insure the success of the League. The Duke proposed to invite 
the rulers of all member states to assemble in Gotha to discuss the 
Constitution. He suggested his capital city because of its proximity 
to Erfurt and the enthusiasm for unification among the people to the 
Saxon duchies. Radowitz at first expressed doubts about the idea, but 
finally agreed and sent a letter to Frederick William IV informing him 
of the proposal. Radowitz hoped that the princes would be able to cope 
with both the Austrian opposition to the Union and the objections of the 
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1 south German states which had joined the League of Four Kings. 
However, once again the King began to vacillate. Having become 
189 
concerned about the Habsburg attitude, he instructed his Foreign Minis-. 
ter, Alexander von Schleinitz, to inform Radowitz that he saw no value 
in the proposed Congress of Princes. Radowitz replied that the princes 
would be able to revise the Constitution in such a fashion as to make 
it acceptable to all member states and thus provide a basis for true 
unity. In his efforts to win the King's approval for the Congress, 
Radowitz found a valuable ally in Duke Ernest. On April 29, 1850, the 
Saxon ruler sent Seebach, his chief minister, to Berlin with a proposal 
that the rulers of the member states and their ministers assemble in 
Gotha to discuss the salvation of the League. Frederick William IV met 
with the Saxon representative at Bellevue Palace on May 1, 1850, but re-
fused to conunit himself on the suggestion. The next day, Seebach met 
with Schleinitz, who was more encouraging. than the King, but insisted 
that Congress meet in Berlin because the Prussian ruler was unable to 
take the time to travel to Gotha. Persuaded by Radowitz and Duke Ernest, 
the King at last gave his formal approval and, citing the Austrian 
threat of war against the League as justification, formally invited the 
rulers of the member states and their ministers to assemble on May 16 
for the meeting. Frederick William IV emphasized the importance of 
swift action to save the Union and requested all princes to inform him 
of their decision within a week. But despite his decision to host the 
Congress of Princes in Berlin, the Prussian monarch did not cease to 
1Ernest II, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Aus Meinem Leben und Aus 
Meiner Zeit (Berlin, 1892), p. 158. 
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entertain serious doubts about the wisdom of the path down which his 
friend had led him. On May 5, he told Radowitz of his pervasive fear of 
the possibility of war with Austria over the Prussian Union, and his 
attitude appeared to be generally indecisive and without faith in the 
2 
undertaking. 
Before the crucial Congress could meet, Radowitz 1 s preparations 
were interrupted by a profound personal tragedy: his youngest daughter, 
Veronika, died on May 4, 1850. Overcome by grief, he wrote that he felt 
as if he had buried all his hopes with the young girl. Two days later, 
he asked to be relieved of his official duties in order to care for his 
sick wife, but Frederick William responded immediately with a letter 
expressing his personal distress that his friend would leave his side at 
such an important time. It indicates a great deal about Radowitz 1 s 
dedication to the cause of unity and his loyalty to his sovereign that 
he yielded to the King's request and returned to Berlin. To his diary 
he confided that he considered it a matter of honor and obligation that 
3 
he continue his work. 
The Congress duly opened on May 9. After a festive worship service 
in the Berlin Cathedral, Frederick William IV officially opened the 
Congress. In his remarks, the Prussian King thanked Duke Ernest for 
2Radowitz to Schleinitz, April 22, 1850, Schleinitz to Radowitz, 
Berlin, April 24, 1850, Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Erfurt, April 
26 and 28, 1850, Telegraphic Dispatch of Frederick William IV to Rado-
witz, Charlottenburg, May 5, 1850, Nachgelassen Briefe, pp. 213, 218-
220, 222, 223; Ernest II, Aus MeinemLeben, PP• 160-166; Meinecke, Rad-
owitz, p. 422. 
3Radowitz 's Notes on the Congress of Princes, Berlin, May 2-16, 
Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Erfurt, May 6, 1850, and Frederick 
William IV to Radowitz, Bellev.ue, May 7, 1850, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 
236, 237, 240. 
191 
suggesting the Congress and pledged himself to continue the work for 
· German unification. The monarch also declared his intention to retain 
the friendship of Austria as long as this. did not mean that Prussia and 
her allies were subservient to Vienna. Duke Ernest replied in the name 
of the assembled princes with an expression of thanks to the Hohenzol-
lern monarch for his efforts toward unification. The actual work of the 
Congress was undertaken by the ministers of the princes, who began their 
sessions the next day. With the exception of the city of Frankfurt, all 
the states represented at the Erfurt Parliament attended the Congress of 
Princes.; the majority of the German states still sided with Pruss.ia. 
As was the case of both the Frankfurt National Assembly and the Erfurt 
Parliament, political factions emerged even among the prices. Hesse-
Kassel and Mecklenburg-Strelitz formed the Right, Mecklenburg-Schwerin 
led the Right Center, while the Saxon duchies joined together to form 
4 
the Left Center. 
Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg, the Prussian Minister 
President, opened the session of ministers by reaffirming the loyalty of 
the Prussian government to the League and introducing the chief Prus-
sian representative at the Congress, Radowitz. The leader of the Rohen-
zollern delegation informed his colleagues that they had two important 
matters to consider: the position of the Union and the reaction of the 
Alliance to the Austrian invitation to a meeting of states in Frankfurt 
to discuss the reinstatement of the old Federal Diet to its former 
4Der deutschen FUrs.tenkongress ~ Berlin im Mai 1850, AktenstUcke 
und Betrachtungen. Anlagen: Die Konferenz-Protokolle (Berlin, 1850), 
pp. 12-17, 45-56, 21; Leopold von Gerlach to Ludwig von Gerlach, Berlin, 
May 12, 1850, Gerlach, Von der Revolution ~ Norddeuts.chen Bund, II, 
P• 674. 
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position. Radowitz next reminded the m.inisters of the Treaty of Three 
Kings of May 26, 1849, and the work of the.Erfurt Parliament. Finally, 
the two officials opened discuss ions by declaring Pruss.ia I s. formal ac-
ceptance of the Constitution as revised by the Erfurt Parliament. 5 
The harmony of the opening session was short lived, for Hans Daniel 
Hassenpflug of Hesse-Kassel declared that he was only present as an ob-
server and that his state refused to accept the decisions of the Con-
gress as binding. Hassenpflug, who earlier had quarreled with Radowitz 
over the activities of his master, Elector Frederick Willliam, was the 
chief spokesman of the reaction at the Congress of Princes, and indulged 
in repeated efforts to obstruct the proceedings. He and his ruler made 
no effort to hide their pro-Austrian sentiments. For example, Hassen-
pflug dined with Anton von Prokesch, the Austrian Minister to Berlin, 
.~ and arrived conspicuously at the first session, an hour late. He then 
protested when complaints were made about his tardiness. On one oc-
casion, he attended a formal party in sport dress. But only Mecklenburg-
Schwerin and Saxe-Altenburg joined Hassenpflug in his objections, while 
the other delegates affirmed their acceptance of the Constitution and 
the Erfurt Parliament. 6 
After rejecting the Constitution, Hassenpflug next proposed that 
ministers answerable to local diets rather than princes be banned from 
participation in the deliberations of the Congress. This was an at-
tempt to use the union as an instrument to crush constitutional forms. 
His proposal led to a stormy debate in which only the spokesman for 
511Die Konferenz-Protokolle," FUrstenkongress, pp. 4-13. 
6Leopold von Gerlach to Ludwig von Gerlach, Berlin, May 16, 1850, 
Gerlach, Von der Revolution~ Norddeutschen Bund, II, p. 675. 
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Schaumburg-Lippe sided with him. Finally, the delegates voted to allow 
all ministers to p.articipate in the meetings without respect to the 
authority of their princes over their actions. Thus, Hassenpflug 1 s 
first attempts to limit the liberal character of the alliance had met 
7 
with failure. 
The next day the ministers assembled to continue their delibera-
tions. At the beginning of the session Hassenpflug renewed his objec-
tions of the previous day, leading to further debate on the issue. 
Fina•lly, Radowitz sought to terminate this unproductive digression by 
introducing a motion calling for the delegates to vote on whether or 
not to establish a provisional government for the League until the Con-
stitution could take effect. Naturally, Hassenpflug objected on the 
grounds that it was too early for such a step. But only Mecklenburg-
Strelitz, Schaumburg-Lippe and Bremen agreed with his position, while 
the majority of the delegates decided to form the provisional govern-
8 
ment. 
It may seem strange that Radowitz did not attempt to put the Con-
stitution into effect immediately and thereby render the Union a real-
ity. However, he always considered every possible alternative and 
wanted time to study the issue throughly. Since Hassenpflug was dis-
rupting the conference and might destroy it completely should Radowitz 
attempt to move too fast, and since the Austrian objections w.ere becom-
ing more insistent, he chose the path of least resistence in the hope 
that by doing so he would gain time to win support for his program. 
711Die Konferenz-Protokolle," FUrstenkongress, pp. 4-13. 
8rbid., pp. 13-18. 
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Although the plan for a provis.ional government would delay the applica-
tion of the Constitution, it would rep.res.e:nt a major step forward and 
require that the Parliament would once again be called into session. 
After deciding. to form a pr.ovisional government, the delegates 
turned to the form this would take. Radewitz presented a plan for dis-
cussion which provided for a C9llege of Princes as the governing body 
of the League. Each single state would have the right to send a dele-
gate to this body, which w.ould be divided into five curias in which each 
state ~ould receive a number of votes corresponding to its size. The 
curias would vote on each issue separately, and then it would be sub-
mitted to the whole College of Princes. The provisional government 
would have the authority to repres.ent the alliance in foreign affairs 
and i.n negotiations with the German Confederation. It would also be re-
sponsible for making arrangements for the next meeting of the Reichstag. 
Radowitz also proposed that Prussia undertake to carry on diplomatic 
negotiations in the name of the League and that the alliance name a 
minister to work with the Prussian government in the discussions with 
Austria and her allies. 9 
When he presented his plan to the deleg~tes, Radowitz reminded them 
that it was only a proposal and that full discussion would take place. 
Several members suggested that s,ince speed was important, they adopt the 
suggestion immediately, but Radowitz, as the presiding officer, post-
poned the vote until the next session. He did not want it to appear 
that Prussia was trying to pressure the Congress into adopting its pro-
gram. The next day the ministers met to consider Radowitz 1 s proposal. 
9 
Ibid., PP• 18-19. 
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During this session, the representative of Hesse-Darmstadt joined the 
deliberations, adding still another state to the Congress of Princes. 
After discussions on the matter, during which most of the delegates em-
phasized the need for swift action, the conference adopted the Prussian 
1 f . . l 10 pan or a prov1s1ona government. 
Radowitz opened the fourth session of the Congress with a proposal 
that the members agree that the provisional government would remain in 
effect for but two months, or July 15, 1850. He argued that by fixing 
a date for its termination, the members would affinn to the Gennan 
people their detennination to put the Union into effect as soon as pos-
sible. After a short discussion, the members accepted Radowitz's pro-
posal by a vote of twelve to eight. The session next turned to a dis-
cussion of the Austrian-sponsored meeting in Frankfurt and what to do 
about it. After considerable debate between Radowitz and Hassenpflug, 
all but Hesse-Kassel, Mecklenburg,-Strelitz, Bremen and Hamburg agreed 
that Prussia should negotiate with Austria and represent the interes,ts 
11 
of the League in regards to the conference at Frankfurt. 
The Congress adjourned on May 16, and Prussia issued an official 
announcement of its results. In this document, the Hohenzollern King 
explained that Prussia had accepted the Constitution of the Union and 
stated that majority of the states that had participated in the Con-
gress of Princes were in agreement with its content. Since it would be 
impossible to put the provisions of the Constitution into effect im-
mediately, however, a provisional government had been fonned by the 
10 , 
Ibid., pp. 19-31. 
11Ibid., pp. 31-43. 
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members of the League. The King .. further.".rejected in advance any at-
tempt to reestablish the old Gennan.C.onfede;ration on the grounds that 
such a step would be against the best. intereat.s of the German states and 
people. That same day, Schleinitz sent a formal statement to Vienna re-
affirming the Prussian desire to work with Austria to achieve a peaceful 
agreement on the solution of their differences. The Prussian minister 
stated, however, that any solution must recognize the r.ight .. of the. 
single German states to take any such action as they themselves deem in 
their best interests. 12 As the leader in the struggle for unification, 
Prussia had also emerged as the champion of the smaller states in their 
efforts to avoid Austrian domination. Thocough its acceptance of the 
Constitution, it had also become the chief spokesman for constitutional 
reform in Germany. 
While Prussia and its allies were mee.ting in Berlin, Austria and 
it$ supporters had assembled in Frankfurt. Besides the .Danubian monar-
chy, only Liechtenstein, Hesse-Kassel, Holstein, Hesse-Homburg, Luxem-
bourg, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and WUrttemberg had sent delegates to 
the conference. Hesse-Kassel attem.p.t.ed to play both sides off against 
each other by sending delegates t.o both meetings, while the city of 
Frankfurt chose a policy of strict neutrality and declined to send 
representatives to either '·assembly. In a direct challenge to Prussia, 
the delegates at the Frankfurt Conference.declared that the old German 
Confederation of 1815 had not been dissolved by the Revolution of 1848 
and called upon all German states to follow the. Federal Act. Such a 
return to the pre-Revolutionary organization would clearly mean a 
12 . 
"Die Verhandlungen," ibid., pp. 26-37. 
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resumption of Austrian dominance in German affairs as well as the dis-
solution of the Prussian League. Thus Germany was divided into two 
camps: . 13 the Prussian and the Austrian. 
During the following weeks Radowitz was absent from Berlin, and the 
King was temporarily incapacitated. At the conclusion of the Congress 
of Princes, Radowitz requested a leave of absence to recover his health 
and left Berlin for Baden-Baden. On May 22, a would-be assassin shot 
Frederick William IV in the arm while the King was preparing to board a 
14 
train for Potsdam. These chance events. had a dual effect on German 
history. The attempted murder of the Prussian monarch strengthened the 
reactionary forces in the Hohenzollern kingdom. These persons were also 
staunch foes of Radowitz and his program and in the end proved as im-
portant to his final defeat as Austria. Another consequence of the in-
ability of both Radowitz and the King to act at this crucial juncture 
was the granting of time to the Habsburg Empire. Had they been able to 
move in a decisive manner to force a solution while Austria was still 
involved in internal problems, perhaps Radowitz's program would have 
succeeded. 
For before he was incapacitated by the attacker's bullet, the King 
had made one important attempt to gain foreign support for the Prussian 
Union. The Prince of Prussia, the future Emperor William I, traveled 
to Warsaw to deliver a letter from the King to Tsar Nicholas I. In this 
connnunication, the Hohenzollern justified his actions by claiming that 
the smaller German states desired to be under his protection and 
13 
Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, II, pp. 900-901. 
1411Prussia, 11 The Times (London), June 3 and 27, 1850, P• 6. 
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condemned Austria for its attempts to revive the German Confederation. 
In his discussions with Prince William, the Tsar discounted the possi-
bility of an Austro-Prussian war because of Austrian weakness. The Aus-
trian chief minister, Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg, was also in the 
Polish capital and met with the Prussian emissary, who learned that Vi-
enna had no objections to Prussia I s forming a union with other German 
states but could never accept the Constitution produced by Radowitz. 
Schwarzenberg reiterated the peaceful intentions of his country and pro-
posed that the differences between the two states be resolved by a joint 
agreement. On May 29, William reported to Berlin that neither Russia 
nor Austria would definitely connnit themselves on the issue. He also 
claimed that the chances of Vienna carrying her objections to the Prus~ 
sian Plan of Union to the point of armed conflict were remote. Finally, 
he informed his King that both countries would recognize the Union if 
15 
Berlin would abandon the Constitution. Although Schwarzenburg's state-
ments left the door open for Austrian recognition of a Prussian Union, 
it would not be the Union agreed o.n by Berlin and its allies.. If the 
Constitution were dropped, Berlin would lose the support of the liberals 
and moderates who favored the Union because of the Constitution. The 
loss of moderate and liberal influence would open the way for a victory 
for the reactionary forces, who wanted to restore the German Confedera-
tion. Another reason that Schwarzenberg's demand was unacceptable to 
Berlin lay in the belief that if Vienna could force Prussia to change 
radically the form of the Union, it could also fo.rce the Hohenzollern 
kingdom to once again accept Austrian domination. Thus, Berlin could 
15 
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not yield to the Austrian demands for the abandonment of the Constitu-
tion in return for the right to form a Union. 
Although far from Berlin, Radowitz did not cease to take an inter-. 
est in his work. His representative in the Prussian capital, Baron Ru-
dolf von Sydow, informed him of the day~to-day events there and also of 
the increasing doubts of the King regar.dins.:,:the alliance. On the other 
hand, Brandenburg, a man with great influence at court, still supported 
the Union and believed that Prussia should take advantage of Austria 1.s 
weakness to force an immediate solution to the German problem. Radowitz 
asked Sydow to advise the King that even if it was necessary to postpone 
the application of the Constitution, the provisional government should 
continue to hold power. On July 14, he wrote a plea to Frederick William 
which repeated his arguments of the past two years and urged his friend 
not to discontinue his support of the Constitution. He proposed once 
again that Germany be divided into a wider union to include Austria and 
a narrow union which would form a middle European empire. 16 
In the meantime, the two contesting German powers. continued to ne-
gotiate. Schwarzenberg informed the Prussian Minister to the Habsburg 
Court, Count Albrecht von Bernstorff, that his country was willing to 
rec.ognize Prussian equality in Ge:crnany if it would abandcm the Union and 
agree to form a new German Confederation at a series of meetings to be 
held in Frankfurt am Main. On July 8, he made his last offer, explain-
ing to the Prussian Minister that the only difference between the two 
German powers was the Constitution and the claim of the Prussian alliance 
16Rudolf von Sydow to Radowitz, Berlin, June 5, 1850, Rado~itz to 
to Rudolf von Sydow, Baden, June 8, 1850, and Radowitz to Frederick. 
William IV, Erfurt, June 14, 1850, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 250, 252, 
258-261. 
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to represent the German Reich. He also stated that his country would 
17 
accept the Union if the Constitution were dropped. 
While Radowitz remained away from the Prussian capital, events pro-
gressed at a rapid pace. On July 14, Frederick William IV s.ent Otto von 
Manteuffel to Vienna bearing a personal Lett.er from the Prussian King to 
Emperor Francis Joseph. The King hoped that this letter, a pledge of 
Prussian friendship would conciliate the Austrians. From his conversa-
tions in the Habsburg capital, the Prussian emissary reported that Rus-
sian and Austrian objections to Radowitz and his plans were so great 
that they would refuse to negotiate seriously as long as the chief advo-
cate of the Union were allowed to keep his position. But the King, re-
fusing to harken to this advice, informed Radowitz of the failure of the 
. d k d f h B l" 18 negotiations an as e or is prompt return to er in. 
In the middle of July, Radowitz arrived in the Prussian capital to 
assume his duties as the President of the College of Princes, the execu-
tive body of the new provisional government of the League. Although 
the original agreement establishing the College of Princes had stipulated 
that the provisional government would only hold power until July 15, 
King Frederick William had extended its life indefinitely in response to 
Radowitz 1 s arguments. By the time of Radowitz's return, all states rep-
resented at the Congress of Princes except Hesse-Kassel and Mecklenburg-
Strelitz had declared their intentions to remain in the Alliance despite 
17 . 
Sydow to Radowitz, June 20, 1850, ibid., p. 262; Sybel, The 
Founding of the German Empire, I, p. 458. 
18Frederick William IV to Francis Joseph, Sanssouci, June 14, 1850, 
Otto van Manteuffel to Radowitz, Vienna, June 20, 1850, Frederick William 
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the pre~sure from Austria. The College of Princes undertook a revision 
of the election law in order to satisfy some of the ultra-conservative 
criticism of the Union. The new statute granted adult males. the right 
to vote but now required that they be self-supporting with an income of 
at least 200 thalers or 350 gulden a year. The democratic features of 
the franchise were restricted through the division of all voters into 
three classes according to taxation, wealth and profession to conform 
to the Prussian electoral law. To be elected to the House of the 
People, a candidate had to receive a majority of the upper classes much 
more power over elections and severely limited the voice of the major-
. 19 1.ty. 
On July 16, the College of Princes turned to Bernstorff's report 
and decided to outline its position in a special note to Vienna. This 
reaffirmed the obligation of every German state to work for German uni-
ification and stated that the League had showed its willingness tone-
gotiate with Austria, but the Habsburg Monarchy had insisted on unreas-
onable demands. The blame for the failure to reach agreement lay with 
Vienna and not the members of the Alliance. However, Prussia and its 
allies favored any reasonable solution to the conflict which would in-
sure the rights of the German states and at the same time pave the way 
for German unification. Once again the member states argued their right 
to form a smaller union within the German Confederation. Prussia de-
clared that it could not take part in the meeting of the Federal Diet 
called by Austria, as it would be a betrayal of its obligations to its 
allies. The College also questioned the right of one German state to 
19Neue Preussische Zeitung, July 20 and 22, 1850. 
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call the Federal Diet 'into session. In his reply, Schwarzenberg in-, 
formed the College of Princes that Austria would never recognize the 
Prussian Union and its Constitution, nor would it agree to abandon plans 
to convene the Diet of the German Confederation. That same day, the 
Danubian monarchy issued a circular to the German courts calling for the 
meeting of the Diet at Frankfurt. Naturally, Berlin rejected this in-
. . 20 v1tat1on. 
At the same time that Austrian protests were growing in strength, 
the Prussian ultra-conservatives continued to voice their criticism of 
the Plan of Union. On July 20, the~ Preussische Zeitung published 
an editorial condemning the Erfurt Parliament as a reflection of the 
Frankfurt National Assembly. The newspaper called for the complete de-
st ruction of the Revolution and all that had. connections with it. Two 
days later, the same paper published a scathing denunciation of Rado-
. 21 w1tz. 
The renewed ultraconservative criticism of the Plan of Union and 
the failure of negotiations with Vienna caused a major crisis in the 
Prussian ministry. On July 24, Manteuffel, the Minister of the Interior, 
presented a motion calling for the abandonment of the League and the 
Constitution. As compensation to the member states, he proposed that 
Prussia offer'them a protective alliance. The acceptance of this pro-
posal would mean that all the efforts of Radowitz had been in vain--that 
he had been defeated not by Austria directly but by his foes within his 
~Oibid., July 14 and 18, 1850; 11Pru~sia, II !h!, Times (London), July 
15 and 20, 1850, p. 6; Sybel, _lli Founding£!. the German Empire, I, pp. 
460-461. 
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own country. He replied to this challenge with a long memorandum stat-
ing that it would represent a moral defeat. if the Hohenzollern kingdom 
were to yield to the Habsburg demands. He claimed that by forming the 
League, Berlin had incurred an obligation both to the member states and 
to the whole German people to fight for the Plan of Union. He con-
eluded with a plea that Prussia not allow the Austrians to destroy the 
ediifice being built to replace the ineffective Confederation. On July 
26, Frederick William IV met with the ministry and informed them that 
while the differences among them woµld delay the application of the Con-
stitution, the principle upon which it stood must not be allowed to 
fail. After some debate, the ministers decided to wait for further ac-
22 
tion from Vienna before taking any dras.tic steps. 
During the sunnner of 1850, the conflict between the two German 
powers intensified, fed as it was by a series of increasingly bitter 
confrontations both within Germany and without. A serious crisis almost 
developed over the question of troop. deployment. On May 26, the Grand 
Duke of Baden had requested that some of his soldiers receive Prussian 
training. At the end of July, Vienna ordered its connnander at the 
Federal Fortress at Mainz to resist any attempt to transport troops from 
Baden to Prussia through his district. Munich lent its support to the 
Austrian protest by massing 16,700 Bavarian troops at Aschaffenburg and 
Nur(;!mberg. In a letter to the King and before a session of the ministry, 
Radowitz suggested that Berlin answer this move by the mobilizat.ion of 
the three army corps stationed at Erfurt. His enemies within the 
22sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, I, pp. 462-463; "Auf-
zeichnung zum Ministerrat am 25 Juli, Sanssouci, 13 Juli 1850," Nachgel-
assene Briefe, pp. 273-275; Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, I, 
PP• 464-465. 
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ministry were quick with their resp.o.ns.es.. General August von Socken-
hausen, the Minister of War, informed- them. .. that he could spare no troops 
at that time and advised against the mohi lization of the militia, as the 
men were needed for the upcoming harvest. Radowitz continued to urge a 
strong reply to the Austrian challenge, until finally the King inter-
vened, suggesting that both sides postpone further action on the matter 
d . . . . 23 pen 1.ng an 1.nvest1.gat1.on. Thus the Baden crisis was allowed to cool. 
But it did portend a final confront.ation that would either spell victory 
for Prussia and her allies and the end of Austrian domination over Ger-
many or a restoration of the old pre-Revolutionary system. 
During the remainder of the sunnner, international affairs were dom-
inated by a renewal of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Since there 
existed at this time no common German authority to negotiate with Den-
mark, it was impossible to reach an agreement binding upon all of Ger-
many. Acting on its own behalf, Prussia signed a treaty on July 2 giv-
ing the duchies .to .the Danish King. Several small German states innned-
iately objected that the Hohenzollern kingdom had no authority to take 
this step and that a peace with the Danes would only be negotiated 
through the auspices of the Diet of the German Confederation. This turn 
of events greatly upset Tsar Nicholas I, who desired the i~ediate end 
of all hostilities over the duchies and the destruction of all liberal 
elements therein. In an effort to persuade Austria to take action simi-
lar to that of Prussia, he sent Baron Peter von Meyendorff, his repre-
sentative in Berlin, to Bad Ischl to communicate with the Emperor. Even 
before his arrival, however, the Habsburg ruler signed an agreement with 
23 
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the Nordic kingdom similar to that signed .. b.y Berlin. Schwarzenberg in-
formed. the Tsar of his intentions to use.:the power of the Federal Diet 
to force the Germans in Holstei.n to accept,, .Danish rule. This removed 
one source of difficulty betweenAustria and Russia and paved the way 
for the Tsar, w:ho had hitherto followed .a Pji>licy of strict neutrality 
in the confLi.ct between the two German .. poIN:efS, to intervene in the Ger-
. h "d f V · 24 man question on t e si e o ienna. 
The already complex international situation was further complica-
ted by the actions of Prince Louis Napoleon, the President of France, 
w:ho saw in the dispute between the two German powers an opportunity to 
strengthen his country. Accordingly, he sent Jean de Persigny to con-
fer with Radowitz and indicate that Paris was in sympathy with the Prus ... 
sian cause, since France wanted to drive the Habsburgs from Italy. He 
further hinted that France would consider going to war on the side of· 
Prussia with the provision that his country receive either Landau or 
Savoy as compensation for the costs of war. Radowitz politely listened 
to the Frenchman and just as politely refused to consider the offer. 
Napoleon next made a similar proposal to Austria, which also rejected 
. 25 
it. 
Throughout the month of August, Radowitz continued to work for his 
program, encouraged by two very important allies, Count Brandenburg and 
William, the Prince of Prussia. At the same time, the tension between 
Austria and Prussia intensified. The Danubian monarchy persisted in its 
24Paul Wiegler, William the First, His Life and Times (New York, 
1929), p. 146; Sybel, !h! F.o.tmding. oL the .Ge"man: ~ire, I, p. 472; W .. E. 
Mosse, The European Powers and·~· German Question 1848-1871 (New York, 
1969), PP• 32-33. 
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attempt to call a meeting o.f the Federal Diet, while Prussia replied to 
the Austrian effort with a note of protest on August 5. 26 It was only a 
matter of time until the tensions would le~d to a serious dispute, the 
outcome of which would decide the fate of Germany and the Revolution of 
1848. In September, the Hesse-Kassel affair. precipitated such a crisis. 
2611Prussia and Austria," '.!..!!! Times (London), August 21, 1850, p. 6. 
CHAPTER IX 
II 
THE ROAD TO OLMUTZ 
Though Radowitz had overcome many obstacles, he and his supporters 
had not been able to disarm their most potent enemies, the Prussian 
ultra-conservatives and Austria. To be sure, the majority of the 
thirty-six German states had chosen to throw their lot with Prussia 
rather than with its Habsburg rival, the Erfurt Parliament had met and 
the Congress of Princes had accepted its recommendations. But the final 
confrontation was yet to come. Before it was concluded, Radowitz would 
see the edifice which he had so carefully built crumble into dust and 
the dreams of 1848 forgotten amid the final victory of the reaction and 
the rebirth of the old and ineffective German Confederation. 
It is ironic that the instrument for his final defeat would be 
Hesse-Kassel, the state which had expelled him twenty-seven years 
earlier. The Elector Frederick William had been trying for several 
months to force the Diet of his small st.ate to vote taxes to pay for the 
expenses of his government. When the members of this body refused to 
yield, his chief minister, Hassenpflug, attempted to collect taxes il-
legally. Confronted by the united opposition of his entire civil service 
against this violation of the constitution, the Elector fled to Frank-
furt. With his sovereign safe, Hassenpflug next tried to use the army 
to collect the taxes, but the vast majority of the officers corps re-
signed rather than violate their oaths to the constitution. Shortly 
207 
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after his arrival in Frankfurt cm Septembe.r .. 12, the Elector appealed to 
the German Diet for help in s,up.pres.s..ing_the revolt. This body voted to 
send 10,000 Hanoverian and Wllrttembergian.trc;,ops to enforce the cqllec-
1 
tion of .taxes. 
These events placed the men in Berlin in a difficult position. Some 
officials such as Count Brandenburg believed that the real reason for 
the south German intervention in Hesse was a desire to embarrass Prussia 
Radowitz, en the other hand, was alert to the strategic significance of 
this move. Since the invasion of Hesse-Kassel by pro-Austrian troops 
would endanger Prussian military reads running through the Electorate to 
the Rhine Province, he urged immediate military precautions. He sug-
gested that the King order reinforcements from Kreuznach to Wetzlar and 
dispatch a detachment of 15,000 Thuringian troops to Fulda and Eisenach 
to be in a position to march on Hersfeld. He further urged that 2,000 
men from Brunswick join the 10,000 Prussian troops at Paderborn. Fred-
erick William IV approved these actions and on September 27 named Rado-
witz Minister of Foreign Affairs as an expression of his support of Rad-
owitz and the Plan of Union. 2 
Prussia also protested the intervention in Electoral Hesse through 
a series of diplomatic notes. On September 12 and 21, Count Brandenburg 
infermed Kassel that Berlin was very distressed by the decision of the 
Elector to depart from the path of constitutional government and Cqlled 
1sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, II, p. 481; "Electorial 
Hesse," The Lendon Illustrated News, September 28, 1850, p. 254. 
2wiegler, William the First, p. 147; Radowitz to the Prince of 
Prussia, September 26, 1850, and "Privataufzeichnung von Radowitz, 27 
September 1850," Nachgelassene Briefe, p. 318. 
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upon him to return to lawful methods. The dispatches also protested 
strongly the decision of the Diet to intervene in the crisis. On the 
first day in his new position, Radowitz reinforced Brandenburg's notes 
with one of his own. Schwarzenberg r.eplied that Prussia had no right to 
interfere in the affair, since Hesse-Kassel had withdrawn from the 
League. The Prussian Foreign Minister responded that his country had no 
interest in territorial expansion at the expense of the smaller state, 
but was only concerned with protecting the security of its military 
roads. He later connnunicated to his Austrian counterpart the peaceful 
intentions of the Hohenzollern kingdom. 3 
The Prussian assurances did little to check the growing hostility 
on both sides, however. On October 11, Austria, Bavaria and WUrttemberg 
formed a defensive and offensive alliance aimed at Prussia and also 
agreed to raise an army of 200,000 men. On that same day, Prussia mo-
bilized three additional regiments. As the crisis intensified, the back-
ing given by Frederick William IV to his friend never wavered. However, 
the King did make efforts to avoid carrying things to the extremity of 
armed conflict, including a letter sent on October 9 to Emperor Francis 
Joseph expressing his desire to reach a peaceful settlement of the dif-
4 
ferences betw:een them. 
Since neither German power had a decisive preponderence over the 
3"Prussia and Electorial Hesse," The Times (London), October 3, 
1850, p. 6; Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, PP• 487-488. 
4Wiegler, William the First, p. 148; "Prussia," The Times (London), 
October 11, 1850, p. 6; Frederick William IV to Radowitz, Sanssouci, 
October 14, 1850 and Frederick William IV to Francis Joseph, Sanssouci, 
October 19, 1850, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 325-326. 
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other, the attitude of Russia w:as crucial. When the Tsar decided to 
back one side over the other, the scales. would be tipped in favor of 
that country, and the other power would have to acquiesce. Throughout 
the summer of 1850, the Romanov ruler had refus.ed to become involved in 
the conflict between Austria and Prussia be.cause of his. concern for the 
fate of Schleswig-Holstein. In this issue, the Tsar had applied great 
pressure to force the German powers to crush the revolutionaries and to 
help Denmark regain control over the Duchies. Although the Tsar was 
still unwilling to take sides in the dispute over the Union, he was. very 
concerned about Radowitz and his program, and his sympathies lay with 
the Habsburg monarchy. As early as October, 1849, General Friedrich 
Wilhelm Rauch, the Prussian Adjutant General in St. Petersburg had re-
ported that the Tsar believed that Prussia had no support from the 
other German states. The Prussian representative had also informed his 
superiors of the bitter opposition to the Erfurt Parliament within of-
ficial Russian circles. The attitude of the Romanov ruler was rein-
forced by the reports of his Minister in Berlin, Peter von Meyendorff, 
who wrote many letters to his superiors expressing his alarm at the 
power of Radowitz. In one dispatch, he called the father of the Erfurt 
Parliament the "evil genius of Prussia." In another, he registered his 
distress at Radowitz's appointment to the post of Minister of Foreign 
5 
Affairs. 
Nicholas, who had to quell a revolt upon his ascension to the 
5 
Report of Frederick William von Rauch, Gatchina and Tsarkoe Selo, 
October 27 and November 15, 1849, Hans Joachim Schoeps, ed., Neue Quel-
len zur Geschichte Preus sens im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1968), pp. 
442-446, 447-448; Meyendorff t.o Nesselrode, Berlin and Dresden, March 4 
and October 6, 1850, Meyendorff, Ein russis.cher Diplomat, pp. 265-267 •. 
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the throne in 1825, was a violent foe of any form of liberalism and be-
came quite concerned over the possible victory of the liberals in Hesse-
Kassel. He was consequen~ly very distressed to learn of Prussia's at-
titude toward the crisis and ordered Count Alexis Orlov to inform the 
Prussian Minister to St. Pet.ersburg., Count Hugo zu MUnster-Meinh8vel, 
of his alarm over the Prus.sian posture in the Hesse-Kassel crisis. Or-
lov told MUnster that the Elector had a right to summon outside military 
help from whomever he wished and that the Tsar considered the Federal 
6 
Act still in effect. 
In late October, it became known in the Prussian capital that Tsar 
Nicholas I had decided to visit Warsaw. Immediately Frederick William 
IV sent Count Brandenburg to the Polish city to deliver a message to the 
Russian monarch, stating that the Hohenzollern kingdom refused to recog-
nize the authority of the Diet in Frankfurt. The King also instructed 
Brandenburg to propose to the Tsar that the crisis be settled by a 
conference of all German states in which Prussia would be granted 
equality with Austria. Nicholas rep,Lied that he had no intention of be-
coming involved in the dispute but that he did favor the efforts of the 
Frankfurt Diet to suppress liberal elements in Holstein and would even 
be willing to go to war in its support. 7 
On October 25, Emperor Francis Joseph also arrived in Warsaw. 
Brandenburg took this opportunity to hold a series of meetings with 
Schwarzenberg, who had accompanied his sovereign. The Austrian official 
rejected at the outset the Prussian demand for equality with the 
6 
Report of MUnster, St. Petersburg, October 4, 1850, Schoeps, Neue 
Quellen, p. 453. 
7 . 
Meinecke, Radowitz, p. 474. 
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Habsburg Empire and also restated his country's position that Prussia 
had no right to become involved in Hes.se-.Kassel. Brandenburg retorted 
that it was Austria and her allies who were intervening in affairs that 
did not concern them. He informed the Austrian minister that any prob-
lems in the Electorate could be handled by local troops and that Vienna 
was really only seeking .a way to exert its powers. Finally, he was 
able to elicit from the Austrians as a basis for further negotiations a 
proposal by which the Danubian monarchy would alternate the presidency 
of the German central government with Prussia. Schwarzenberg also sug-
gested that the two powers meet in Dresden to discuss their differ-
8 
ences. 
In Berlin, events w•re developing at a rapid pace. On October 29, 
a meeting of the ministry adopted Radowitz 's suggestion to mobilize the 
Ninth Army Corps in the event of a Bavarian invasion of Hesse-Kassel. 
Three days later, after Count Brandenhurg ... had returned to the Prussian 
capital, he was informed that Austria had ordered the mobilization of 
100,000 men on the Bohemian border. On November 1, the ministry con-
vened to decide on a course of action in response to the new Austrian 
threats. Brandenburg opened the session by reconnnending that every ef-
fort should be made to continue negotiations with Vienna. Next, Rado-
witz rose to demand that the Hohenzollern kingdom order the innnediate 
activation of all troops and, if necessary, prepare for war. He based 
his plea on Schwarzenberg's hostile attitude and his belief that if the 
Danubian Monarchy and her allies were allowed to intervene in Hesse-
8Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, II, pp. 9-12; Neue 
Preussische Zeitung, November 1, 1850. 
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Kassel without active opposition, the authority of the Frankfurt Diet 
would be reestablished over Germany. Adalbert. von Ladenberg and 
August von der Heydt supported Radowitz, but Otto von Manteuffel opposed 
him and went so far as to urge that Berlin Lend its support to the Aus-
trian action. At the close of the session, Brandenburg declared that 
if the ministry decided to disregard his advice to continue parleys with 
9 
Vienna, he would resign his position. 
Almost immediately after the close of the meeting, the King and 
his ministers learned that 8,000 Bavarian troops under the command of 
Prince Maximilian, Karl of Thurn and Taxis had occupied Hanau in Hesse 
and were marching toward Gelnhausen. To counter the Bavarian action, 
Frederick William IV immediately ordered General Karl von Grtlben to 
. 10 march his troops into Electoral territory. Now it was no longer 
merely an issue of discussions and polite diplomatic notes. The decis-
ive crisis had finally arrived, and Radowitz and his fellow Prussians 
were at a crossroads. They could either continue to support the Union 
and risk almost certain war with Austria and her allies, or they could 
back down and avoid an armed conflict, losing everything that had been 
accomplished. As long as there existed a possibility that the Habsburgs 
were only bluffing, it was possible to postpone the decision on just how 
far Berlin was willing to go to see the Union take effect. But by No-
vember 1, 1850, troops were marching, and a decision had to be made. 
The Bavarian action prompted the King to call a Crown Council for 
9Meinecke, Radowitz, p. 483; "Privataufzeichnung von Radowitz," 
Nachgelassene Brie.fe, p. 344; SybeL, T.he. Founding of the German Empire, 
II, PP• 26-27. 
10 . "Prussia and Germany," and "The Entry of the Prussians into 
Hesse," The Times (London), November 6, 1850, p. 5. 
214 
that afternoon. At this meet.ing., .Br.and.enburg insisted that Prussia 
should yield to the Austrian demand.s.becau.se of the friendly attitude 
of Schwarzenberg at Warsaw and his beli.e.f. that in the event of war be-
tween Austria and Prussia, Russia would intervene on the side of Aus-
tria. Frederick William IV suggested that the Constitution of the League 
should be set aside for the moment and that the Bavarians be allow:ed to 
occupy the southern part of the Electorate, while his own troops would 
garrison the military roads in the north. He hoped that this would 
place his kingd.om in a position to play a major role in the solutian of 
the conflict~ After the King had sp.c,,ken,.Radowitz took the floor. In 
a last effort to save his work, he argued that Prussian troops should 
occupy as much of Hesse-Kassel as possible, thus giving Berlin a strong 
position from which to begin. negotiations. In answer to those who had 
expressed a fear of war, he maintained that there was an important dis-
tinction between mobilization and a declaration of war. Prince William 
supported Radowitz and urged that the Union not be sacrificed. However, 
Manteuffel stood firm in his objection that war was a certainty unless 
the Union were abandoned and the troop . .s r.ecalled. He took the position 
that his country had no right t.o become.. inv:olved in what he saw as the 
internal affairs of another German state. Finally, August von Socken-
hausen, the Minister of War, maintained that,the general mobilization 
demanded by Radowitz would almost inevitably lead to war. He also re-
ported that such an undertaking would cost seventeen million thalers. 
With the issue still undecided, the session closed. By this time, Aus-
tria had assembled 150,000 of her own troops and another 50,000 from 
11 
Bavaria and WUrttemberg at Bregenz. 
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The next day, Radowitz lost the suppo.rt of Frederick William IV, 
who had long entertained doubts about continuing down the path which his 
friend had led him. With troops in the field, it was no longer a matter 
of lendi.ng moral support to his friend as he.had done earlier. He ei-
ther had to give up the whole idea or be willing to lead his people into 
what could become a major war. Frederick Willi am was no Frederick the 
Great; he was incapable of making such a fateful decision. 
The ministry met at Bellevue Palace at 10:00 A.M. on November 2. 
After a few opening remarks on the dangers facing his kingdom, the King 
led his ministers into an adjoining room and left them to discuss the 
problem. Brandenburg continued to favor the withdrawal of the troops 
and a continuation of the negotiations begun at Warsaw. Faithful to 
his cause until the end, Radowitz refused to budge from his position of 
the day before. When the vote finally took place, only those men who 
had supported him the; previous day sided with the aggressive policy of 
Radowitz. The majority opposed hint. The ministry recommended to their 
monarch that all forward movement by Prussian troops in Hesse-Kassel 
be suspended and that a note be sent to Austria requesting postponement 
of all preparations for war. Faced with this decision, the King yielded 
to the advice of the majority of his ministers. But at the same time, 
he issued a statement in support of his friend and a warning that the 
ministry alone would be responsible for any criticism that would arise 
11Meinecke, Radowitz, PP• 487-490; Neue Preussische Zeitung, No-
vember 2, 1850. 
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f h . . d 12 rom t eir JU gment. Thus Radowitz had been deserted by both his 
fellow ministers and his King, who refused to take a stand qn the is-
sue. 
His program rejected by the ministry, the man who had fought so 
long for his cause sent his ruler a letter of resignation innnediately 
thereafter. He left the scene of his defeat on November 6 to join his 
family at Erfurt. Though the King thanked him for his faithful service 
and expressed regret at the outcome of events, it was clear that Rado-
witz would no longer enjoy influence at Berlin. On the day of Radowitz 1 s 
departure, Count Brandenburg died, and the monarch named Otto von Man-
teuffel his new Minister President. 13 
Although the King had appointed Radowitz 1 s chief critic his new 
Minister President, he had no completely rejected the Plan of Union. 
Throughout the next month, Frederick William IV would vacillate between 
support for the Union and acquiescence the Austrian demands. He first 
attempted to save the Union by an alliance with Great Britain. He in-
formed Radowitz that he was sending him to England on the pretext of 
studying new developments in artillery and the building of iron bridges. 
While there, Radowitz was to sound out the attitude of the British 
toward a possible alliance. Seeing in the proposal the chance to regain 
Prussian honor and perhaps even save the Union, Radowitz innnediately 
agreed. Before approaching the British Government, Radowitz was in-
structed to find out its attitude toward German affairs through 
1211Privataufzeichnung v.on Radowit.z, 11 Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 344-
345; Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, II, p. 36. 
13Radowitz to Frederick William IV, November 2, 1850, Nachgelassene 
Brief e, p. 342; Meinecke, Radowitz, pp. 499-501; "Prussia," The Times 
(London), November 11, 1850, p. 3. 
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discussions with the Prussian Minister to the Court of St. James, Baron 
Christian von Bunsen. Radowitz believed.that the British would be sus-
ceptible to a warning that if Aust.ria won the struggle over Hesse-Kassel, 
Russian hegemony over Germany would become .. a possibility. He also pro-
' 
posed to hint to the British that an Austrian victory would open the 
way for French interference in German affairs. 14 Thus there was at 
least a slim possibility that he could save all the work of the last 
several years. 
In the meantime, the Hessian crisis remained unresolved. General 
GrHben, finding himself face t.o face with the Prince of Thurn and Taxis 
and his men, suggested to his counterpart on the other side that a line 
of demarcation be drawn between Prus.sian-occupied territory and that to 
be held by the southern troops. ThePrince connnunicated this proposal 
to the Austrian Minister to the Diet in Frankfurt, Count Leo Thun. Af-
ter some discussion, the Diet voted to order the Prince to continue the 
occupation of all Prussian troops. The news of these demands caused 
Frederick William IV to order his army to prepare for war. At a meeting 
of the Ministry on November 20, he announced his decision to avoid any 
attempts at alliance with the French, who had been massing troops on the 
border. The next day the King. de_Livered his address from the throne at 
the opening of the Prussian Diet. This speech was couched in very 
strong terms, and some interpreted it as a challenge for war. The Aus-
trian Minister to Berlin, Prokesch, responded with a note pledging the 
14Frederick William IV to Radowitz, Sanssouci and Bellevue, Novem-
ber 9 and 12, 1850; Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Erfurt, November. 
10 and 13, 1850, Nachgelassene Briefe, pp. 354-357. 
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protection of the Prussian military roads running through the Elector-
15 
ate. 
This turn of events and the apparent inclination of Frederick Wil--
liazn toward a warlike policy finally led the Russian Tsar to intervene 
openly in the conflict. He instructed Baron Andreas von Budenberg, the 
Prussian Ambassador in Berlin, to inform Frederick Williazn IV that the 
Tsar had ordered the mobilization of the Cossacks for war in support of 
Austria if events should prove .s.uch a step,.:necessary. On November 23, 
the Prussian ministry met to discuss the is~ue. As usual, Manteuffel 
urged reconcilliation with the Danubian monarchy and received the sup• 
port of Stockhausen and Simon. Ladenberg., whose resignation in support 
of Radowitz had been rejected, favored a more aggressive posture arguing 
that since Prussia had already lost face over the Erfurt Constitution 
and the Plan of Union, it should not suffer further humiliation on the 
matter of the military roads. Because the ministry was unable to reach 
16 
an agreement, they decided to continue discussions with the King, 
While talks continued in Berlin, the Habsburgs decided to force 
the matter to a conclusion. On November 27, _Austria and her allies or-
dered the Prince of Thurn and Taxis to march to Kassel and if necessary 
engage the Prussian troops if they blocked his way. Two days before 
the march, Prokesch delivered a demand that Prussia evacuate the Elec-
torat~ by noon on the day of the planned movement. Manteuffel innnedi-
ately transmitted this information to the King at Potsdam. Frederick 
1511The Intervention in Hesse," The Times (London), November 11, 
1850, p. 3; Sybel, The Founding of~ Ge:i:man Empire, II, PP• 59-60; 
16 
Sybel, The Founding of _ili German Empire, II, PP• 59-60. 
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William IV once again lost his courage and instructed his minister to 
telegraph Vienna that he was being sent to meet Schwarzenberg with a 
"friendly message." At a meeting of the ministry that day, the King or-
dered Manteuffel to coIIDilunicate to the Austrian official that Prussia 
would consider no further concessions. He also proposed that a solution 
to the Hessian affair be reached at a general European congress. The 
Prussian Minister President was to attempt to persuade Schwarzenberg to 
agree to the withdrawal of all non-Hessian troops from the Electorate 
and gain Austrian acceptance to the p.oints brought up in his meeting 
"hhT ·w l7 wit t e sar in arsaw. 
Before these proposals could go into effect, the Prussian ministry 
received a telegram from Vienna stating that Schwarzenberg would agree 
to meet with Manteuffel as soon as he received confirmation of the Prus-
sian decision to withdraw from Hesse-Kassel. At this same time, Gr8ben 
reported that the southern troops were advancing on his position. These 
new events prompted the King to call another meeting of the ministry. 
It was here decided that Manteuffel should go to the proposed meeting 
bearing personal letters from Frederick William to Emperor Francis Jo-
seph and from the Queen to Archduchess Sophie, her sister and the mother 
of the Emperor. The King hoped that Schwarzenberg would not refuse to 
meet with a person carrying private correspondence to the Imperial fam-
ily. That evening Bernstorff was told to inform the Austrian ministry 
that the Prussian representative was on his way to OlmUtz, in eastern 
Bohemia. An hour later, Berlin received confirmation that the choice 
17Ibid., 61 64 
.L PP• - • 
18 
of the city was acceptable and the meeting would take place. 
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At OlmUtz, on November 29, Manteuffel and Schwarzenberg reached an 
agreement that the Hesse-Kassel crisis would be solved peacefully by 
joint Austro-Prussian action. The Prussian minister agreed that his 
government would permit passage by the southern troops through the area 
occupied by Grtlben. As an assurance of Austrian good intentions, the 
north German power would be allowed to station one battalion in the 
Electorate. They also agreed that the German question would be solved 
. 19 
at a conference to be held at Dresden in December. Thus a war between 
the two German powers was averted. 
Some historians have labeled the agreement at OlmUtz a "humilia-
tion,1120 but such a designation is not justified by the facts. It is 
true that Prussia agreed not to put the Union and its constitution into 
effect, but that decision had already been made on November 2 with the 
repudiation of the Radowitz plan by the Prussian ministry. After that 
date, the Hohenzollern kingdom was interested merely in protecting its 
roads and maintaining its honor. At OlmUtz, both conditions were met. 
Austria recognized the right of Prussia to remain in the Electorate and 
to garrison the roads. In so doing, the Habsburg Empire had backed down 
from its earlier demand that Prussia evacuate the area completely and 
provided an avenue of honorable withdrawal for the north German power. 
The so-called "humiliation" of OlmUtz was in reality a compromise be-
tween two opposing sides. If a "humiliation" had occurred, it was in 
18Ib1°d., 64 67 pp. - • 
19 
"German States," The Illustrated London News, December 14, 1850, 
p. 446. 
20 
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Berlin on November 2, not at OlmUtz. 
Contemp.orary opinion did not inte.qu:..et the OlmUtz convention as a 
Prussian defe.at. For ex.amp.le, D.uke Ernest II of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, a 
dedicated champion of unification, considered the treaty a victory for 
Prussia because it meant that the German question would be submitted to 
the conference at Dresden. The Duke believe~ that this would give him 
an opportunity to gain recognition for the Prussian Union and its con-
stitution. He even approached eighteen .fellow rulers to persuade them 
to come to Dresden prepared to fight for the League. In his optimism he 
was not alone, for his brother, Prince Albert, the husband of Queen 
Victoria, wrote him a letter expressing hop.e. that at last Austria would 
be forced to recognize the necessity of reform and the establishment of 
21 
a unified Germany. 
Moreover, if OlmUtz had represented a total defeat for Prussian 
p.o licy, Radowitz I s plan for a "wider and narrower union" would have been 
abandoned. This was not the case. For when the representatives of the 
states gathered in Dresden on Decemb.er J, 1850, Manteuffel himself re-
vived this proposal: Prussia would ag.re.e .. to the admission of all the 
Habsburg lands to the German C.onfederatio.n. in return for Austrian recog-
nition of the right of Prussia to form its own north German union, But 
Austria refused to accept the principle, and all attempts at compromise 
proved in vain. The Conference finally adjourned on May 15, 1851, after 
agreeing to the restoration of the German Confederation in its pre-
revolutionary form. It was at Dresden that Prussian policy foundered, 
22 
not at OlmUtz. 
21 
Ernest II, Aus meinem Leben, pp. 217-218. 
22Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, II, pp. 924-929. 
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It was not unti.l ye.ars Late.r when ... the .. coµservatives under Bismarck 
had united Germany and felt a need to dis.cred..it Radowitz and his efforts 
that the term !!humiliation" was app.Li.e(L..to .. 0.l)ll.ijtz. Though Bismarck con-
demned Radowitz at the time and argued.for an agreement with Austria, he 
made no referenc.e t.o the Treaty as a nhumiliation." If the defeat of 
Radowitz I s program led. to a d.isillus.io.nment: of German liberals, this oc-
curred as a result of the Conference of Dresd.en and the reinstitution of 
23 
the German Confederation, not the Agreement at OlmUtz. 
I.n the meantime, Radowitz had arr.iv.ed ... in London on.November, 24. 
His hopes for gaining British support were not without foundation, for 
Prince Albert was in sympathy with his designs. On July 24, 1849, the 
Prince had written Prince William of Prussia to express his "delight" at 
the success of the Prussian Union and to emphasize his hopes that Fred-
erick William IV would fight for its success. He also condemned in very 
strong terms the enemies of the League. In the sunnner of 1850, when 
Austrian protests against theUnion and its constitution were at their 
height, he had written William again to urge Berlin to stand behind the 
Erfurt Constitution and not allow t.he Austrian threats to cause its 
24 
abandonment. 
Albert was not alone in his pro-Prussian sympathies. At the height 
of the Hesse-Kassel crisis, Queen Victoria had proposed to her Foreign 
Secretary, Viscount Henry Palmerston, that since England had supported 
23 . 
"Ueber die deut.sche Frage.: Rede g.ehalten am 3. December 1850," 
Bismarck~ _Reden, I, pp• 50-58. 
24Prince Albert to Prince William of Prussia, Osborne, July 24, 
1849 and August 20, 1850, Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Victoria, 
Letters of the Prince Consort 1831.,,,1861, ed. by Kurt Jagow, trans. by 
E.T.S. Dugdale (New York, 1938~p-:--is0-151, 163-165. 
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constitutionalism in Italy, it should throw its weight behind Prussia in 
its advocacy of .a constitutional rearg.anizatiop of Germany. But Palmer-
ston was cautious; though he sup..p.o.rted Pruasia, he did not cansider ac-
tive intervention to be in the best interests of England. As if he knew 
that Radowitz would later propose an alliance between the two nations, 
the Foreign Secretary wrote Earl Russell, the Prime Minister, that such 
an alliance would require the consent of Parliament, which he did not 
25 
think would be given. 
So when Radowitz arrived in England, he found a friendly but cau-
tious receptian. He traveled to Windsar ta confer with Prince Albert, 
who informed the Prussian emissary that in order to discuss an alliance 
between the two countries he wauld have to meet with the ministry. He 
expressed considerable doubt that it would accept the proposal. Before 
leaving the castle, Radowitz also had an audience with the Queen. Rado-
witz told her that Prussia must take the lead and redeem the pledges 
given in 1848; unless this were done, the popular dissatisfaction might 
lead ta further troubles which could mean the fall of several German 
rulers. Victoria agreed with Radowitz, though she realized that because 
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In short, no alliance was possible. On December 1, Albert wrote 
Frederick William. IV to soften the blow. He ~xp lained that such an im-
portant matter as an alliance between.the.two countries must be handled 
by the ministry; an effort on. hi.s p.art in favor of such: a proposal would 
be a violation of his constitutional po.s.ition. The. Prince, expressed 
his hope however that Prussia would become. the .. champion of constitutional 
forms in Germany and by this method win .th~z:al support of the German 
people, Radowitz himself reported. to .hi.s Kit1,g that the British Foreign 
Secretary favored Prussian interests and in ,the event of a war between 
Prussia and Austria would tend to side with Berlin. But all these at-
tractive possibilities were nullified when news of the agreement of 
OlmUtz arrived in London. Deeply di.sappointed, Radowitz wrote his wife 
that it would perhaps be better for king and country if he were to re-
main in voluntary exile in Engl.and until things cooled off. Neverthe-. 
27 
less, he returned to his family .. at Erfurt on January 28, 1851. 
After the failure of the Prussian Union and the resurrection of the 
German Confederation in 1851, Radowitz faded from the scene just as 
swiftly as he had emerged. He r.emained. i.nt.e.rested in German politics, 
but never again played an active role, confini.n~ his activities to draft-
ing occasional letters to Frederick William IV. After he completed his 
collected writings, the King appointed him General Inspector for Mili-
tary Preparedness. In this sinecure, Radowitz occupied himself for a 
year until his health finally broke in the summer of 1853. Anticipating 
27 
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imminent death, Radowitz traveled with hi.s son to the Harz Mountains to 
fulfi 11 a wish to see his birthpl.ace once mo.re before his death. After 
his return to Berlin, the pain of his arthritis and its complications 
became so great that he was forced to spend his few remaining days in 
bed. On December 24, he spoke with his devoted wife about his plans to 
write a book concerning the poetry of marriage, which he intended to 
dedicate to her~ On the next day, as the res.t of Germany was celebrat-
ing Christmas, Radowitz died at the age of fifty-six. The funeral was 
held in the Berlin Garrison Church. In tears, Frederick William IV 
paused at the coffin to embrace hi$ departed friend's two youngest sons. 
28 
Radowitz was buried at Erfurt, the site of his greatest triumph. 
The reasons for Radowitz 1 s defeat are complex. However, the single 
most important factor in his failure was the strong opposition he faced 
within his own country. Such men as Manteuffel, the Gerlach brothers, 
Bismarck, and in the end, Brandenburg refused to support his plans. One 
reason for this was the suspicion with which he was viewed by the 
Junkers. Despite his friendship with the King and his marriage to the 
Countess Voss, they still considered him a foreigner. He could not trace 
his ancestry back to Prussian origins: his forebears were not even Ger-
' 
man. Another factor that made him seem alien to the Junkers was his re-
ligion. Prussia and its ruling classes had strong Protestant traditions 
and looked upon Radowitz, a devout Roman Catholic, with deep distrust. 
Some even wondered if he were not really an agent of the Pope. 
This suspicion had even deeper roots. The Junkers had lived on 
their estates for centuries and had a fear of anything that might 
28Meinecke, Radowitz, pp• 524-547; Radowitz (son), Aufzeichnungen 
und Erinnerungen, pp. 5-10. 
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threaten their p.os.itio.n. They considerecL anything non-Prussian to be 
inferior and a possible source of corrup.ti.o,µ. The unification of the 
Hohenzollern Kingd.om with other Ge:anan ... s.ta:t;es could open the way for a 
breakdown of the sense of d.i.scipline .so important to this class. Rado-
witz, as the champion of German unification, was advancing ideas con-
sidered dangerous by Prussian ".reactionaries. 
Because of their reactionary attitude, the Junkers violently op-
posed the Revolution and anything that had any association with it, 
Radowitz had freely participated in the symbol of the Revolution, the 
Frankfurt National Assembly, and as such, the,y considered him a "fellow 
traveler!' with the liberals. He also supported constitutional govern-
ment for Prussia and other st.ates. This increased his revolutionary 
taint and caused the reactionaries to consider him a dangerous subver-
sive. 
The opposition of the Junker class to Radowitz and his ideas was 
complicated by the weakness of Frederick William IV. The King had en-
couraged his friend to form the .Union, but when effective leadership was 
needed, the King was unable to take the necessary action, He was will-
ing to go along with the wishes of the.ministry out of his own inability 
to reach a decision, not out of agreement with their position. When he 
regained his courage and sent Radowitz to London, events had progressed 
at such a pace that it was impossible to make up for lost time~ 
Another important reason for the failure of the Prussian Union and 
its designer was the attitude of Russia. Tsar Nicholas I was dedicated 
to the suppression of the revolution. Once again, the association of 
Radowitz with the Frankfurt National Assembly and constitutional forms 
of govermnent made him suspect. In addition to these factors, the 
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posture assumed by the father of the Union toward the crisis over Hesse-
Kassel intensifi~d the Tsar' s. do.ubts co.ncerning the Prussian leader~ 
Schwarzenberg had posed as the champ.ion of the restoration of the old 
order, a rest.oration which was endangered by the Prussian Union and the 
protests of the Hohenzollern kingdom against the unconstitutional ac-
tions of the Elector of Hesse-Kassel. This caused the Tsar to side with 
Austria. 
On the other hand, Radowitz was na ma.re popular with the democratic 
and, __ liberal factions. Oddly enough, many of them viewed the father of 
the Erfurt Parliament as the exact apposite of the dangerous subversive 
feared by the Junkers. Thus, he was unable ta appeal to the peopte for 
support when the ministry turned against him. Even if this had been 
possible, his political principles would have prevented him from taking 
such a step. Radawitz was na democrat; in reality he was a political 
moderate who avoided association with either extreme. 
Radawitz 1 s personality played a major role in his career. Though 
a romantic, he could be coldly practical. His letters are full of deep~ 
ly analytical interpretations of events, and he often spent so much time 
studying the situation that.he was incapable of the quick action neces-
sary to put his plans in force. Postponing decisive action in the sum-
mer af 1849, when his foes were too weak to resist him, he preferred to 
wait in order to take the most practical course possible. Yet, he was 
nonetheless dedicated to his cause. Even though grief-striken by his 
daughter's death and his wife's illness in 1850, he returned to Berlin 
to continue his work. 
Whether his first loyalty was to Germany or to Prussia is a com-
plex question. He was a strong supporter of the Prussian King and 
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wanted· to see him the leader of Germany, but he was also dedicated to 
Germany. He worked long and hard in 1840 to prepare Germany for any 
possible· Erench attack and later for German unification. His plan of 
union did not call for the annexation of the rest of Germany by the 
Hohenzollern Kingdom, but attempted a genuine federation, which would 
allow the other German states to take .their rightful place in the new 
nation. At all times during .hi.s · s.tru~,e, he rema:~ned loyal to his 
adopted land, but he was also concerned with the rest of Germ.any. In 
reality, it is impossible to separate the devotion held by Radowitz to 
Prussia from that toward Germ.any as a whole, because he himself never 
made any serious distinction between the two. To him the interests of 
the Hohenzollern kingdom were bound up with those of Germ.any, and since 
Prussia was the· leading German power, he believed that the interests of 
the other German states were tied to those· of the north Germ.an kingdom.· 
He dismissed Austria from a leading role in Germ.any because it had de-
cided to link its fortunes with those of non-Germ.an peoples. The ma-
jority of those living under the rule of Berlin were Germ.an: the same 
could not .be said about those living under the rule of Vienna. 
Although Radowitz I s life ended in app.arent failure, such was not 
really the case. Practically everything that he had ~ought to achieve 
eventually materialized. Even Leopold von Gerlach, one of his most ded-
icated foes, finally realized that Radowitz had at least been partially 
29 
right. Radowitz believed that Germany needed unity to assume a role 
in the modern world and that Germany's link with the Danubian monarchy 
291eopold vo.n Gerlach to his brother Ludwig, Berlin, December 3, 
1858, Von der Revolution ~ Norddeutschen Bund, II, p. 965. 
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hindered this unification. Both these ideas culminated in the proclama-
tion of the new German Empi.re by William I on January 18, 1871. Emperor 
William, the man who as Prince of Prussia had supported Radowitz in the 
struggle of 1850, wast? rule over a. state w:ith a structure very similar 
to that proposed by the father of the Erfurt Parliament. Ironically, 
this Empire was the creation of the very element in Prussia that had 
considered Radowitz such a dangerous person. Since such men adopted 
much of the thinking of Radowitz to achieve the unification of Germany, 
his goals and ideas did not fail. Indeed, they lived after him and in 
the end prevailed over.the doubts of the sceptics. 
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